

Conclusion

Semantics with an Edifying Intent: Recognition and Recollection on the Way to the Age of Trust

I. Edifying Semantics

The main task of this concluding chapter is to summarize the philosophical view I take Hegel to bring us to by the end of the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, after we have been educated by traversing the path he rehearses for us. I express that view in my preferred terminology rather than his, and ignore other things he thinks that seem to me extraneous to and potentially distracting from his central philosophical contribution. Hegel has views about practically everything. But the story I have told here is focused on one central, core topic: the nature of discursive activity and the sort of conceptual contentfulness things show up as having in virtue of their involvement with that kind of activity. As I read him, everything else he addresses should be understood to stand downstream in the order of explanation from his pragmatist semantic insights.

This telling of Hegel's story revolves around three master ideas. First, on the semantic side, is a nonpsychological understanding of conceptual contentfulness in terms of *determinate negation*. Second, on the pragmatic side, is a social understanding of normativity in terms of *mutual recognition*. Third, articulating his pragmatism, is a historical understanding of the relations between conceptual content and implicitly normative discursive practices in terms of an *expressive process of recollection*. Each of these ideas

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comprises a number of subsidiary ones, and has an intricate fine structure relating them. The model of expression as recollection—the story about what one must *do* to count as thereby making explicit something that was implicit—is in many ways the keystone of the edifice. It explains the representational semantic and cognitive relation between how things appear “for consciousness” on the subjective side of thought and how things really are “in themselves” on the objective side of being. It explains the constitutive reciprocal relations between normative attitudes and normative statuses: how attitudes both institute norms and answer to them. And it explains the relations between those two stories: how normative practices bring about semantic relations. (In Hegel’s terms, explaining how cognition presupposes recognition is explaining how consciousness presupposes self-consciousness.) Conceptual idealism is a kind of pragmatism, in virtue of the way what one is practically *doing* in recollecting (producing a retrospective recollective rational reconstruction of a course of experience as expressively progressive) is the basis for an expressive semantic account of relations of representation.

Hegel thinks that once we properly understand in his recollective terms the process of experience that both determines and expresses conceptual contents, we will explicitly acknowledge practical commitments concerning how we ought to treat one another that we will see as having been implicit in our discursive activity all along. Exercising the discursive capacities to think determinate thoughts (to take the objective world to be one way rather than another) and to formulate definite intentions (commitments to make the objective world be one way rather than another) commits knowing and acting subjects to adopting definite kinds of recognitive attitudes to each other, and so to instituting a special kind of recognitive community. Heightening our specifically semantic self-consciousness is the road to practical self-improvement. Hegel’s astonishing aspiration is for a morally *edifying* semantics. The truth shall set us free, and guide us to a new age of *Geist* whose normative structure is as much an improvement over the modern as the modern was over the traditional. It is a pragmatist semantic truth: an understanding of what is required for the determinate contentfulness of concepts.

The path that leads from cognition to recognition goes through the pragmatist idea that the *content* of concepts is properly intelligible only in a larger explanatory context that includes the *use* of those concepts: the practices of

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applying them in judgment and practical agency that must also be intelligible as *instituting* the norms that govern such applications. Bimodal hylo-morphic conceptual realism understands conceptual content as coming in two forms: the subjective, deontic normative form of thoughts and the objective, alethic modal form of facts. Objective idealism asserts the reciprocal sense-dependence of those two different forms. Conceptual idealism explains the intimate relations between the two forms of conceptual content (the representational dimension of semantics) in terms of what subjects *do* in recollectively retrospectively rationally reconstructing their experience into the form of expressively progressive cumulative revelations *for consciousness* of how things really are, *in themselves*. The momentous transformation from modernity to the postmodern age of trust will take place when we give our practical, norm-instituting recognitive attitudes this magnanimous recollective shape. Recognition as recollection is forgiveness. The process and practice of recollection and the distinctive kind of rationality it embodies, which emerge from the investigation of what it means for conceptual content to be determinate, are the basis of the recognitive relations, and hence the normative structure, characteristic of the heralded, nascent third form of *Geist*.

I begin rehearsing the story that has this edifying punchline by introducing the topic of *Geist*, the sense in which it has a large-scale metaphysical history, and the idea of a recollective phenomenology rehearsing that history. As we have seen, the modern stage in the development of *Geist* suffers from the metaphysical defect he calls “alienation” [Entfremdung]. I consider four contemporary philosophical issues that are recognizably symptoms of alienation, when it is understood as I recommend. I then explain the two main claims that Hegel makes in his *Preface*. They are both focused on truth. Like most prefaces, it was written after the body of the work was completed, and so serves in many ways as *his* conclusion. The first of the core claims of the *Preface* is his account of the experience of error as the way of truth, epitomized in his memorable dictum that “truth is a vast Bacchanalian revel, with not a soul sober.” The second is the doctrine that “everything turns on grasping and expressing the True not only as Substance, but equally as Subject.” Along the way I rehearse some of the lessons we have learned about normativity, and pull together a number of threads under the heading of Hegel’s logical, metaphysical, and semantic holism.

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I close by considering more closely the morally edifying, practically uplifting lesson we are supposed to learn from the extended investigation of the relations between conceptual content and the use of concepts in cognition and intentional action. *Recollection* has emerged as the core of the pragmatist semantic story Hegel tells. The pragmatism of that story consists in the way conceptual content is understood functionally, in terms of the role it plays in implicitly norm-governed discursive practices. Hegel's normative pragmatics understands the relations between normative attitudes and normative statuses according to the model of mutual recognition. When norm-instituting, content-conferring recognitive social practices are explicitly and self-consciously given the historical form of recollection, the result is a distinctive kind of recognitive community, a distinctive kind of normativity, and a distinctive kind of intentional agency relating the community, the norms, and the self-conscious individual community members who adopt those recollective recognitive practical attitudes toward one another. Recognition that includes commitment to the magnanimous recollective rationalization of norms reaches *sittlich*, unalienated practical acknowledgment of the authority of norms over attitudes, which are applications of those norms, and combines it with the acknowledgment of the authority of instituting attitudes over instituted norms that is the characteristic insight of modernity. The heroic, postmodern, magnanimous form of self-conscious intentional agency that is governed by norms instituted by the recollective recognitive attitudes of forgiveness and confession is the practical ideal projected by Hegel's semantic theory.

II. *Geist*, Modernity, and Alienation

In order to write the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Hegel had first to come up with its topic: *Geist*. There is clearly a sense in which no one had ever thought about this topic before he did. Yet it is part of his argument that everyone had been thinking about it all along. Further, he had to explain how the distinctive kind of invention and discovery, at once a making and a finding, that he was engaged in with the concept of *Geist*, is a basic feature of concept-use as such. The idea of a "phenomenology" of *Geist* is the idea that rehearsing the right sort of survey of the ways in which *Geist* has shown up

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to us (which is to itself) will reveal what it has in fact always been. Such a phenomenology is a retrospective recollective narrative that makes explicit a noumenal reality found to be already implicit in its various phenomenal appearances, which are what we have made of it, the way it has appeared to us.

Hegel's conception of *Geist* is what he makes of Kant's revolutionary insight into the fundamentally *normative* character of discursive intentionality. That is the idea (so often invoked in these pages) that what distinguishes judgments and intentional doings from the performances of merely natural creatures is that they are things their subjects are in a distinctive sense *responsible* for, as exercises of their *authority*. They express *commitments* of knowers and agents, whose *entitlement* to those commitments is always potentially at issue. Indeed, knowers and agents count as *rational* subjects just insofar as assessment of their entitlement to doxastic and practical commitments depends on the *reasons* they have for those judgments and intentions.

Hegel synthesizes Kant's normative understanding of mindedness with his reading of Enlightenment traditions of thought about the nature of normativity to yield a naturalized social account of norms. On his account, *normative* statuses are *social* statuses. He takes them to be products of the practices of those who attribute and are governed by and assessed according to those norms. In particular, he understands normative *statuses* of authority and responsibility as instituted by normative *attitudes*. The social structure of the constellation of what he calls "recognitive" attitudes determines the metaphysical structure of the resulting forms of normativity. What such a constellation of practical attitudes institutes is at once recognitive communities ("social substance") and the self-conscious individual normative selves, which are the subjects of normative statuses just insofar as they are members of such communities constituted by their attitudes. What is brought into existence in this way is what Hegel calls "Geist." *Geist* comprises all our normative doings, and everything they make possible: all the norms and recognitive attitudes and their subjects ("subjective Geist"), the practices they engage in and the communities and institutions they produce ("objective Geist"). *Geist* is us described in a normative vocabulary.

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A metaphysics of *Geist* is such a vocabulary. Hegel's preferred vocabulary for discussing things on the normative side of subjects begins by distinguishing what things are *in themselves* from what they are *for* (a) *consciousness*. I have rendered this application of the reality / appearance distinction in terms of the distinction between normative *statuses* and normative *attitudes*. The two principal normative statuses for Hegel are *independence* and *dependence*. I have rendered these as *authority* and *responsibility*. The two principal normative attitudes for Hegel are what something is *for itself*, and what it is *for another*. I have rendered this basic distinction of social perspective as that between *acknowledging* a commitment (responsibility), or claiming authority for oneself, and *attributing* responsibility or authority to another. The subjects of these normative statuses and attitudes are individual self-conscious selves, who are *particular* desiring biological creatures, who become self-conscious *individual* selves in virtue of being members of a recognitive community—that is, falling under a Hegelian *universal*. (In general, as Hegel uses these logical terms, individuals are particulars as characterized by universals.) All the terms structuring the metaphysical vocabulary Hegel uses to discuss *Geist*, on the side of knowing and acting subjects—"in itself" / "for consciousness," "independence" / "dependence," and "particular" / "universal" / "individual"—have corresponding uses on the objective side of natural objects known and acted upon. That this is so is an essential element of Hegel's idealism. How and why the concepts articulating the metaphysics of normativity also apply to objective nature is what that idealism proposes to teach us.

In spite of these basic metaphysical concepts being amphibious between the subjective and objective poles of the intentional nexus, one of Hegel's most basic claims is that normative, *geistig* things are structurally different from natural ones. For they have *histories* rather than *natures*. To say that something has a history in this special sense is to say that it is subject to a special kind of self-constitutive developmental process. It doesn't just *change*, it *changes itself*. The paradigmatic case is individual selves, the subjects of normative statuses and attitudes. As such subjects, they are not only something *in themselves* (their normative statuses); they are something *for themselves* (their normative attitudes). The normative attitudes are the commitments (responsibilities) and entitlements (authority)—that is, the normative statuses—

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they in practice *take* (acknowledge or claim) themselves to have. As having such attitudes, individual normative subjects are *self-conscious*, just in the sense of being something *for* themselves.

One of Hegel's big ideas is that what self-conscious subjects are *in* themselves essentially depends on what they are *for* themselves. For he takes it that normative statuses are instituted by normative attitudes of reciprocal recognition. Such statuses, what one is *in* oneself, are the product of what one is *for* others and what one is *for* oneself—what one is recognized as by those one recognizes. And what one is *for* *them* depends on what one is *for* *oneself*. Paradigmatically, what one is held responsible for depends on what responsibilities one acknowledges. So any subject's statuses depend on its attitudes: what others are for it (whom it recognizes) and what it is for itself. It by no means follows that a subject simply is whatever it takes itself to be. The recognitive metaphysics of normativity is a social metaphysics. The recognitive attitudes of others make just as important and essential a contribution to constituting normative statuses as the subject's own recognitive attitudes: the statuses it attributes to itself and to others.

Because subjects of normative statuses are essentially self-conscious in the sense that what they are *in* themselves depends upon what they are *for* themselves, they are subjects of a distinctive kind of self-constitutive developmental process. For if their attitudes change, so do their statuses. Changing what they are *for* themselves (or, indeed, what others are for them, the commitments and entitlements they attribute as well as those they acknowledge or claim—for instance, whom they recognize) can change what they are *in* themselves. That change in what they are in themselves, their statuses, can produce in turn a change in what they are for themselves or for others—resulting in a further change in what they are in themselves. *Geistig* items, which are what they are as the ever-changing products of such a cascade of interdigitated changes of attitude and status, can be understood only *historically*—that is, by recounting a narrative recollecting or reconstructing the history of their development. To understand them, one must tell a story about how they got to be what they are.

This is true not only of essentially self-conscious individual selves, who are subjects of normative attitudes and statuses. This historical character is inherited by other *geistig* items. Particular electrons and animals, as natural, can have *pasts*. This individual electron was bound first in this atom, then in

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that one. This individual animal first flourished in that environment, and then struggled in this one. But the *concepts* electron and species, as normative, *geistig* things, have *histories*. For the contents of those concepts, what they are in themselves, depends on the practical attitudes manifested in actual applications of those concepts—what they are for their users. As the applications change, so too do the contents expressed. Those conceptual contents determine what one has endorsed, committed oneself to, or made oneself responsible for in judging. They are what one has invested one's cognitive authority in. They determine the normative statuses one acknowledges or attributes in using or applying those concepts—that is, in adopting the discursive attitudes that both shape and reveal (make and find) those contents.

It is a consequence of the fact that all of its components are in this sense historical entities that the whole constellation of normative subjects and their attitudes, statuses, practices, communities, and institutions that is *Geist* must itself have a history. One of Hegel's master ideas is that in addition to what follows from the historicity of the smaller normative items it comprises, the structure of *Geist* as a whole undergoes large-scale historical transformations. In particular, he thinks that the biggest, most momentous event in human history—simply the single most important thing that ever happened to us—is a vast change in the most basic structure of normativity. This is the transition from the traditional form of *Geist* to its modern form. This titanic sea change affects every aspect of the normative realm: the self-conscious normative selves or subjects themselves, the norms they are governed by (both in the sense of being guided by and in the sense of being assessed according to), their understanding of and attitudes toward those norms, and the practices, institutions, and communities articulated by those norms. All the canonical philosophers from Descartes through Kant were centrally engaged in developing the modern understanding of discursive normativity in its theoretical and practical forms. But Hegel was the first to take modernity in all its multifarious aspects—intellectual, political, economic, institutional, and psychological—as a single phenomenon, a single topic of research. What unifies it, on his account, is the way the structure of normativity it articulates differs from the traditional structure of normativity out of which it developed. The concept of *Geist* is in no small part delineated for Hegel by this contrast between traditional and modern structures normativity can take and has taken.

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The traditional conception of *Geist* understands norms as objective in much the same sense that the natural world is objective. Normative statuses, paradigmatically the authority of the superior to command and the responsibility of the subordinate to obey, are a feature of how things simply are—just part of the furniture of the world. The most basic metaphysical structure of that world is epitomized by the *scala naturae*, the Great Chain of Being, stretching from God, through the celestial hierarchy of his thrones and dominions, down through emperors, kings, and lords, to people of various ignoble stations, animals, and inorganic nature. It orders all things by those normative relations of subordination. The “fitnesses” of things, how it is appropriate that they be, what they ought to be, are built into how things in fact are. Those who cannot see those appropriatenesses are barbarians—or simply not properly brought up. Normative proprieties, no less than natural properties, are found, not made. We may make some laws. But the warrants for those laws, what makes them binding on us, are to be found outside of us, in the nature of things. Our task is properly to acknowledge their authority, by conforming our practical attitudes to those antecedently existing objective norms. We are made what we are, as *geistig*, normative beings, by the norms (the normative statuses) by which we are governed and assessed.

The modern conception of *Geist* understands norms as subjective products of our activities and attitudes. The subjective normative realm is sharply distinguished from the objective natural realm. The Enlightenment had the idea that there were no normative statuses of authority and responsibility (superiority and subordination) in the objective world, before we started practically taking or treating each other *as* authoritative or responsible (superior and subordinate). Norms are not found, but made. Indeed, they are instituted by our practical attitudes. Social contract theories of political obligation are paradigmatic of this Enlightenment line of thought. Obligations are understood as brought about by social normative attitudes such as promising, agreeing, or contracting. Normative significances are like cloaks thrown over natural things (“imputed” to them) by the role they play in our practices of praising and blaming, holding each other responsible, treating each other as having authority or being responsible. The discovery at the core of modernity is the realization that we are self-made creatures. The norms that make us the *geistig* beings we are, are our own products. From the modern

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point of view, when thinking traditionally we *fetishized* norms, in the technical sense of the term Marx introduced to express this Hegelian idea. We treated what in fact were the products of our own activities as though they were objective things independent of us.

The modern realization of the constitutive role of our attitudes in instituting norms is a new, deeper form of self-consciousness. It is consciousness of ourselves as *essentially* self-conscious, so that what we are *in* ourselves (our normative statuses) essentially depends on what we are *for* ourselves (our normative attitudes toward ourselves and each other). Hegel takes it that this insight *is* a realization: the appreciation of something that always was true of us, without us knowing it. So it is learning something about normative selfhood. But because we *are* in fact essentially self-conscious beings, this change in what we moderns are *for* ourselves, our attitudes, changes also what we are *in* ourselves—the kind of normative beings we are. The structure of normativity itself changes when we become self-conscious in this sense characteristic of modernity. The kind of authority we exercise, the sort of responsibilities we undertake and attribute, our normative practices, institutions, and communities all change with this change in self-conception. (Again, that is not to say that they all automatically become just whatever we take them to be.) That change is the cataclysmic advent of modernity.

Expressed in the most general terms articulating Hegel's metaphysics of normativity, the structural transformation defining the progressive move from traditional to modern *Geist* is that from appreciation of the status-dependence of normative attitudes to appreciation of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses. In the traditional structure of *Geist*, the norms are independent, in the sense of authoritative. Our normative attitudes, what we *take* to be correct or appropriate, who we treat as authoritative or responsible, are responsible to the independent (authoritative) norms, which set standards for assessing those attitudes. In the modern structure of *Geist*, our attitudes are independent, in the sense of exercising authority over normative statuses. They *institute* statuses of authority and responsibility.

The issue that distinguishes the premodern and modern structures of normativity is the relative normative and explanatory priority of norms (normative statuses) and normative attitudes. Are there norms that are objective in the sense of being attitude-independent? The tradition says yes, and modernity says no. Does the bindingness of norms come first, or the subjects'

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attitudes of acknowledging and attributing that bindingness? Is the normative force of statuses such as authority and responsibility conditioned on the attitudes of those who attribute or possess such statuses? The principal dimension of priority here is normative: the status-dependence of attitudes and the attitude-dependence of statuses is a question of the *authority* of the one over the other. But these normative relationships entail explanatory ones, too. In the traditional structure of *Geist*, there is a normative pressure pushing attitudes to conform to norms because individual normative subjects are liable to criticism insofar as their attitudes do not conform to the objective norms. In the modern structure of *Geist*, claims about what the norms are can be justified only by appeal to the attitudes that acknowledge or attribute them.

Hegel regards the transition to modern forms of *Geist* as expressively progressive. Something important about what *Geist* always was implicitly or in itself becomes explicit for it with modern self-consciousness. Normative statuses really are attitude-dependent. The Enlightenment is quite right that apart from practical attitudes of attributing and acknowledging them, there are no normative statuses of responsibility and authority. In failing to understand that, traditional *Geist* was opaque to itself in ways that modern *Geist* is not. This is a defect in the normative self-consciousness native to *Geist* with that premodern structure, and hence to the normative selves that are what they are in virtue of being governed by norms with that practical structure.

But the modern form of *Geist* is also defective. Its defect is the mirror image of the defect of the traditional form of *Geist*. For each has seized *one-sidedly* on just *one* of two complementary aspects of the metaphysics of normativity, making no room for appreciation of the other. The premodern understanding of normativity holds fast to the status-dependence of normative attitudes, ignoring the attitude-dependence of normative statuses. The modern understanding of normativity holds fast to the attitude-dependence of normative statuses, ignoring the status-dependence of normative attitudes. In fact, according to Hegel's metaphysics of normativity, the dependence relations between normative attitudes and normative statuses are reciprocal. Each exercises a distinctive kind of authority over the other, and each is accordingly responsible to the other in a distinctive way. A proper understanding requires appreciating *both* the sense in which statuses are respon-

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sible to attitudes (as the moderns do) *and* the sense in which attitudes are responsible to statuses (as the tradition does).

The failure of modern normative self-consciousness to appreciate the status-dependence of normative attitudes Hegel calls “alienation” [Entfremdung]. In the distinctively modern form of *Geist*, he thinks, realizing the attitude-dependence of normative statuses is incompatible with treating normative statuses as exercising authority over normative attitudes. The authority of norms over attitudes is undercut. The norms cannot be understood as genuinely *binding* on the practical attitudes of normative subjects, including those expressed in intentional actions. The cost of appreciating the authority of attitudes over statuses is to lose sight of the complementary responsibility of attitudes to statuses. This is the bindingness or validity (Kant’s “Verbindlichkeit,” “Gültigkeit”) of norms. Practically acknowledging the authority of norms over attitudes is what Hegel calls “Sittlichkeit.” It is what the traditional premodern form of *Geist* got right. Hegel thinks that when we realized that we are responsible *for* our norms, we lost sight of the crucial sense in which we are also responsible *to* them. The good insight that our attitudes institute the norms is stretched inappropriately into the idea that there are only attitudes, which answer to nothing outside those attitudes. Modern *Geist* is not *sittlich*, but alienated.

The ultimate theoretical challenge is to formulate a metaphysics of normativity that overcomes the one-sidedness that both the traditional and the modern forms of *Geist* exhibit. This is to do justice at once to the *sittlich* appreciation of the authority of norms over attitudes and to the self-conscious appreciation of the authority of attitudes over norms. Retaining the advance in self-consciousness of modernity while overcoming its alienation would usher in a new, self-conscious *sittlich* structure of *Geist*—a third phase in human history. This is what I call the “age of trust,” after the final form of reciprocal recognition that structures it.

The key to a metaphysics of normativity that adequately appreciates the reciprocal relations of authority and responsibility between norms and normative attitudes—acknowledging both the status-dependence of attitudes and the attitude-dependence of statuses—is to be found in understanding what is required for both normative statuses and normative attitudes to be *determinately contentful*. That is, it lies in understanding the relations between a normative *pragmatics* and a *semantics* that explains the concept of

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determinate conceptual content. At the center of Hegel's account lies the process of *experience* [Erfahrung] that is at once the *application* and the *institution* of determinately contentful conceptual norms. This process of *determining* the conceptual norms is structured by normative relations of authority and responsibility that have the historical recognitive structure of a *tradition*. If conceptual contents are understood as determinate in the sense of the tradition Kant inherited (and Frege continued), according to metaconcepts exhibiting the structure Hegel calls "Verstand," the reciprocity of authority and responsibility that relate norms and attitudes is unintelligible. The attitude-dependence of normative statuses can be made sense of only at the cost of alienation: being unable to make sense of the *sittlich* status-dependence of normative attitudes. What is needed is Hegel's new understanding of the determinateness of conceptual contents, according to metaconcepts exhibiting the structure he calls "Vernunft." The notion of determinate conceptual content is to be understood in broadly functional terms—that is, in terms of the role such contents play in the interplay of normative attitudes and normative statuses in the process of experience. Hegel's semantics arises as a chapter in his normative pragmatic story. In this sense, he offers a *pragmatist* account of the relation between pragmatics and semantics. The overall aim of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, as I understand it, is to introduce the constellation of metaconcepts *Vernunft* comprises, and to deploy them to explain both the process of experience structured by reciprocal relations of authority and responsibility relating normative statuses and normative attitudes and how the conceptual contents applied by adopting those statuses and attitudes are determined by the very same experiential process that is their application.

III. Some Contemporary Expressions of Alienation in Philosophical Theories

Before rehearsing how we are to understand the relations between norms, normative attitudes, and conceptual contents in the heralded third, post-modern phase of *Geist*—the age of trust—it will be helpful to consider in further detail the modern phenomenon of alienation that must be overcome to achieve that ideal of *sittlich* subjective self-consciousness. Hegel sees alien-

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ation as inextricably woven into the metaphysics of normativity characteristic of modernity, deforming our actual norms and attitudes (what they are in themselves) by deforming our understanding of them (what they are for us). If he is right, then alienation should be manifestly pervasive in our contemporary philosophical understanding of normativity, once he has opened our eyes to see it. Is it?

I want to point to some familiar lines of thought that offer evidence for Hegel's diagnosis, two centuries on. The first and most obvious is moral or ethical relativism. Next, we can look to the principal twentieth-century philosopher who rediscovered Kant's revolutionary insight into the fundamentally normative character of intentionality, and placed that discovery at the center of his problematic: the later Wittgenstein. From the point of view of what we have made of Hegel's notion of alienation, it is interesting to consider both the skeptical semantic worry Kripke extracts from Wittgenstein in his book on rule following and a more general characterization of the later Wittgenstein's largest philosophical concerns. A further test case is what contemporary jurisprudential theory finds puzzling about the institution of legal norms in the case of "judge-made law"—turning on its head the example I have appealed to at various places in this work in articulating Hegel's positive view. Finally, reductive naturalism, which evidently is a pervasive party in contemporary philosophical debates, shows up as a paradigmatic form of Hegelian alienation, when we understand the latter as suggested here. Other candidate illustrations abound, but perhaps these suffice to make the point that the large-scale philosophical tendencies and temptations Hegel takes to be pathological symptoms of modernity are still alive and abroad in the land. If and insofar as they are characteristic of our time, we ought to be all the more interested in the details of his diagnosis, and the shape of the theoretical and practical therapy that he recommends.

In the broad terms I have used to characterize it here, alienation is what happens when appreciation of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses makes theoretically and practically unintelligible the status-dependence of normative attitudes—that is, the *sittlich* appreciation of the genuine *bindingness* of norms, their authority. Metaethical moral relativism is a relatively straightforward, explicit version of this phenomenon. For what moral norms are taken to be relative *to* is moral normative attitudes. This idea first becomes tempting with an anthropological understanding of the cultural diversity of

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normative attitudes as expressed in the various practices, traditions, institutions, and avowed beliefs of different groups. There evidently are substantial differences in what people practically *take* to be appropriate and inappropriate, obligatory and permitted. Whether or not this diversity of attitudes is treated as disagreement, the thought is not far off that there might be no fact of the matter determining one of these conflicting constellations of practical attitudes as correct. In particular, insofar as one thinks that moral normative statuses (what really is right or wrong) do not swing free of normative attitudes (in one expressivist tradition thought of as “sentiments”) of praise or blame, approval or disapproval—that is, insofar as one appreciates the attitude-dependence of those norms or normative statuses—the systematic variation of attitudes with cultural circumstances undercuts the validity claims of any particular one. While metaethical moral relativism is by no means a consensus view among contemporary theorists of this dimension of normativity (though it has a number of distinguished proponents), its popularity and easy accessibility will be attested to by anyone who has taught undergraduate introductory surveys of moral theory. In this population, at least, as a matter of sociological fact it seems to be contested principally by those whose religious convictions lead them to premodern rejection of any form of attitude-dependence of moral norms.

Relativist skepticism about moral norms as a response to observed variations in moral normative attitudes is an obvious expression of Hegelian alienation. That the skeptical arguments about semantic norms that Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein are also expressions of alienation in Hegel’s sense is much less clear. But in fact Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s argument essentially consists in the confrontation of the status-dependence of normative attitudes with the attitude-dependence of normative statuses, drawing the conclusion that the latter makes the former unintelligible.

Kripke begins with what is in fact a Kantian insight: applying a concept has *normative* consequences.¹ Meaning plus by “+” includes undertaking *commitments* as to how it would be correct to apply the expression in cases beyond those in which I actually apply it. In the language I have been using to articulate Hegel’s views, adopting a determinately contentful *attitude*—for instance, acquiring a belief or forming an intention—is undertaking (or attributing) a normative *status*. The commitment undertaken, the status acquired by using the expression, is significant for assessments of the *correct-*

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ness of future applications. That status is a commitment or responsibility that one undertakes. Having such a status is subjecting oneself to a norm, in the sense of making oneself liable to assessments of the correctness of one's attitudes, according to the standard set by the norm. The *content* of the normative status (here, belief or intention) determines *what* norm one makes oneself liable to by acquiring that status, by adopting an attitude that is the undertaking of that status. The content of the commitment (e.g., the concept plus) is the standard according to which attitudes expressed using "+" are to be assessed. In other words, the determinate contentfulness of normative attitudes is intelligible only in terms of the authority that normative statuses (the commitments one undertakes in expressing a belief or forming an intention using "+") have over those attitudes. This is the status-dependence of normative attitudes. The observation that sets the stage for Kripke's Wittgenstein's argument is that the determinate contentfulness of normative attitudes is intelligible only insofar as those attitudes are understood as responsible to norms—that is, only insofar as normative statuses, in the form of the commitments one undertakes by believing or intending, are authoritative with respect to assessments of the correctness or success of the attitudes in question.

The second step in setting up the skeptical argument directed against the criterion of adequacy of making sense of the status-dependence of normative attitudes then appeals to the attitude-dependence of normative statuses. We can ask: What is the source of the norms that set standards for assessments of correctness of the attitudes that are applications of concepts such as plus? Kripke's Wittgenstein's second claim is that only the *use* of the expression can confer that content on it. *All* there is to determine the content of the concept applied, and so the norm that governs applications of it (in the sense of providing a standard of normative assessments of correctness for those applications) is the way it has been applied, the attitudes that have in fact been adopted. So the question becomes: What fact is it about the use of the expression "+" in virtue of which it means plus? The use of the expression consists in adopting attitudes expressed by means of it: undertaking and attributing commitments, whether theoretical, in the form of beliefs, or practical, in the form of intentions. So the challenge becomes explaining how the adoption of a sequence of prior attitudes can determine a norm governing which possible future applications would be correct. How are we to understand

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those attitudes as exercising the appropriate authority to institute determinately contentful normative statuses—the attitude-dependence of those statuses?

The third move in the argument is then the claim that there is no way to explain how any course of past actual applications of a concept can determine a normative standard for assessing the correctness of novel possible future uses. How is such a passage from an “is” to an “ought” to be justified? Past usage consists of a finite number of candidate cases where the term was in fact applied, and a finite number of candidate cases where its application was withheld. How is that supposed to determine how it would be *correct* to apply (or withhold application of) the concept in an infinite number of future cases? What gives those past applications binding normative force over future ones? Here, though tempting, it is no help to appeal not only to *actual* applications, but to *dispositions* to apply the concept. For such dispositions will not underwrite a notion of mistaken application robust enough to make sense of the idea that one might be disposed to make mistakes. As Wittgenstein says, if whatever seems right to me is right, then there can be no question of right or wrong. [*PI* §258] Further, even if we can tell a story about the origin of normative force in nonnormative matters of fact—the attitudes that have actually been adopted—and so justify a transition from “is” to “ought,” the question will still remain: *which* ought, which determinately contentful norm, of all the ones *compatible with* the actual prior applications, should be taken to be instituted thereby? For there are *many* ways to “go on in the same way” as the prior applications, and for any of them a story can be told about why it is the right one. And it seems that appealing to definitional or inferential connections to other concepts—defining addition in terms of counting, plus in terms of successor—merely puts off the issue, because the same sort of question can be raised about the institution or the determinate contents of *those* conceptual norms by prior applications of them.

The conclusion is that if we accept that all there is to institute a conceptual norm is prior uses of the concept (and perhaps the use of related concepts, for which the same issue arises), then it is hard to see how such uses can institute a norm that is sufficiently determinate to serve as a standard of correctness for an indefinite number of further possible uses. That is, accepting the attitude-dependence of normative statuses seems to rule out the authority of those attitude-instituted norms over further attitudes: the

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status-dependence (norm-governedness or responsibility to a norm) of normative attitudes. In gesturing at the familiar argument of Kripke's Wittgenstein, I am ignoring a host of subtleties, because I am after only one conclusion: the argument is a paradigm case of the alienation Hegel diagnoses as the worm in the apple of modernity. It is a particularly important contemporary philosophical manifestation of that alienation, because it directly addresses the issue of how to understand determinately contentful conceptual norms, and it is one of the master ideas of the reading of Hegel's *Phenomenology* that I have been offering here that this topic is at the core of the book. It is part of that claim that in 1806 Hegel already foresaw the problem that Kripke's Wittgenstein raises. It is accordingly a principal criterion of adequacy of the account I attribute to him of how to overcome alienation and reconcile a *sittlich* appreciation of the status-dependence of normative attitudes with a modern appreciation of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses that it provide a pointed and powerful response to Kripke's Wittgenstein's skeptical semantic challenge. The account Hegel offers splits the difference between what Kripke calls "straight" and "skeptical" solutions to the problem. It is like the straight solutions in that it explains what is required for claims about what someone means and what the determinate content of their normative statuses and attitudes is to be *true*. It is like the skeptical solutions in that it agrees that the dilemma posed by the apparent conflict between the status-dependence of discursive normative attitudes and the attitude-dependence of discursive norms cannot be resolved in terms articulated according to the traditional modern philosophical metaconcepts of *Verstand*, but only if we shift to thinking about truth and determinateness according to the philosophical metaconcepts of *Vernunft*. In any case, insofar as Hegel's counts for this reason as a skeptical response, it is a *very* different one from the proposal Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein, of replacing talk of truth conditions with talk of assertibility conditions.

I think there are good and sufficient reasons to doubt that Wittgenstein endorses the response Kripke suggests for him. And though Wittgenstein points out many of the raw materials Hegel deploys in his account, I do not think he does or would endorse the detailed, theoretically ambitious, constructive recollective metaphysics of normativity Hegel develops by assembling and processing them as he does. But at the level of abstraction at which I have described it, using the terms I propose for understanding Hegel's, I

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think Kripke is right to see Wittgenstein in effect as centrally concerned with the difficulty of reconciling commitment to the status-dependence of discursive normative attitudes with commitment to the attitude-dependence of discursive normative statuses. And I take it that, like Hegel, Wittgenstein thinks it is absolutely essential to appreciate both of these apparently incompatible but actually complementary aspects of discursive social practices.

Wittgenstein clearly did—as far as can be told, independently—recover the Kantian insight into the fundamentally normative character of intentionality. He understands that being in an intentional state, such as having a belief or an intention, includes having a kind of normative status. For it involves *committing* oneself as to how things are or are to be. In believing or intending one essentially makes oneself liable to normative assessments of the correctness of the belief or the success of the intention. And he is interested in a certain kind of puzzlement we might have about the nature of that normative significance. How are we to understand the way intentional states, as it were, reach out to various possible states of affairs and sort them into those that are and those that are not in accord with the content of the state?

Someone says to me: “Show the children a game.” I teach them gambling with dice, and the other says “I didn’t mean that sort of game.” Must the exclusion of the game with dice have come before his mind when he gave me the order? [*PI* §70]

The thought is that the retrospective claim about what was meant, intended, ordered, or requested is quite correct: he did *not* mean that kind of game. But what, exactly, does that fact consist in? We might find ourselves puzzled about this normative significance, as about how a signpost (“considered just as a piece of wood”) can show us the right way to go.

This question is the first move that sets up the problematic of Kripke’s Wittgenstein. But Wittgenstein has concerns broader than those that show up there—concerns that also articulate the alienation characteristic of the modern metaphysics of normativity. Wittgenstein’s preoccupation with processes and practices of *learning* language games is often remarked upon. Less often noticed, but at least equally central to his thought are the processes and practices of *extending* a familiar language game to a novel one. Indeed, it is not too strong to say that he takes the way in which an extended lan-

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guage game can grow out of a more restricted one to be the most central and essential discursive phenomenon. It is for this reason, I think, that he is pessimistic about the prospects for systematic semantic theorizing about language—the project of associating meanings with expressions in such a way that even the most basic proprieties of their use could be systematically computed from those meanings. For even if one could achieve such a codification, it would hold at most for a brief time slice of the evolving and developing language, liable to falsification by the next transformative extension. It is because it is at every stage the product of a multifarious process of organic growth that language is at every stage in its development a “motley”—a messy, unsurveyable assemblage of suburbs that have grown out of adjoining regions without a central downtown.²

It seems to be the *contingency* of the budding and sprouting course of development of discursive practices that matters most to Wittgenstein. What developments of a practice take place depends to begin with on what extensions practitioners can catch on to, so that they practically agree about “how to go on” in new cases. These can turn on quirks of embodiment, large and small. (“If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.”³) But what extensions are in this sense practically possible for a community can also depend on the details of the forms of life they already share and can learn and teach each other to project to new situations. Whether a particular local projection of one practice into another that people *could* learn actually takes place also depends on which among all the practically possible candidates in fact arise, and which of those happen to catch on in the community. The observation motivating this line of thought is that if any of these contingent matters of fact *had* been different, the contents of our concepts, and hence the norms we bind ourselves to by using them in thought and judgment, *would* be different. But the occurrence of those contingencies does not provide *reasons* that *justify* talking as we do rather than some other way. “In” means something different, is governed by different norms, because we could and did extend our purely spatial use from applying to gold in teeth to applying also to pain in teeth. One lesson illustrated and reinforced by many of Wittgenstein’s anecdotes is that the matters of fact (of quite various kinds) on which the boundaries of the norms that govern various expressions are subjunctively and counterfactually dependent, are *contingent* in the sense that they could have been different—some

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features of our embodiment and the history of our practices more easily, and others less easily.

A foreseeable consequence of appreciating these contingencies conditioning our practices is a delegitimizing of the norms whose contingency has been revealed. This undercutting of the rational bindingness of the norms is alienation in Hegel's sense. A familiar example of this general phenomenon happens when a young one realizes that the religious commitments she has always taken for granted are as they are because of the community she was born into—that she is a Baptist because her parents and everyone they know are Baptists, and that had they all instead been Unitarians, Buddhists, or Muslims, she would have been, too. Realizing the contingencies on which her commitments are counterfactually dependent has the effect of bringing into question their justification, and so their normative force. What is the warrant for taking seriously the claim of those norms, for practically treating them as binding, once the accidental character of the standard for assessment they provide has been revealed? Pointing to the radical contingencies that our conceptual norms are subjunctively dependent upon poses a threat to our understanding of those norms as *rationally binding* on us. The challenge is to see why, if the norms are to this extent and in this way our products, they can nonetheless be understood to be binding on us, to be *correctly* used this way and not that. How can conceptual norms provide us with *reasons* to apply them one way rather than another, given their counterfactual dependence on contingencies that do *not* provide reasons for the *contents* of those norms to be as they are, rather than some other way?

The legitimation problem is not just that there are true counterfactuals to the effect that if some contingent fact had been different, the content of the norm in question would have been different. It is that those counterfactuals codify the dependence of the attitude of, for instance, *believing* (acknowledging or undertaking a doxastic commitment) on the occurrence of events that do not provide reasons or evidence justifying the content *believed*. That the believer was born into a Baptist community is not evidence for the truth of predestination. This is the structure that underlies the delegitimizing force of genealogical explanations generally. The great unmaskers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, all told stories of this shape. If one's approval of treating labor as a commodity is due

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to one's bourgeois upbringing, if one's Christian humility is the result of *resentiment*, if one's authoritarianism should be understood as stemming from unresolved conflicts left over from the Family Romance, then the justifiability and hence the normative force, the authority, of those commitments is challenged. For being raised in bourgeois circumstances is not evidence for the justice of labor markets, being riven with *ressentiment* does not provide reasons for esteeming humility, and Oedipal rivalry with one's father does not justify the contents of authoritarian attitudes. Genealogies point to causes of attitudes that are contingent relative to the norms articulating the contents of the concepts, showing them to be as they are because of those contingencies, in the sense that these conditions and the occurrence of these events do not provide *reasons* for applying the concepts one way rather than another. They do not provide *evidence* that could be appealed to in *justifying* the application or withholding of the application of the concept in particular cases.

Exhibiting these sorts of *causes* for attitudes undercuts the *sittlich* claim of those attitudes to be responsive and responsible to the authority of *reasons* provided by the norms those attitudes acknowledge. In the cases to the fore for Wittgenstein, the contingent fact that we *did* extend our practice of spatially locating some things *in* others to include treating pains as in body parts, and did *not* extend it to treating sounds as in bells explains why we *say* the ache is in the tooth and not that the peal is in the bell, but it does not *justify*, does not offer evidence or reasons for the claims that pains are in body parts and sounds are not in bells. That as a matter of contingent fact we can catch on to an extension of prior practice, that we can all learn to agree in practice about "how to go on" to apply it in new cases, is not a *reason* to go on that way. "We just talk that way," is an observation about our practices that is not at the right level to serve as a justification for claims about the world to the effect that one thing is to be found in another—any more than offering a historical explanation of why we use the sign designs "dog" (written and spoken) to refer to dogs, instead of some other arbitrary marks and noises, justifies the claim that Lassie is a dog.

I think Wittgenstein's thought in this area begins with appreciation of the contingency of important aspects of our discursive practices. We inherit ways of using expressions that both are essential to their meaning what they do and show on their surfaces the marks of the contingencies that have

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shaped them. We find ourselves always already “thrown into” such a situation, and have no choice but to conduct our practical and theoretical discursive affairs against that in many ways arbitrary background. Adapting a Heideggerian term, this fact might be called “semantic *Geworfenheit*.” I think Wittgenstein both thinks that semantic *Geworfenheit* threatens our sense of the norms our discursive practices institute as rationally binding on us, in the sense of providing genuine *reasons* for applying expressions the way we do in novel cases (that is, that it is alienating), and that he diagnoses this threat as resulting from a residual misunderstanding of the discursive norms that articulate what is a reason for what.⁴ In particular, I think he objects to the way of thinking about the division of labor between *instituting* discursive norms and *applying* them that is implicit in seeing semantic *Geworfenheit* as threatening the intelligibility of understanding those discursive norms as governing our practice, in the sense of exercising authority that is genuinely binding on (sets a standard of correctness for assessments of) future uses. The use of expressions, applying them in some circumstances and withholding application in others, is all there is to institute the norms that govern such applications. The contingencies that turn out to be inherent in our adoption of normative attitudes are essential to their having the determinate contents they do. Any picture of discursive norms as answering to norms that are rational in a sense that excludes genealogical contingencies is an idealized fantasy, visible as such by its precluding the determinate contentfulness of those norms.

I take it that Wittgenstein is concerned both to point out our semantic *Geworfenheit* and to show that it ought not to be understood as impugning the integrity of discursive norms, because it is essential to their determinate contentfulness. If we are to talk at all, we have no choice but to do so by engaging in practices whose implicit norms are as they are as a result of contingent facts that don’t *justify* talking as we do. (As to the alternative, recall Sellars’s dictum “Clearly human beings could dispense with all discourse, though only at the expense of having nothing to say.”⁵) Any account of discursive normativity that treats the fact of our semantic *Geworfenheit* as undercutting the legitimacy of those norms (that is, any alienating account), is to be rejected as incorporating an evidently mistaken metaphysics of normativity. The proper response to this realization, Wittgenstein thinks, is not to construct some alternative positive metaphysical story, but simply to

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acknowledge and embrace discursive contingency and semantic *Geworfenheit*. We might call this recommended therapeutic meta-attitude “semantic *Gelassenheit*,” to continue the Heideggerian metaphor. (Though so used, the term owes more to Meister Eckhart’s original usage than to Heidegger’s radical adaptation of it.) Basically, it recommends that we just get used to our *Geworfenheit*, rejecting theories according to which it is alienating, without adopting others in their stead.

According to this line of thought, the culprit responsible for the threat of alienation from the discursive norms that make our thought possible is out-moded metaphysical pictures of what would be required to justify those norms, to show them to be genuinely binding on us, to provide suitable standards for assessing the correctness of our attitudes. Rather than holding our practice up to Procrustean standards provided by *a priori* models of what rationality must be like—requiring, for instance, that reasons have the form of deductive derivations from noncontingent premises, or that they maximize utility in the light of subjective preferences and credences—we should accept that our discursive practices are in general in order as they are, and understand justification in terms of those semantogenic practices. So understood, the recommended *Gelassenheit* is a kind of pragmatism, in the sense of investing authority in our reason-giving practices, and taking our theories to be responsible to them, rather than the other way around.

Hegel anticipated Wittgenstein’s social-practical understanding of discursive normativity. That is how he brings Kant’s insight into the normativity of intentionality down to earth—in a suitably broad sense *naturalizing* it. And he foresaw the danger that appreciation of our normative semantic *Geworfenheit* poses for the intelligibility of discursive norms as genuinely binding on the attitudes of those who engage in practices of applying those norms. I have been claiming that that is the core of his concept of alienation: that the modern appreciation of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses (a matter of how discursive norms are instituted) undercuts the traditional *sittlich* practical appreciation of the status-dependence of normative attitudes (a matter of how discursive norms are applied). Hegel, too, rejects the conclusion that there is an ineluctable incompatibility here, and so rejects any and every metaphysics of discursive normativity that entails such an incompatibility. For him, these are accounts that operate with the concepts construed according to the categories of *Verstand*, which Kant brought to

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explicit flowering. One diagnosis he offers is that in Kant's hands the distinction between reasons and causes (articulating the overarching distinction between the normative and the natural) has been regimented and rigidified into a dualism. (As I am using the term, a distinction becomes a dualism when it is drawn in terms that make the relations between the distinguished items unintelligible.) In particular, it is of the first importance to Hegel that the contingent causes on which genealogical analyses show our discursive norms to be counterfactually conditioned are themselves features of prior applications of concepts. In striking contrast to Wittgenstein's version of normative semantic *Gelassenheit* as theoretical quietism, Hegel offers a detailed systematic account of the process by which and in which actual, and therefore contingent, applications of concepts both institute norms governing such applications and acknowledge the authority of those norms.

This is the process Hegel discusses in the *Introduction* as the experience of error and in the *Preface* as the truth-process ("A vast, Bacchanalian revel with not a soul sober."). It is the process, he says, of giving contingency the form of necessity—that is, normative form. It is the process of determining the contents of concepts, as norms governing applications of them, in the sense of setting authoritative standards for assessments of the correctness of applications that accordingly show up as responsible to them. In that process, actual applications of concepts play the role both of causes and of reasons. As actual applications of concepts, the causes are also takings-to-be-correct. Such attitudes also determine what is correct. The relations of dependence (authority and responsibility) between attitude and norm are reciprocal. We could think of this reciprocity in terms of a positive feedback loop, or as the process of achieving a Rawlsian reflective equilibrium—and neither of those would be wrong. But Hegel's story has a *lot* more structure than either of those models (which can still serve as useful points of comparison). The main point of the *Phenomenology* as I read it is to teach us about how conceptual contents, the norms that articulate truth, are determined by the process that is the experience of error, and especially the role played in that process by its recollective-reconstructive phase. It is that understanding, replacing the categories of *Verstand* with those of *Vernunft*, that permits us to overcome alienation by showing us in detail how to reconcile modern appreciation of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses with the *sittlich*

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appreciation of the status-dependence of normative attitudes. Hegel moves beyond the strategy of overcoming alienation by embracing *Gelassenheit* to offer a detailed systematic account of the recollective dimension of the experiential process that institutes, articulates, and sustains the reciprocal attitude-dependence of normative statuses and status-dependence of normative attitudes.

Before turning to an exposition of that account, it is worth looking beyond Wittgenstein and pointing to two further contemporary philosophical manifestations of alienation in Hegel's sense, one concerning jurisprudential theory and the other reductive scientific naturalism. These discussions can be brief, because both are familiar, though for quite different reasons. The jurisprudential case is familiar to readers of this work because I have appealed to it many times, beginning already in the discussion of the *Introduction*, as offering a paradigmatic example of how Hegel's explanation of the determination of conceptual content works, and in particular of the distinctive historical recognitive structure of reciprocal relations of authority and responsibility he invokes. Reductive scientific naturalism is familiar just because it is a ubiquitous presence in the contemporary philosophical scene.

The jurisprudential question concerns the origin, nature, and extent of the determinate contentfulness of the concepts used to formulate laws. The question is important because the rational authority of legal judgments and legal argumentation derives from the capacity of laws articulated by those concepts to serve as *reasons* justifying those judgments and arguments. It is essential to the normative bindingness of applications of legal concepts to particular cases that those applications can be *rationally* licensed by laws articulated by legal concepts. The issue arises most clearly in Anglo-American common law. By contrast to statute law, in which norms are made explicit in the form of stated principles, the legal norms articulated in common law are implicit in the tradition of applying them. All there is to determine the contents of the concepts of common law is the way they have in fact been applied in prior judicial decisions. The need to understand how legal norms can emerge from actual applications of those norms is not restricted to common law, however. For even where legal norms are stated explicitly in the form of rules or principles (statutes), they must be interpreted in order to be applied to particular cases. (This is a point to which Wittgenstein has sensitized philosophers.) Case law works like common law.⁶ What distinguishes these

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contexts is that the legal norms they involve are evidently attitude-dependent. What constitutes “strict liability” in assessment of torts is settled, insofar as it is settled at all, by the prior applications of that concept by judges deciding cases. They are the only source of authority that a current judge can appeal to in offering reasons justifying her own decision to apply or not apply that concept to a novel set of facts.

The fact that common and case law is in this sense “judge-made law” has seemed to some to offer grounds for skepticism about whether determinately contentful, genuinely binding norms have actually been instituted. Does not the idea that the process or practice of applying concepts determines the contents of norms governing such applications involve the naturalistic fallacy? For acknowledgment of the normative significance of conceptual contents means that understanding such contents to be conferred or instituted by the process of applying concepts requires a transition from “is” to “ought.” Somehow, what practitioners *actually* do in applying concepts—accepting some arguments and judgments articulated by a given constellation of concepts, and rejecting others—must be intelligible as settling what those practitioners *ought* to do—which such applications would be *correct*, in the sense of rationally justifiable by appeal to the contents of those concepts (in the context of the facts), and which not. One form such skepticism takes is to let normative attitudes do *all* the work, in effect dropping the notion of *norms* or *normative statuses* entirely. A statement of what is legal (a normative status) is understood as a matter-of-factual *prediction* about what a judge would decide (the judge’s normative attitude). Extreme forms of legal realism in addition insist that what the judge says is typically determined by nonlegal reasons or causes. Legal decisions are brought about causally by such factors as “what the judge had for breakfast,” as the slogan has it (and more realistically, by her training, culture circle, reading, and political inclinations).

The point I want to make by gesturing at this skeptical challenge in the philosophy of law is just that it clearly deserves to be counted as a manifestation of *alienation* in Hegel’s sense. The intelligibility of the governing authority of norms over normative attitudes, of what *is* right over what is *taken* to be right—that is, the status-dependence of normative attitudes—is understood to be threatened by the attitude-dependence of norms (normative statuses). This line of thought is generally thought to be corrosive of jurisprudential practice, which depends on the traditional commitment of the responsible

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jurist not to *make* the law, but to *find out* what it already is. But such *sittlich* acknowledgment of the status-dependence of normative attitudes seems incompatible with the legal positivists' appreciation of the attitude-dependence of legal norms. From Hegel's point of view, of course, both of the parties to this debate are defending one-sided views. The former sees only the judge's authority, but not his responsibility, and the latter sees only his responsibility, but not his authority. What is needed is an account that does justice to both, to their essential interrelations with one another, and to the way the process of which both are aspects determines conceptual contents. That is precisely what Hegel offers us—and is the direct applicability of his account to his case that has motivated my recurring invocation of it in expounding his resolution in these pages.⁷

The final contemporary philosophical expression of normative alienation I want to point to is reductive scientific naturalism about norms. A good point of departure is the Sellarsian principle that has come to be called the "*scientia mensura*":

In the dimension of describing and explaining, science is the measure of all things, of those that are, that they are, and of those that are not, that they are not. [EPM §41]

Sellars was a Kantian, who took on board as master ideas two of Kant's most basic insights. The first is the normative character of intentionality. The second is the idea that some concepts do not play the ground-level role of describing or explaining, but rather make explicit essential features of the conceptual framework that makes describing and explaining possible. Sellars gave that second thought a Carnapian twist, by treating the concepts that play that categorial role as essentially *metalinguistic*. Following out the first thought, for Sellars, prime among the framework-explicating concepts are concepts articulating the normativity of discursive activity. So the opening phrase of Sellars's slogan is specifically meant to exclude normative concepts from those over which science is claimed to have exclusive ontological dominion. For he takes it that because they do play metalinguistic roles, they therefore *cannot* play descriptive or explanatory roles. Perhaps this is not so. Even if he is right about their categorial role, perhaps Sellars is wrong to deny normative concepts descriptive and explanatory roles, and so to exclude

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them from the intended scope of the *scientia mensura*. In any case the subsequent philosophical tradition has not so far been much cognizant of or influenced by Sellars's sophisticated views on this point. The line of thought I am concerned to point to here is one that is widely shared in the contemporary philosophical scene and that is well formulated by Sellars's naturalistic principle, taken against his intent as applying specifically to what is picked out by the use of normative vocabulary.

In its starkest form, the idea is that norms and normative statuses are explanatorily otiose. They are not to be found in the causal order as it is made visible by natural science, and (so) need never be appealed to in explanations of events that are in that order. There are only normative attitudes. People really do *take* some behaviors to be appropriate and others inappropriate, they do *attribute* authority and responsibility, commitment and entitlement. Those practical attitudes *are* in the natural order and *can* appropriately be invoked in explaining why people do what they do. But *all* the explanatory work can be done by normative attitudes. There is no explanatory surplus gained by postulating, in addition to people's adopting practical attitudes of *taking* or *treating* something as right or wrong, actual statuses of *being* right or wrong. While the best explanation of people's beliefs and intentions concerning electrons is that there really are electrons—that's why things work out as they do in our interactions with them—the best explanation of people's normative beliefs and intentions are just more beliefs and intentions: theirs, those of their parents and teachers, those of the ones they interact with practically and verbally. If that is right, then it seems we do not have the same sorts of reasons to believe in norms that we do in electrons. The argument Harman offers for the specific case of morality is a case in point.

At least in its general outlines, I suppose this is a familiar line of thought. I have argued that this way of thinking is already visible in the person of Hegel's allegorical valet, for whom the status-dependence of his master's attitudes, the responsibility they acknowledge to authoritative duties, remains invisible, supplanted by self-standing self-regarding attitudes. This *niederträchtig* meta-attitude is an extreme version of the modern appreciation of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses: the authority of attitudes over statuses. For according to this extreme version of that modern insight, normative statuses have no actual existence. They have only a virtual existence, as the objects of normative attitudes. No attitude-transcendent

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statuses are instituted at all. Such a view is a kind of *ne plus ultra* of alienation.

And this view is contestable in its own right. For an argument-to-best-explanation strategy to yield an attitudes-only ontological verdict, it needs to restrict the vocabulary in which both what is to be explained and what is available to explain it are specified, so as to meet two criteria of adequacy. It is not clear that they can be jointly satisfied. The scientific naturalism version excludes from the realm of facts whose best explanation need appeal only to attitudes facts such as that murder is wrong. Indeed, descriptions such as that, couched in normative terms, are not available in the language of natural science. But the *normative attitudes* for which explanations are sought and in terms of which explanations are to be given must then themselves be specifiable in that same language of natural science. This is a tall order. It is by no means clear that any specification of attitudes that can be given in the nonnormative language of the natural sciences can be entitled to treat them as having *any* determinate semantic content, never mind determinate content that is itself specifiable entirely in nonnormative terms. One would need such a specification in order to make sense of norms as having even virtual existence as the objects of acknowledgment and attribution in such normative attitudes.

A version of an argument along these lines against a naturalistic attitudes-only reductionism about norms is implicit in Hegel's positive account of the reciprocal relation between normative attitudes and normative statuses—in the way he reconciles the traditional *sittlich* appreciation of the status-dependence of normative attitudes with the modern appreciation of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses. What is most impressive, I think, is that he does not restrict himself to criticizing one-sided ways of thinking, such as the contemporary philosophical manifestations of alienation we have just rehearsed. He offers a detailed account of how things actually work. I have gestured at five contemporary lines of philosophical thought: meta-ethical relativism; Kripke's Wittgenstein's "rule-following considerations"; Wittgenstein's broader concern with the apparent tension between the contingency of conceptual content and the rational bindingness of conceptual norms; jurisprudential puzzling about how, if it is judge made, case and common law can be understood as having the binding force of law; and reductive scientific naturalism about norms. According to Hegel's conceptual

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scheme, they all deserve to be seen disparagingly as manifestations of modern alienation. They all accordingly set appropriate criteria of adequacy against which his constructive metaphysical account of both the semantics and the normative pragmatics of discursive practices should be measured. It is to that account that we next turn.

IV. Three Stages in the Articulation of Idealism

On the ground floor of Hegel's intellectual edifice stands his nonpsychological conception of the conceptual. This is the idea that to be conceptually contentful is to stand in relations of material incompatibility and consequence (his "determinate negation" and "mediation") to other such contentful items. The relations of incompatibility and consequence are denominated "material" to indicate that they articulate the *contents* rather than *form* of what stands in those relations. This is his first and most basic semantic idea: an understanding of conceptual content in terms of modally robust relations of exclusion and inclusion.

The next move is to think of the relation between conceptual content, so understood, and the forms such contents can take. The result is a *hylomorphic* conception of the conceptual. Conceptual contents, understood as roles with respect to relations of material incompatibility and consequence, are amphibious: they show up in two different forms. They have a *subjective* form and an *objective* form. The subjective form articulates what things are or can be *for consciousness*, and the objective form articulates what things are or can be *in themselves*. The second is the form of empirical *reality*; the first is the form in which that empirical reality *appears* to knowing subjects. They are related as the two poles of the intentional nexus: what can be *known* and the attempted *knowing* of it, noumena and phenomena. Genuine knowledge requires that one and the *same* content shows up in *both* different forms: the subjective form of thought and the objective form of fact. Conceptual contents of the two forms stand in a broadly representational relation to one another, as subjective *representings* of reality and the objective realities *represented*. Hegel's second semantic idea is this consequence of the hylomorphic development of the first: the two forms of conceptual content stand to one another in *representational* relations. These two dimensions of semantic contentful-

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ness, the intelligible and the representational, can be thought of as Hegelian versions of the Fregean metaconcepts of sense and reference (*Sinn* and *Be-deutung*): thoughts and what thoughts are about, what can be expressed and what can be represented.

Hegel's semantic explanatory strategy is to explain the representational dimension of conceptual contentfulness in terms of the basic sense of conceptual contentfulness as articulated by relations of material incompatibility and consequence. What it is to represent something is to be understood in terms of relations among conceptual contents. The idea of a noumenal reality is to be explained in terms of how phenomenal appearances point beyond themselves, in virtue of their relations to one another. This is one sense in which his book counts as a "phenomenology." This account is essentially expressivist and historical. Its key concept is recollection.

Another idea that is of the first importance for this enterprise is that conceptual content in the most basic sense is an essentially *modal* notion. The relations that in the first instance articulate conceptual contents of either form are *modal* relations. Incompatibility relations codify conjunctions (in a broad sense) that do not merely *happen* not to hold, but that are *forbidden* or *ruled out*. Consequential relations codify conjunctions that do not just happen to hold, but that are *obligatory* or *must* hold. The relations of incompatibility and consequence Hegel understands as articulating conceptual contents are related to one another as the two paired modalities of necessity and impossibility, or obligation and prohibition are related to one another. (That is one of the ways *negation* is built so deeply into his system.)

Of course it matters a lot for such a view how the modal force in question is understood. Here Hegel's revolutionary idea is that the two forms conceptual contents can show up in correspond to two different kinds of modality. Modal relations of incompatibility and consequence have both *alethic* and *deontic* forms. They can be given both *nomological* and *normative* readings. These are the modalities that articulate the objective realm of being (reality, how things are in themselves) and the subjective realm of thought (appearance, how things are for consciousness, how they are taken to be), respectively.

On the objective side of reality, the properties of being a mammal and being a reptile are incompatible in the sense that it is *impossible* for them to be conjoined in one object at the same time. The property of being a mammal

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has being a vertebrate as a consequence in the sense that it is *necessary* that any creature that is a mammal is a vertebrate. On the subjective side of thought, it is not impossible to take one and the same creature to be both a mammal and a reptile. Those thoughts are incompatible rather in the sense that one *ought not* conjoin them. If one takes a creature to be a mammal, it is possible that one does not take it also to be a vertebrate. But one *ought* to do so, one is *committed* or *obliged* to do so. The relations of incompatibility and consequence that articulate the conceptual contents of objective properties and states of affairs are alethic modal relations of noncompossibility and necessity, codified in laws of nature. The relations of incompatibility and consequence that articulate the conceptual contents of subjective thoughts are deontic normative relations. Two thought-contents are incompatible when one cannot be *entitled* to commitments to both, though one might do so anyway. One thought-content is a consequence of another when commitment to one entails commitment to the other—though the actual attitudes of individual thinking subjects might not always actually include acknowledging that normative status. In addition to Hegel’s terms “determinate negation” and “mediation” having these paired senses, one for each form content can take, so too do “independence” and “dependence.” On the side of subjects, they are read normatively or deontically, as authority and responsibility; on the side of objects, alethically, in terms of necessity.

The resulting view is a kind of *conceptual realism*. For it takes the reality thought about, no less than thoughts about it, already to be in conceptual shape. It does that by starting with a conception of the conceptual that is not restricted to thoughts as thinkings, as psychological events or processes. It ties the conceptual to thought only in the Fregean sense of thinkables. (Frege says: “A fact is a thought that is true.”⁸) On this conception, to be conceptually contentful is to stand in relations of incompatibility and consequence: to exclude and include other conceptually contentful items. The relations of incompatibility and consequence that articulate conceptual contents (and so count as “material” relations) are modally robust ones. So Hegel’s is a modal conceptual realism. His particular version is hylomorphic. Conceptual contents can take two forms: objective and subjective. Those two forms correspond to two different kinds of modality, alethic and deontic, nomological and normative. What accordingly becomes visible as *bimodal hylomorphic conceptual realism* makes intelligible the possibility of genuine knowledge,

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by understanding conceptual content as actualizable in two forms: an objective form articulated by alethic nomological relations of necessary consequence and noncompossibility and a subjective form articulated by deontic normative relations of obligatory consequence and prohibited conjunction.

On an account of this shape, the subjective and objective poles of the intentional nexus, representings in thought and what in reality is represented thereby, correspond to the two modal forms conceptual contents can take. So implementing the semantic explanatory strategy of showing how to understand the representational dimension of conceptual contentfulness (“of”-intentionality) in terms of the expressive dimension (“that”-intentionality) requires explaining the relations between nomological and normative preclusion and inclusion, between alethic and deontic incompatibility and consequence. For it is those notions of incompatibility and consequence that articulate the basic notion of conceptual content.

The next large conceptual contribution Hegel makes in investigating the relations between the modally articulated realms of thought and being is a contribution to that investigation that takes the form of a broadly epistemic and semantic thesis. It is a pair of claims about what is required to *understand* the different kinds of modal structures. The first is perhaps not surprising: an essential aspect of understanding the structure of thought about the objective world is understanding the structure of the world being thought about. Less conventionally, he claims conversely that one cannot understand the most fundamental structure of the objective world unless one also understands the structure of the activity of thinking about it. Together these claims assert a *reciprocal sense-dependence* between the metaconcepts articulating the alethic modal nomological structure of the objective world and the deontic normative structure of the subjective world of thought. At a finer grain, the claim is that there is a reciprocal sense-dependence between the metaconcepts articulating the alethic modal structure of *law-governed facts* about *objects* and *properties*, on the side of objective reality, and the metaconcepts articulating the deontic normative structure of the processes and practices of *inferring*, *asserting* or *judging*, and *referring* and *classifying*, on the side of the subjective graspings in thought of those objective structures.

This is an epistemic and conceptual claim, not an ontological one. That is, what is claimed is sense-dependence, not reference-dependence. The thesis is not that there would be no laws, facts, objects, or properties if there were

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no activities of inferring and explaining, stating and judging, referring and classifying. (The converse is uncontroversially true.) The claim is that one cannot *understand* what one is talking about in talking about laws and facts and objects with properties unless one also understands what one is *doing* in inferring and explaining, stating and judging, referring and classifying. Some terms, such as “superior” and “subordinate” are both reciprocally sense-dependent and reciprocally reference-dependent. You cannot understand one unless you understand the other, and the phenomena they indicate cannot occur except in tandem. The largest normative categorial structures of activities of thinking and the largest modal categorial structures of the objective world thought about are reciprocally sense-dependent, with only a one-way reference-dependence: of the actual existence of activities of inferring, judging, and referring and classifying on the actual existence of laws, facts, and objects with properties.

In Chapter 7 I called this thesis “objective idealism.” It tells us we cannot understand the ontological structure of the objective world, its coming as law-governed facts about the properties of objects, except in terms that make essential reference to what subjects have to *do* in order to count as *taking* the world to have that structure—even though the world could have that structure in the absence of any subjects and their epistemic activities. What one needs to *do* in order to count thereby as treating two facts as incompatible in the alethic modal sense is to treat the corresponding subjective doxastic *commitments* as incompatible in the normative sense. That is to take it that commitment to one precludes entitlement to the other, so that if one finds oneself with both of them one is obliged to *do* something further, to *change* the situation by relinquishing at least one of the commitments. This is the deep connection between *determinate negation* and *change* or *movement*, which is central to Hegel’s system. What one needs to do in order to count thereby as treating one fact as a nomological consequence of another is practically to acknowledge that commitment to one *obliges* one to acknowledge commitment to the other.

It is obvious that one cannot understand anything about laws, facts, and objects with properties unless one *can* engage in the practices of inferring and explaining, asserting and judging, and referring and classifying. Those are things one must be able to *do* in order to count as thinking about things at all. The further claim is that one’s grasp of the *concept law* as a categorial

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ontological feature of the objective world essentially depends on one's understanding the role statements of laws play in explanation, and so in subjunctively robust inferences. Laws are the sort of thing expressed by modally qualified quantified conditionals (in the simplest case, "Necessarily, all A's are B's"). One's grasp of the *concept fact* as a categorial ontological feature of the objective world essentially depends on one's understanding that facts are stables, judgeables, thinkables. They are the sort of thing expressed by the declarative sentences one uses to say things.

Similarly, one's grasp of the *concepts object* and *property* as a categorial ontological feature of the objective world essentially depends on one's understanding that objects are what one refers to by using singular terms and properties are what one classifies objects as falling under by using predicates. A necessary condition of understanding the ontological structure of the objective world empirical consciousness is consciousness of is that one must also understand the epistemic activities by which consciousness can become conscious of it. That is why there is the reciprocal sense-dependence, but not reference-dependence that objective idealism claims, of concepts articulating the ontological structure of the objective world, such as *object*, *property*, *fact*, and *law*, on the one hand, and concepts articulating the processes and practices of talking and thinking about that world, such as *referring*, *describing*, *judging* or *asserting*, and *inferring* (and so *singular term*, *predicate*, *declarative sentence*, and *subjunctive conditional*), on the other.

The objective pole of the intentional nexus is structured by subjunctively robust nomological relations. We understand these relations and the relata they articulate functionally (so holistically) in terms of their role in a whole constellation of lawfully related facts, surrounded, as it were, by a penumbra of excluded and merely possible states of affairs (Hegel's "inverted world"). Those facts in turn articulate lawful relations among properties and the objects that exhibit them, surrounded, as it were, by a penumbra of excluded properties and impossible objects. The subjective pole of the intentional nexus is structured by processes and practices that are norm-governed, in the sense of being subject to normative appraisal. We understand these norm-governed activities functionally, and so holistically, in terms of their role in a whole constellation of commitments, articulated by subjunctively robust inferential relations among judgments and practical commitments, surrounded, as it were, by a penumbra of excluded and merely possible

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commitments—thinkables to which the thinking subject in question ought not to be or is not committed. Those claims in turn are articulated by acts of referring and classifying, expressed by the use of singular terms and predicates that can be used to express many more judgeables. This constellation of subjective doxastic commitments articulated by further commitments regarding which doxastic commitments are incompatible with or are consequences of others is what Hegel calls “the Concept.”

At the grossest level of structure, the objective realm of being is articulated by nomological *relations*, and the subjective realm of thought is articulated by norm-governed *processes, activities* or *practices*. We saw that it can be asked how things stand with the intentional nexus between these realms. Should it be construed in *relational* or *practical-processual* terms? If these are not mutually exclusive (as Hegel in fact understands things), so that both semantic relations and pragmatic discursive activities of knowing and acting are essential, does one have conceptual—that is, explanatory—priority over the other? Objective idealism asserts that the nomological and normative aspects of those relations and practices (what is expressed by alethic and deontic modal vocabulary), respectively, are reciprocally sense-dependent. Understanding these aspects of the two realms is symmetrical: each can be understood only as part of a whole that contains the other as well. For the norms articulate what one must *do* in order to count thereby as claiming that the nomological *relations* hold. But what about the activities and relations themselves? Here I claimed that Hegel takes there to be an explanatory asymmetry in that the semantic *relations* between those discursive practices and the objective relations they know about and exploit practically are *instituted* by the discursive practices that both articulate the subjective realm of thought and establish its relations to the objective realm of being. This asymmetry claim privileging specifically recollective discursive practices over semantic representational relations in understanding the intentional nexus between subjectivity and objectivity is the thesis of *conceptual idealism*.

The view Hegel develops in the *Phenomenology* is being expressed here by means of a progression of three ever more radical, distinctively Hegelian theses: bimodal hylomorphic conceptual realism, the reciprocal sense-dependence of objective idealism, and recollective conceptual idealism. Each of these offers a sense in which the intentional nexus is to be understood

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as a special kind of unity that, each in its own way, cancels the distinction between its necessarily related poles, in virtue of the necessity of their being bound into the sort of unity they are. In each case, the related items are to be understood functionally, in terms of the role they play in the kind of unity in question. The first two make symmetry claims. Conceptual content is conceived in a unified way as what is articulated by relations of material incompatibility and consequence. It is then seen to show up in two forms, distinguished by the modality characteristic of each. In their objective form, incompatibility and consequence are alethic modal relations of noncompossibility and necessity. In their subjective form, incompatibility and consequence are deontic normative relations between commitments to which a subject cannot be simultaneously entitled and conclusions one ought to draw. Neither is accorded any priority or privilege over the other by the conceptual realist metaphysical claim. Those two modal forms are then asserted to be reciprocally sense-dependent. Neither can be understood apart from its relation to the other. Neither is accorded any priority or privilege over the other by the objective idealist epistemological claim. The conceptual idealism that digs deeper to explain and justify these less radical Hegelian theses breaks this symmetry. It asserts a distinctive kind of practical priority, and therefore a crucial dimension of explanatory priority, of norm-governed recollective discursive practices over alethic modal relations.

Because the objective world is both the cause of sense and the goal of intellect—the first a nomological matter and the second a normative one—cognition involves both alethic modal and deontic normative relations between the objective realm of being, whose structure is articulated by alethic modal relations and the subjective realm of thought, whose structure is articulated by deontic normative relations. The first are relations of *epistemic tracking*. They support subjunctively robust conditionals of the form “If the objective facts *were* different (or were to change) in such-and-such ways, the commitments endorsed in thought *would* be different in these-and-those ways.” These conditionals articulate a dimension of *authority* (independence) of the objective world over subjective thoughts—a dimension of *responsibility* (dependence) of thought to fact. This is the subjunctive sensitivity of thoughts to things. The second sort of relations are relations of *normative responsibility* of thought to fact. What things are for consciousness *ought* to

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conform to what things are in themselves. Those normative relations, too, express the authority of the objective over the subjective. Because the objective world is both the arena of action and the target of intention, intentional agency involves both alethic modal and deontic normative relations between the subjective and objective realms. Agency is *efficacious* insofar as subjunctively robust conditionals of the form “If the agent’s practical commitments *had* been different, the events in the objective world *would have* been different” hold. These articulate a dimension of authority of the subjective over the objective—a dimension of dependence of the objective world on subjective practical commitments. The normative standard of *success* of intentional agency is set by how things objectively are after an action. The idea of action includes a background structural commitment to the effect that things *ought* to be as they are intended to be. Conceptual idealism focuses on the fact that *all* these alethic and normative modal *relations* are instituted by the recollective *activity* that is the final phase of the cycle of cognition and action.

Conceptual realism asserts the identity of conceptual content between facts and thoughts of those facts. (Compare Wittgenstein: “When we say, and mean, that such-and-such is the case, we—and our meaning—do not stop anywhere short of the fact; but we mean: this-is-so.” [PI §95]) Objective idealism asserts not an underlying semantic identity of content but a reciprocal semantic relation between the two different forms such contents can take: sense-dependence. The priority or dependence relation claimed by conceptual idealism is not in the first instance a semantic matter. It is not a relation between senses and senses, as in sense-dependence, or between referents and referents, as in reference-dependence. It is not even the semantic relation between senses and referents (representings and representeds). It is rather a matter of offering a *pragmatic* account of the practical process by which that semantic-intentional relation between what things are for consciousness and what they are in themselves is established. Pragmatics, as I am using the term, is the study of the *use* of concepts by subjects engaging in discursive practices. Conceptual idealism asserts a distinctive kind of explanatory priority (a kind of authority) of pragmatics over semantics. For this reason it is a *pragmatist* semantic explanatory strategy, and its idealism is a *pragmatist idealism*. The *sui generis* rational practical activity given pride of explanatory place by this sort of pragmatism is *recollection*.

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V. Recollection: How the Process of Experience Determines Conceptual Contents and Semantic Relations

The beating heart of the *Phenomenology* is the concept of experience [Erfahrung]. That is why Hegel's original title for it is "The Science of the *Experience* of Consciousness." Even after, in the course of writing the work, he came to see that "consciousness" picks out only one aspect of his real topic, *Geist*, he could still with full fidelity to his intentions have called it "The Science of the Experience of *Geist*." Experience is the process by which the Concept develops, and so the process by which its constituent concepts develop. It is of the essence of the reading presented here that the notion of experience functions at two levels, corresponding to the two fundamental kinds of concepts Hegel distinguishes. These are "logical," speculative [begrifflich, begreifend], or philosophical concepts, on the one hand, and ordinary empirical and practical "determinate" concepts, on the other.

The origin of the distinction lies in Kant's revolutionary idea that besides the concepts that we deploy to describe and explain empirical goings-on, there are concepts whose distinctive expressive role is to make explicit crucial structural features of the framework that makes description and explanation possible. (Among them are alethic modal and deontic normative concepts.) Kant thought there was a single set of such categories that could express the structure of discursive activity *überhaupt*. The recollective story Hegel tells in the *Phenomenology* is a rationally reconstructed history of the expressively progressive development of "shapes of (self-)consciousness," which are articulated by different, more or less adequate categorial metaconcepts. It culminates, however, in a single set of expressively adequate philosophical concepts. The master strategy animating this reading of Hegel (and of Kant) is *semantic descent*: the idea that the ultimate point of studying these metaconcepts is what their use can teach us about the semantic contentfulness of ground-level concepts, so the best way to understand the categorial metaconcepts is to use them to talk about the use and content of ordinary concepts. It is because it is aimed at extracting such lessons that what is being offered is a *semantic* reading of the *Phenomenology*. It is a *pragmatist* semantic reading because the key to understanding the conceptual contentfulness common to the objective empirical world of lawfully

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related facts about objects and their properties and the normative subjective activity of thinking (undertaking commitments by inferring and claiming, referring and classifying) is found to lie in the discursive practice and process of experience. The lead role in Hegel's account of experience as instituting semantic relations is played by recollection.

The pragmatic metaconcept of the process of experience is first put in play in the *Introduction*, at the very beginning of the book, in the form of the experience of *error*. It is invoked to explain how the consciousness-constitutive distinction-and-relation between what things are *for* consciousness and what things are *in* themselves shows up *to* consciousness itself. Hegel assumes that, however vaguely understood it might be at the outset, it is a distinction-and-relation that can at least be a topic *for us*, the readers of the book, the phenomenological self-consciousness that under his guidance is rehearsing the development of phenomenal self-consciousness. Hegel's terminology of what things are explicitly "for consciousness" and what things are "in themselves" [an sich] ("implicitly") is his preferred way of talking about what I have been calling the "intentional nexus," which relates the subjective realm of thought, the way things *appear* to subjects, with the objective realm of being, the way things *really* are. It is, as emerges already in the *Introduction*, the phenomenon addressed by the distinction between subjective *representings* and objective *represented*s (baked into Early Modern philosophical thought about mind and knowledge by Descartes). Partly on that basis, I have urged that we can think about it as the fundamental *semantic* relation between what Frege calls "sense" and "referent" (*Sinn* and *Bedeutung*). The question is how this crucial distinction already shows up practically for even the most metatheoretically naïve knowing subject. How are we to understand the basic fact that

the difference between the in-itself and the for-itself is already present in the very fact that consciousness knows an object at all. Something is *to it* the in-itself, but the knowledge or the being of the object for consciousness is *to it* still another moment. [PG 85]

This is the most primitive, practical form of *self*-consciousness—awareness of what consciousness is—available even to conceptually untutored "natural consciousness."

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Hegel traces its origin to the experience of *error*—to what happens when a subject inevitably eventually discovers that it is in some instance *wrong*, that things are not in fact as they seemed. It is in having to *give up* a view that becomes untenable that it becomes visible as a *view* (a representing), normatively answerable for its correctness to how things actually are (what is represented). When an error is practically acknowledged, what was *to* the subject a reality is unmasked and revealed as merely a guise, an appearance, a way things were only *for* the subject. One took the stick to be bent. On pulling it all the way out of the water, one sees that it was really straight all along. One's prior view shows up as just a view, a way it looked. That change of view involves distinguishing how things merely look from how they really are.

Later on in the book Hegel will root this sort of experience in our biological nature as desiring beings. For a kind of desire, such as hunger, comes with a characteristic associated sort of practical activity: eating. And responding to something in the environment by engaging in that activity, eating it, is according it a distinctive sort of practical significance: food. The very same desire that motivates the associated activity and defines that practical significance then serves as a protonormative standard of correctness. What a creature practically takes or treats *as* food, by eating it, can turn out *not really to be* food, if eating it does not satisfy the hunger that motivated it. Eating something that turns out to be disgusting, or just unsatisfying, is the most primitive form of the experience of error. In it one learns that what one took to be food, what appeared to one as food (what one practically represented as food), was not in fact food. When a creature goes through that process of error and discovery, the distinction between what things are *for* it (the practical significance it practically assigned to them) and what things are *in themselves* (the practical significance they actually have, as assessed by the satisfaction of desire) becomes something *to* that creature. It is how a distinction between appearance and reality shows up practically already for preconceptual, merely desiring organisms. This sort of experience is the basis and practical form of *learning*. It is because it is also for Hegel the practical basis for the semantic distinction between representings and representeds, sense and referent, that his deserves to be called a “pragmatist semantics.” The justice of this characterization becomes still more evident further along in the book, when Hegel broadens his concern from the experience of error

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to the full cycle of cognition and action, which underwrites and incorporates not only cognitive error and knowledge, but also the practical failure and success of intentional actions.

We saw that the most basic concept in the purely semantic strand of Hegel's thought is his understanding of the conceptual—in the sense of the graspable, what thoughts have in common with facts—in terms of relations of incompatibility and consequence. This is the semantic basis from which the expressive-recollective account of the representational dimension of conceptual content is elaborated. It, too, is explained in terms of the experience of error. For an essential part of the acknowledgment of error is practically taking or treating two commitments as incompatible. Such genuinely conceptual activity goes beyond what merely desiring beings engage in. The origins of Hegel's idea here lie in Kant's earlier broadly pragmatist account of what knowing subjects must *do* in order to count as apperceiving. Apperception is *sapient* awareness, as opposed to the merely *sentient* awareness exhibited by desiring animals. For Kant, to be aware in the narrower sense is to synthesize a constellation of commitments that exhibits a distinctive kind of unity: apperceptive unity. This is a *rational* unity—and hence, he thinks, a *discursive* unity, in the sense of one that is *conceptually* articulated. It is a rational unity because of the distinctive kinds of norms that govern its synthesis.

Synthesizing a constellation of commitments (both doxastic and practical) exhibiting the rational unity distinctive of apperception is practically acknowledging a variety of task responsibilities. The one that matters most for Hegel's later construal of the experience of error is the *critical* task responsibility to extrude incompatible commitments. When one finds oneself with commitments that are incompatible, by one's own lights—that is, according to the contents one thereby counts as attributing to them—one must practically acknowledge the responsibility to *do* something: to change or relinquish at least one of them. There is also a rational *ampliative* task responsibility to acknowledge commitment to the *consequences* of one's commitments: to draw conclusions that rationally follow from them. Further, there is a *justificatory* responsibility, to be able to give *reasons* justifying the commitments one incorporates in the evolving constellation. Being apperceptively aware or conscious of something is *discursive* awareness of it, bringing it under a *concept*. The concept is for Kant accordingly a rule that determines

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what is incompatible with what (giving specific content to one's critical rational task responsibility) and what is a consequence of what (giving specific content to one's ampliative and justificatory task responsibilities). Conceptual contentfulness is suitability to play a functional role in the process of synthesizing a constellation of commitments exhibiting the rational unity characteristic of apperception. So conceptual content is a matter of standing in relations of material incompatibility and consequence to other such conceptually contentful items. This is a broadly pragmatist account, because the notion of conceptual content, which is the subject of *semantics*, is understood functionally in terms of the norm-governed practical synthetic *activity* by which one's commitments evolve and develop, which is the subject of *pragmatics*.

Hegel builds on Kant's model and develops it in his account of the experience of error. In doing so, he naturalizes Kant's account, in a broad sense, bringing it down to earth by grounding it in the preconceptual experience of desiring animals. But he also radicalizes and generalizes both the methodological pragmatism that consists in reading off an account of conceptual contentfulness from an account of rational activity and the specific focus on incompatibility and consequence as the relations that articulate conceptual content. He further substantially adds to the picture of the experiential process that shapes the development of the constellation of commitments that the Concept comprises. As Kant would, Hegel sees a single episode of experiencing error as beginning with the *registration* of an anomaly: the acknowledgment that one finds oneself with commitments that are *incompatible*, in the sense that one cannot become entitled to them both (or to all of them). They preclude jointly fulfilling one's justificatory responsibility. Practically acknowledging that incompatibility is taking oneself to be obliged to *do* something, *change* something. This is the obligation to engage in a process of *repair* of the anomaly, to replace rational discord with rational harmony, by altering or giving up some of the offending commitments. At this point, Hegel breaks from the Kantian picture by adding a crucial constraint on what counts as successful repairs. Not just any rejiggering that removes the incompatibility suffices. Successful repairs must *explain* and *justify* the changes made, in a special way, by taking a distinctive form. The addition of this requirement, the characterization of this constraint, is one of Hegel's Big Ideas, and stands at the center of the conceptual idealism (and so the pragmatist semantics) of the *Phenomenology*.

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Hegel's idea is that vindication of a proposed reparative strategy in response to acknowledgment of incompatible commitments must take the form of a special kind of *historical* narrative: a recollection. One must tell a retrospective story that rationally reconstructs an idealized expressively progressive trajectory through previous changes of view that culminates in the view being endorsed after the repair of the most recently discovered anomaly. In the first stage of the experience of error, the previous conception of how things are, what played the role *to* consciousness of what things are *in* themselves, has been unmasked as appearance, and has accordingly shifted status. It now plays the role *to* consciousness of being only what things were *for* consciousness: an erroneous view of how things really are. To justify endorsing a new view as veridically representing how things really are in themselves, one must show how, assuming that things are that way, one did or could have come to *know* that things are that way.

Doxastic commitments are for Hegel implicitly knowledge claims. He has characteristic versions of all three of the dimensions of classical conceptions of knowledge as justified true belief. What I have been calling commitments, a kind of normative status, are the analogues of thoughts or beliefs (putative knowings), in his deontically inflected conception of the *geistig* realm of thought. Conceptual realism teaches that the truth dimension of such claims to knowledge is a matter of thought and fact sharing a common conceptual content. The demand for recollective vindication of one's commitments codifies Hegel's version of the justification dimension of claims to knowledge. This distinctive kind of justification requires showing how the previous views one held in the process leading up to the current candidate can properly be understood as views, appearances, or representings *of* what one now endorses as the reality one claims was all along being viewed, appearing, or being represented. To be entitled to claim that things are as one now takes them to be, one must show how one *found out* that they are so. Doing that involves explaining what one's earlier views got right, what they got wrong, and why. It involves rationally reconstructing the sequence of one's previous views of what one now takes to be the same topic so as to exhibit it as a process of *learning*, of gradual *discovery* of how things actually are. This is the progressive emergence into explicitness, the ever more adequate expression, of what is retrospectively discerned as having been all along implicit as the norm governing and guiding the process by which its appearances arise and pass away.

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Offering such a retrospective historical rational reconstruction of the process leading up to the constellation of commitments whose endorsement is being vindicated as the lesson properly to be learned from the earlier registering and reparative phases is the final, *recollective* phase of an episode of the experience of error. Recollection (Hegel's "Erinnerung") turns a *past* into a *history*.⁹ It transforms a mere description of past commitments into a progressive narrative of a sequence of lessons whereby how things really are, in themselves (according to one's current commitments), gradually came to be revealed, through that progressive sequence of ever more adequate appearances, culminating in one's current happy state of (as one takes it to be) *knowledge* of how things really are. A recollecting narrative is a narrative of *expressive* progress. It is a story about how what is now revealed to have been all along *implicit* in prior commitments, as the reality they were appearances of (the noumena behind the phenomena), gradually emerged to become fully *explicit*, showing up as what it really is, in the view currently endorsed, in which that process culminated. It is a story of how what things are in themselves ("an sich") becomes what they explicitly are for consciousness.

Already something thought, the *content* is the property of substance; existence has no more to be changed into the form of what is in-itself and implicit, but only the *implicit*—no longer merely something primitive, or lying hidden within existence, but already present as a *recollection*—into the form of what is *explicit*, of what is objective to self.
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A recollection accordingly exhibits past commitments that have been discarded because of their incompatibility with others as genuine (if only partially correct) appearances *of* reality as it is now known to be, and in that sense as not *merely* illusory.

As was indicated already in the discussion of Hegel's *Introduction*, this recollective phase of the experience of error is meant to explain "of"-intentionality in terms of "that"-intentionality—the representational dimension of thought in terms of its conceptual contentfulness. Conceptual contentfulness in Hegel's sense is what thoughts and facts (phenomena and noumena) can share: being articulated by relations of material incompatibility and consequence to other similarly contentful items. What practically

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distinguishes what is *taken* or *treated* by a conscious subject *as* noumenal, as how things really are, in themselves, from what it takes or treats *as* phenomenal, as presenting an appearance of things, is just the subject's *commitment* or *endorsement* of the content. (This is adopting an attitude that undertakes a normative status.) Doxastically endorsing a conceptual content *is* taking it to be a fact. That *what* one takes to be facts (which contents, exactly, one endorses) *changes* is just a change in status of the contents involved during the registration and repair stages of the experience of error. The old content changes status from being endorsed to not being endorsed, and its replacement changes status from not being endorsed to being endorsed. What was *to* consciousness noumenal reality is unmasked as phenomenal appearance, and replaced by a different content, newly endorsed as objectively factual. The recollective stage of an experience of error justifies this change of status by forging a distinctive kind of link between the content newly endorsed as noumenal and all the previously endorsed contents that now are taken to be phenomena. It is a representational link, in virtue of which they show up to the conscious subject as phenomenal appearances *of* that noumenal reality. The link is forged by offering a retrospective recollective rational reconstruction of a sequence of phenomena culminating in the facts as one currently takes them to be. That rational reconstruction exhibits them as all along implicitly normatively governed by their link to that noumenal reality, in the sense that it serves as the normative standard by which their adequacy *as* phenomenal appearances of it is to be assessed.

This recollective story about the representational dimension of conceptual content is, crucially, an *expressive* account of it. It explains how what was, according to each recollection, always *implicit* ("an sich," what things are in themselves), becomes ever more *explicit* (for consciousness). The recollective story is an *expressively* progressive one. The representational relation between senses and referents is established by displaying a sequence of appearances that are ever more adequate expressions of an underlying reality. In general Hegel thinks we can understand what is implicit only in terms of the expressive process by which it is made explicit. That is a recollective process. The underlying reality is construed as implicit in the sense of being a norm that all along governed the process of its gradual emergence into explicitness. Without at any earlier point being fully explicit to the consciousness undergoing the experi-

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ence, according to the recollection that unveils it as what the appearances were appearances of, it nonetheless practically (hence, implicitly) governed the process. According to the retrospective rational reconstruction that is the recollection, it served as a normative standard for better and worse appearances, accordingly as they revealed (expressed) that reality more adequately. And according to the recollection, those assessments were efficacious. The metanorm that governs recollection (determining better and worse recollections) demands *expressive* progress: progress in making explicit what shows up as having been all along implicit. This recollective notion of expression is more fundamental than the notion of representation it is called on to explain.

Telling that sort of recollective reconstructive story is offering a *phenomenology* of a view (a set of commitments). A phenomenology vindicates that view by showing how it gradually emerged into the explicit light of day from the partial, variously erroneous appearances of it. This is what Hegel does at the metalevel for various “shapes” of self-consciousness (and ultimately, of the whole of *Geist*) in the *Phenomenology*. The final, adequate form of self-consciousness (“Absolute Knowing”) knows itself as engaging in a process of this historical recollective kind in its dynamic experience of ground-level empirical and practical commitments and the determinate concepts that articulate them. Such a phenomenology vindicates the endorsement of some conceptual contents as noumenal reality, as objectively factual, by showing how they explain the sequential variety of phenomenal appearances by which a subject comes to know them *as* noumenal reality, and thereby explain the advent of that knowledge.

A recollective reconstruction does that by exhibiting the various erroneous beliefs *that* things are thus and so (phenomena) as appearances of the facts as they really are (noumena). A recollection performs a great reversal: what eventuates from a process of repeated experiences of error, as its final (thus far) *end* or result, is placed, as it were, also at the *beginning* of the sequence.

We shall not cease from exploration
 And the end of all our exploring
 Will be to arrive where we started
 And know the place for the first time.¹⁰

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(Hegel often uses circular imagery in this connection.) For the fact is seen as what drives its progressive revelation. How things actually are is recollectively revealed as normatively governing the process both deontically, as a standard of assessment of expressive success, and alethically, as that to which the episodes that count as expressively progressive are subjunctively sensitive. It is at once the cause of a course of experience and its goal. Linguistically, the kind of link that holds such a recollected history together is *anaphoric*. Hegel introduces it in the *Sense Certainty* chapter when he focuses on the sort of “this” . . . “it” . . . “it” . . . chain by which an initially unrepeatable demonstrative thought must be able to be taken up and repeated in order to be cognitively significant for subsequent thought. Later elements of the anaphoric chain pick up their referents from the earlier one, in virtue of the anaphoric repetition structure to which they belong. In the case of phenomenological recollection, the conceptual content that is endorsed as factual, as the underlying noumenon, is taken to be *referred to* by all the phenomena thereby linked to it as appearances *of it*. The recollective reversal marks the fact that this anaphoric chain also runs backward, with the anaphoric dependents temporally preceding the anaphoric “antecedent” on which their reference depends, and from which it is inherited.¹¹ Hegel deepens and further articulates his view of such relations when in the *Reason* chapter’s discussion of intentional agency he explains how the intention [Absicht] that regulates an ongoing action can only retroactively be attributed, and is anaphorically linked to the various phases of the action it normatively governs. The fact that the model in terms of which we ought to understand the recollective phase of the experience of error as establishing a referential or representational relation between reality and its appearance in cognition is for Hegel to be drawn from the recollective form in which an agent’s doings are to be made intelligible as intentional is a significant component of his conceptual idealism.

Even at the ground level, as addressed to determinate empirical concepts, an *Erinnerung*, then, is a phenomenology: a process in which the stages of a rationally reconstructed sequence of conceptually contentful commitments are anaphorically referred back to the view in which they culminate, as phenomenal appearances or views *of* that noumenal reality. At the end of the *Force and Understanding* chapter, Hegel puts on the table the idea that the sense in which objective reality “stands behind” subjective appearances of it

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is best understood in ultimately *expressive* terms, rather than representational ones. The noumenal reality is revealed as *implicit in* phenomena accordingly assessable as more or less adequate partial expressions of it by recollectively arranging them in an expressively progressive history of the emergence of what was implicit into the explicit daylight of the view currently endorsed (which is to say endorsed as factual).

Stories of this recollective-vindicating sort are familiar from various institutional practices. Old-fashioned histories of science typically took the form of pointing to some feature of current scientific theories (genes are encoded by sequences of DNA base pairs, the division between subatomic particles described by Fermi-Dirac statistics and those described by Bose-Einstein statistics is exclusive and exhaustive, etc.) and then offering a canned Whiggish account of the process by which this truth was gradually discovered, one feature emerging from this experiment or conceptual breakthrough, another from that one. False starts, wrong turns, and dead ends are ignored, except insofar as some bit of the truth is taken to have been revealed thereby. For another example, the final results of complex medical diagnoses are explained by telling stories of this sort: “Even though the patient *did* have an infection, the absence of cytokines in the blood showed that, contrary to what we had thought, the fever must be exogenous.” And—to invoke a comparison I have returned to repeatedly in this work—recollective vindications also play an absolutely essential role in jurisprudential practice. This is clearest in case law, and (because it is essentially “case law all the way down”) especially common law. For there the principal form of justification a judge can offer for her application of a legal concept (strict liability, duty of care, etc.) is a suitable rational reconstruction of prior applications, which are considered precedential in that they reveal explicitly some of the contours of the underlying law that is implicit in the juridical tradition.

Kant had the idea that representation is a normative concept. Something counts as a representing in virtue of being *responsible to* something else, which counts as represented by it in virtue of exercising *authority* over the representing by serving as a standard for assessments of its correctness *as* a representing. It is in precisely this sense that a recollective story treats the commitments it surveys as representings of the content currently treated as factual. The current commitment in which the sequence being reconstructed culminates is treated as authoritative for the previous commitments that

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sequence comprises (and them as responsible to it) in that it provides the standard for assessing the extent to which they are successful or adequate expressions (and so representations) of it. In picking out a trajectory from the actual experiences of error that led up to the currently endorsed conceptual content (all of which exhibit “that”-intentionality by standing in relations of incompatibility and consequence), a trajectory that is expressively progressive by that standard—thereby turning a mere past into an intelligible history of discovery—the recollection treats them as responsible *to* it in the sense required for them to be representations *of* it (to exhibit “of”-intentionality). It is the sort of process that institutes representational relations—the process whereby conceptual contents become representations “*to* (a) consciousness.”

It is accordingly by engaging in a course of experience, a sequence of episodes of the experience of error each of which exhibits all three phases—critical registration of an incompatibility of commitments, constructive repair of the incompatibility by alteration of commitments, and recollective vindication of the new constellation of commitments—that knowing subjects establish representational semantic relations between what play the roles for Hegel of senses and referents. Hegelian senses are, for him as for Frege, thoughts as thinkables. For Hegel that means conceptual contents, apt to be both thinkable and, when all goes right, factual: to be the facts thought or, as we could also say, thought about. They are thinkable, conceptually contentful, in virtue of standing in relations of material incompatibility and consequence to other such contents. As such, they exhibit “that”-intentionality. For they can be the content of thoughts *that* things are thus and so. Recollective rational reconstruction of an expressively progressive trajectory culminating in a thinkable endorsed as factual precipitates out a representational relation. That anaphorically structured representational relation exhibits the elements of the favored trajectory as exhibiting also “of”-intentionality by expressing contents that are more or less adequate explicit expressions, and so representations of the content finally endorsed, which accordingly shows up as having been all along implicit in them. This is Hegel’s story about what a subject has to *do* in order to bring about representational semantic relations between its thoughts and the facts. Recollection is accordingly the core of his pragmatist semantics, and of his conceptual idealism.

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Hegel's *Consciousness* chapters bring into relief the modally robust relations of material incompatibility and consequence that articulate the contents of the concepts we use in describing and explaining the empirical world. *Force and Understanding* ends by recommending that we replace a *representational* understanding of the laws of nature, expressed in alethic modal vocabulary, by an *expressive* understanding of the laws as making explicit something that is implicit in ordinary empirical statements of fact. This alternative is marked as taking us from *vorstellen* to *begreifen*, and hence as an integral part of moving from using metaconcepts with the structure of *Verstand* to those with the structure of *Vernunft*. The move from representation to expression is accordingly put forward as central to the lessons of the whole book. But at that point, there is very little flesh on the bones of the concept of expression as making explicit what is implicit. The meat is added by the account, in *Reason's* investigation of practical agency, of the retrospective recollective imputation of intentions as norms guiding and governing actions. What was only implicit when the action begins becomes more and more explicit as it unfolds. Recollection is what makes this process retrospectively visible as *expressively* progressive. By doing so it gives a definite sense to the notion of implicitness understood in terms of the recollective process of making it explicit. That model accordingly becomes available (retrospectively), for understanding the sense in which modal relations are to be understood as implicit in the facts they articulate, which Hegel put on the table at the end of *Force and Understanding*.

I have suggested that although both in the opening of the *Introduction* and at the end of *Force and Understanding*, Hegel strongly contrasts the way of thinking he wants to recommend—the expressive paradigm—with representational ways of thinking, his recollective elaboration of expression is designed to give semantic representationalism its due, by reconstructing in expressive terms what representationalists were right about. Conceptual content does have a representational dimension, and it can and ought to be understood ultimately in recollective expressivist terms. The strategy pursued in Chapter 12 to expound Hegel's expressivist rational reconstruction of representational relations is to use Frege's semantic vocabulary of sense and reference as an amphibious intermediary between representationalist and expressivist semantic idioms. On the one hand, it is recognizably a way of talking about representings and representeds. Senses do refer to, and in

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that sense represent, their referents. On the other hand, the senses that semantically determine reference are also thought of as intrinsically graspable. For Hegel, following Kant, that means they are conceptually contentful. Hegel's understanding of conceptual contentfulness as articulation by relations of material incompatibility and consequence provides a model of thoughts as senses.

Hylomorphic conceptual realism then underwrites the idea of the categorical homogeneity of senses as graspable thoughts and their referents (what they represent) as correspondingly conceptually contentful, stable facts. This makes intelligible the idea that thoughts are the explicit expressions of facts. They make explicit (for consciousness) how the world is (in itself, implicitly, "an sich"). The objective idealist appeal to a reciprocal sense-dependence between specifications of objective facts and their modal relations, on the one hand, and norm-governed processes of practically acknowledging the consequences of one's commitments by rejecting others and accepting yet others is one step in filling in the expressivist story. That story is completed by appealing to the model of practical agency to yield an understanding of *expression* in terms of *recollection*. The result is an expressive account of the representational dimension of conceptual content in the form of a recollective account of both representation and expression.

VI. From *Verstand* to *Vernunft*: Truth and the Determinateness of Conceptual Content

At the end of each successful episode of the experience of error rational harmony has been restored to the subject's commitments. The incompatibility detected has been repaired and the resulting constellation of commitments recollectively vindicated by recollecting it as the result of a course of experience that has been selected and rationally reconstructed as an unbroken triumphalist expressively progressive narrative of revelation and discovery—as the gradual making explicit of what is presented as having been all along implicit. But Hegel takes it that *every* achievement of this sort of rational equilibrium is temporary. It is fated to be disrupted by the eruption of new anomalies. Acquiring new empirical commitments immediately (in the sense of noninferentially, perceptually) and mediately, by inferentially extracting

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consequences from one's current commitments (fulfilling one's ampliative rational task responsibility), will inevitably, sooner or later, result in one's finding oneself once again with commitments that are incompatible with one another, by one's own lights (the contents one takes them to have). The plight of finite knowing and acting subjects metaphysically guarantees liability to empirical error and practical failure. The experience of error is inescapable. What I earlier called the "false starts, wrong turns, and dead ends" of inquiry can be retrospectively edited out of the sanitized, Whiggish vindicating recollective narrative, but they cannot be avoided prospectively.

Why not? In short because the rational, conceptual character of the world and its stubborn recalcitrance to mastery by knowledge and agency are equally fundamental, primordial features of the way things are. On the one hand, the world is lawful, articulated by alethic modal relations of incompatibility and necessary consequence, so conceptually contentful and graspable. ("To him who looks on the world rationally, the world looks rationally back," Hegel says elsewhere.¹²) It is, in Hegel's terms, thoroughly "mediated." On the other hand, it is shot through with brute immediacy, which impinges on thought through perception. Kant, following the empiricist tradition, conceives the task of conceptualizing sensuous immediacy as an uncompletable, infinite task. For him, sensuous immediacy is conceptually inexhaustible. There is no aspect of what you see when you look at the palm of your hand that you cannot express in a perceptual judgment. But no matter how many such judgments you make, you will never run out of new, as yet unexpressed judgments that would codify genuine features of what you see. One of Hegel's most original ideas is his understanding of the sense in which the immediacy of objective being outruns what can be captured conceptually in subjective thought, not in terms of its necessary *inexhaustibility* by empirical *judgments*, but in terms of the necessary *instability* of determinate empirical *concepts*.

For Hegel, the experience of error requires not just the revision of *beliefs* (doxastic commitments) but also of *meanings*—the concepts or conceptions that articulate empirical judgments. If my conception acid includes as circumstances of appropriate application tasting sour and as appropriate consequences of application turning litmus paper red, then if I run across something that tastes sour and turns litmus paper blue, I will find myself with commitments that are incompatible by my own lights. The world, it

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seems, will not let me have that conception of *acid*, because it commits me to consequences that do not in fact follow in the objective world. In response to registered anomalies, I might need to revise not just my doxastic commitments, but also my broadly inferential commitments concerning what is incompatible with what and what follows from what. In fact Hegel (in striking contrast to Kant) thinks that there is and could *in principle* be no set of determinate empirical concepts that when *correctly* applied to things (according to the normative circumstances and consequences of application defining those concepts) will not eventually lead to the undertaking of incompatible commitments articulated by those concepts, and hence to an experience of error. This is his way of registering immediacy as an irreducible, ineliminable aspect of determinate objective being, and hence of determinate thought about it.

The manifestation of stubborn, residual immediacy in thought is the inevitability of the experience of error. Every recollectively vindicated, rationally harmonious constellation of commitments achieved along the way is fragile, precarious, and temporary—doomed eventually to be riven by incompatibility and unmasked as presenting one more appearance of a reality that is thereby shown to be elusive. Such a view licenses the fallibilist meta-induction. Every previously adopted view has been found wanting—indeed, incoherent—so the way things are presently taken to be, and every way they will be taken to be in the future, also will turn out to misrepresent them. On such a view, experience would seem to be a skeptical “path of despair,” as Hegel puts it.

This is not the conclusion Hegel was aiming at. The *Introduction* starts off the book by insisting that we must not endorse a semantics that makes the achievement of genuine knowledge unintelligible in principle. And what becomes of the conceptual realism that was supposed to match the contents of commitments in thought with those of facts in the world, at least when all goes well? Holding on to hylomorphic conceptual realism while accepting that every constellation of determinately conceptually contentful commitments is doomed to be found to be incoherent (to include incompatible ones) would seem to yield the conclusion that the objective world itself is incoherent—“inconsistent.” Hegel sometimes puts his own claims in ways that invite such a reading.

Hegel presents the tension between the ineluctability of error and the realistic possibility of genuine knowledge as not only a destructive, but also a

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productive one. Both express valid perspectives on what is always at once both the experience of error and the way of truth. The important thing is not to seize exclusively—and so one-sidedly—on either aspect, but to understand the nature of the process as one that necessarily shows up from *both* perspectives. It is of the essence of the historical process of experience to afford both retrospective and prospective temporal perspectives on it. Looking back, from the vantage point of each recollectively vindicated constellation of commitments resulting from the repair of acknowledged incompatibility, one sees unbroken epistemic expressive progress culminating in the achievement of genuine knowledge of truths, as construed by bimodal hylomorphic conceptual realism. Looking forward, one sees the inevitable decay of each such beautiful harmony by the unavoidable advent of commitments incompatible with one another by their own lights, and the initiation of new trifold episodes of the experience of error. The retrospective point of view, recollectively producing by rational reconstruction an expressively progressive tradition in which what was implicit (*an sich*) becomes explicit for consciousness, makes visible the sense in which subjective thought can genuinely grasp the objective world: how things can be for consciousness what they are in themselves. The prospective point of view focuses on the ruptures occasioned by the disparities between successive recollective reconstructions, as what is endorsed by one is rejected by a later one. It makes visible the sense in which the immediacy of actual being, reflected in sensuous immediacy, inevitably outruns what is captured by any determinate conceptual (mediated) structure, inferentially articulated by relations of material incompatibility and consequence. We have seen that one of Hegel's animating ideas is that the independence of immediacy (its distinctive authority over structures of mediation) is manifested in its role as a principle of instability, as providing a normative demand for change, for both rejection and further development of each constellation of determinate concepts and commitments articulated by them. The independence of mediation (its distinctive authority over immediacy) is manifested in all the retrospective recollective vindications of prior constellations of commitments as genuine knowledge, as resulting from the expressively progressive revelation of reality by prior claims to knowledge.

Determinate negation, material incompatibility, is not only the fundamental *conceptual* structure, but also marks the moment of *immediacy* within what is conceptually articulated, whether on the side of being or of thought.

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Immediacy in the realm of being necessarily produces/reveals, via perception of cognitive error and practical failure, the incompatibilities of commitment that normatively oblige the knowing and acting subject to *do* something, to engage in the reparative and recollective phases of experience. The forward-looking obligation to repair acknowledged incompatibilities of commitment acknowledges error and the inadequacy of its conceptions. The backward-looking recollective obligation to rationalize as expressively progressive previous, now superseded, repairs and recollections institutes knowledge, truth, and determinate concepts whose incompatibilities and consequences track those articulating (in a different modal key) the objective world. Acknowledging this obligation by constructing retrospective expressively progressive recollective narratives is the form of Reason's march through history. It is what "looking on the world rationally" consists in.

The recollective process is also what Hegel calls "giving contingency the form of necessity." Objective immediacy, what brutally is, shows up cognitively (becomes something for consciousness, is expressed) as sensuous immediacy in the deliverances of commitments by perception. The "form of necessity" is a *normative* form. ("Necessary," "notwendig," for Kant means "in accordance with a rule. That is why it has for him two species: natural necessity, articulated by alethic modal relations, and practical necessity, articulated by deontic normative relations.) The intrusions of commitments arrived at noninferentially in perception give rise to anomalies through engendering incompatibilities. Giving those eruptions the form of necessity is incorporating them into an expressively progressive recollective narrative that exhibits them as the agents whereby the true contents of concepts are gradually revealed and become more explicit.

So a version of Kant's evenhandedness regarding the cognitive contributions of the faculties of understanding and sensibility is eventually reached within Hegel's more comprehensive rationalist order of metaphysical and semantic explanation, in the form of the equilibrium of retrospective and prospective perspectives on the process that is experience. A common caricature has Hegel, in a simple-minded rationalist way, trying to do with concepts alone what Kant does by dividing the labor between the discursive and the sensible. The real story is much more complicated and interesting.

Understanding the experiential process, which comprises both what shows up when that process is viewed retrospectively and what shows up when it is

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viewed prospectively, so as to see truth and error as equally essential, complementary aspects of it—as two sides of one coin—requires reconceptualizing both truth and determinateness. The key in each case is to understand them not as properties, states, or relations that can be instantiated at a single time, but as structural features of enduring experiential processes. This is making the shift between the static modern metaconceptual structure Hegel calls “Verstand” and the dynamic successor metaconceptual structure he calls “Vernunft.” According to the categories of *Verstand* as articulated by Kant, for instance, the understanding has available to it a stock of concepts that are determinate, in that it is already settled in advance what manifolds of intuition they can successfully synthesize. What is recognizably a cognate *Verstand* conception of determinateness shows up in Frege as the requirement that concepts fix extensions, in the sense of determining, for every possible object, whether that object does or does not fall under the concept. The view is that fixed, permanent truths can be formulated using concepts that are determinate in this sense, and that progress in knowledge consists in endorsing more and more such truths, and rejecting more and more falsehoods formulated in terms of those same determinate concepts. By contrast, the metaconceptual standpoint of *Vernunft* focuses on the malleability of concepts. In the toy example of an experience of error mentioned earlier, a subject finds herself with commitments incompatible by her own lights because she endorses a concept of acid that includes tasting sour as a sufficient reason for applying the concept, and turning litmus paper red as a necessary consequence of its application. Immediate perceptual experience of a liquid that tastes sour and turns litmus paper blue precipitates a crisis. While either of the perceptual judgments might be relinquished, progress can consist in amending the content attributed to the concept. Perhaps only substances that both taste sour and combine with metals to form salts should count as acids. Insofar as this emendation is successful, progress is made in that the subject deploys concepts that better track what really follows from what in the objective world. The experience of error obliges not only change of belief, but change of meaning.

The metaconceptual move that takes us from *vorstellen* to *begreifen* (*Verstand* to *Vernunft*) is the replacement of the model of experience as *representation*, an external relation between independently specifiable realms of representations and representeds, confronting each other across a gulf, by a model of

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experience as *expression*. This is an internal process of development whereby each single content, retrospectively recollectively identifiable as persisting throughout the process of its development, shows up originally in implicit form and is gradually expressed or unfolds, becoming available in ever more explicit form. Experience is the process whereby the determinate, and so mediated contents implicit in immediacy come to appear as explicitly mediated. Representational relations take their explanatorily subsidiary place as arising from one aspect of the activity of developing conceptual contents.

The residue of traditional *Verstand* ways of thinking about cognitive progress that consists in understanding experience as progressive insofar as it asymptotically approaches objective facts and relations of incompatibility and consequence is, according to the more capacious *Vernunft* picture, one-sided and incomplete. It results from appreciating only the retrospective-recollective perspective on experience, which underwrites talk of “facts” (true claims) and “what really follows from (excludes) what” (objective consequences and incompatibilities) from within each vindicating recollective rational reconstruction. Experience is indeed the royal road of truth and knowledge—but it is not that alone. Taking into account also the prospective perspective on experience, which focuses on the fragility and necessarily temporary character of any and every set of doxastic and inferential commitments, requires thinking of truth and determinateness as features of the process of experience, rather than as goals it asymptotically approaches. Experience is the truth-process. And it is the process of *determining* conceptual contents. It is expressively progressive, in the sense that the retrospective-recollective perspective shows it to be genuinely revelatory of reality. That experiential process *both* institutes (on the subjective side) and discovers (on the objective side) conceptually articulated contents, and so truths, that are determinate in the Kant-Frege *Verstand* sense (in its recollective phase) *and* engenders their dissolution in the discovery of residual error.

The comprehensive view that encompasses both what shows up as progressive from the retrospective-recollective perspective and what shows up as disruptive and erroneous from the prospective perspective (corresponding to different phases of the process of experience) is summarized in a central passage from the *Preface*:

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[T]his whole movement constitutes what is positive [in it] and its truth. This truth therefore includes the negative also, what would be called the false, if it could be regarded as something from which one might abstract. The evanescent itself must, on the contrary, be regarded as essential, not as something fixed, cut off from the True, and left lying who knows where outside it, any more than the True is to be regarded as something on the other side, positive and dead. Appearance is the arising and passing away that does not itself arise and pass away, but is “in itself,” and constitutes the actuality and the movement of the life of truth. [PG 47]

“Appearance” here is the phenomena, the world as it shows up for consciousness, in the form of conceptual contents articulated by relations of material incompatibility and consequence, which are endorsed by the knowing, acting subject of the cycle of cognition and action that is the process of experience. Although each such phenomenon is unmasked as erroneous, as an *appearance* that in some ways *misrepresents* reality, the recollective phase of experience also reveals each such constellation of commitments to be an appearance *of* a noumenal reality (what things are in themselves) represented by it, visible as having been all along implicit in it, gradually but inexorably emerging into greater explicitness. The passage continues with one of the most justly famous images of the whole book:

The True is thus the Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunk; yet because each member collapses as soon as he drops out, the revel is just as much transparent and simple repose. Judged in the court of this movement, the single shapes of Spirit do not persist any more than determinate thoughts do, but they are as much positive and necessary moments, as they are negative and evanescent. In the whole of the movement, seen as a state of repose, what distinguishes itself therein, and gives itself particular existence, is preserved as something that *recollects* itself [sich erinnert]. [PG 47]

In interpreting this allegory, it is important to keep in mind the two levels of concepts I have claimed are being considered. The surface topic is “shapes of Spirit,” various forms exhibited by the normativity articulating the thinkings

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and doings of self-conscious subjects, traditional, modern, and beyond. This is one of the places where Hegel explicitly marks that, besides thoughts and concepts at this categorial metalevel, he is also addressing the nature and evolution of ground-level determinate thoughts and concepts. A characteristic feature of the “pragmatist semantic” reading I have been presenting here is “semantic descent”: focusing on what we are supposed to learn about the use and content of these ordinary empirical and practical “determinate” concepts and commitments. Here the partygoers participating in the movable feast are those commitments: doxastic, practical, and inferential—in the broad sense that articulates conceptual content and so includes commitments concerning what is materially incompatible with (“determinately negates”) what. The revel is the process of experience. What matters about the image of their drunkenness is its picturing of the restless, woozy jostling and elbowing of each other as different contents of potential commitments that are incompatible with each other in the company of the others already on board seek a place at the table. Those that are forced out are immediately replaced by others, so the party continues, though with a shifting cast. The crucial contribution to the festivities that was made by the departed members, those who at some earlier point slipped insensible beneath the table, is still “preserved as recollected,” in the story the later revelers tell about how they got where they are.

This recollective activity establishes the relation between a sequence of phenomena (appearances, senses, representings) and noumena (reality, referents, representeds) in which the latter shows up twice: both as the current constellation of explicitly endorsed conceptual contents in which the rationally reconstructed sequence culminates and also as having been all along implicit in and normatively governing that sequence, by serving as the standard for assessing the expressive success of all of its members. It is because the account grounds the semantic *relations* between senses and referents, representings and representeds, in this recollective *activity* of the experiencing subject that it deserves to be thought of as offering a *pragmatist semantics*.

Conceptual idealism (the *begreifen* that comprehends *vorstellen*) claims both that that semantic, representational relation is to be understood only expressively, in terms of recollective activity, and that it is actually produced or instituted by that activity. The first is a sense-dependence claim, and the

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second is a reference-dependence claim. (What both address is representational relations between senses and referents.) The distinctive kind of doing that is experience for Hegel is, in its reparative and recollective phases, shaping and determining the conceptual contents the subject endorses at the end of each tripartite episode. In that sense it is making or producing conceptions (conceptual contents)—for instance, of acids as what both taste sour and combine with metals to produce salts. This is one sense of “determining conceptual contents”: determining as making up. But the recollective process essentially includes a commitment to having *found* what it in this sense makes. It is a process of *discovery* of what has according to it all along been being expressed and represented, first less and then more adequately, by the sequence of always partly erroneous constellations of commitments in the expressively progressive trajectory retrospectively recollectively rationally reconstructed. This is another sense of “determining conceptual contents”: determining as finding out.

That it is a finding rather than a making is an essential, constitutive commitment even of the jurisprudential species of recollection, which develops and determines legal concepts that are not empirical concepts, in that they are not controlled by perceptually immediate (in the sense of noninferentially elicited) applications of other legal concepts. To use an example of Frege’s, though we might progressively redraw the boundaries of the North Sea, we are not producing the thing itself by doing that. We produce it at most *as* the North Sea, *as* what is picked out by that concept. Repair of an anomaly and its recollective vindication produce new conceptions, articulated by deontic normative relations of material incompatibility and consequence. But the result of those activities as such purports to find alethic modal forms of those relations in the objective world being represented. In this hylomorphic sense, the conceptual contents consciousness finds in the world are just those that it has recollectively made. Conceptual idealism asserts that when, as self-conscious in the sense of being conscious of itself *as* conscious, consciousness distinguishes between its certainty and truth, between what things are for it and what they are in themselves, between appearance and reality, representings and representeds, it is neither alienating itself from itself nor acknowledging a confrontation with something alien to it. Its *finding out* how things really are is a distinctive, *sui generis* kind of active recollective *making* of that distinction, which is essential to consciousness as

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such, through its experience. The world as it is in itself *as* distinct from how it is for consciousness is not a brute other, but in that distinctive sense the product of its own recollective activity in experience. (This is not a reference-dependence claim.) In this sense consciousness finds only what it has made—and not only made findable. In this sense, it sees itself in the objects of its knowledge, even insofar as they transcend that knowledge.

One might be tempted to object that the recollective phenomenological story at most tells us about what activity institutes the semantic representational relation between what things are *for* consciousness and what they are *in* themselves as that relation practically shows up *to* consciousness. And the thought would be that we want rather to know what that semantic representational relation is objectively, in itself. This is a question at the metalevel. The response is that the *begrifflich-Vernunft* recollective story makes explicit how the institution of semantic representational relations by reparative-recollective reconstructions really works, in itself. And the story is that claims of this form are vindicated by retrospective recollective rational reconstructions of the process by which we found out that this is how things really work (in this case, how consciousness really works). That is exactly the metalevel story Hegel tells, in the form of a phenomenology of “shapes of *Geist*.”

VII. Normativity and Recognition

The semantic story about how to understand both how facts as true thinkables are genuinely knowable and how the authority of facts over thought is manifested in the in-principle instability and untenability of every determinate conception of them is also a pragmatic story about the reciprocal relations of authority and responsibility that relate normative attitudes and normative statuses. The attitude-dependence of normative statuses is articulated by understanding normative statuses as instituted by reciprocal recognitive attitudes. The retrospective recollective perspective fills in the countervailing status-dependence of normative attitudes, by exhibiting the concepts that determine the statuses as the culminating phase of an expressively progressive tradition of ever more adequate conceptions normatively governed by the facts they reveal. The prospective disruptive perspective fills in the status-

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dependence of normative attitudes, by exhibiting each conception as inevitably failing adequately to express the objective concepts articulating the facts, which serve as the normative standards for assessing the correctness of the various conceptions. In this way, justice is done to the attitude-transcendence of normative statuses: the way what a subject is really committed to goes beyond anyone's attitudes, beyond what that subject acknowledges and what others attribute.

Because the relations between normative attitudes and normative statuses on the normative pragmatic side of the subject in this way mirror the semantic relations between what things are for consciousness and what they are in themselves, understanding Hegel's *begrifflich Vernunft*-structured historical biperspectival account of the relations between subjective conceptions and objective concepts decisively moves us beyond the *alienation* he diagnoses as characteristic of modernity. For the challenge he sees us facing is how to hold on to modernity's defining insight into the attitude-dependence of normative statuses while reachieving the ancient *sittlich* appreciation of the status-dependence of normative attitudes. That is what the pragmatist semantics of conceptual idealism shows us how to do. The truth that shall set us free is truth understood as a vast Bacchanalian revel with not a soul sober, in which no sooner does one member of the party fall insensible beneath the table than his place is taken by another. For this semantic account explains how normative statuses can at once be instituted by (a tradition of) normative attitudes and also transcend those attitudes, exerting authority by both serving as a normative standard for assessments of the correctness of those attitudes and being what the attitudes reconstructed as expressively progressive are exhibited as subjunctively sensitive to.

Fully to appreciate Hegel's resolution of the challenge set by alienation from norms—the loss of intelligibility of their binding force—that results from modernity's recognition that those norms are instituted by subjective attitudes requires further attention to the fine structure of his account of how attitudes institute normative statuses that transcend and exert authority over those attitudes. The context in which the problem of how to understand this most pointedly arises for Hegel, and which provides the raw materials he re-assembles for his own account, is Kant's autonomy model of the institution of normative statuses by normative attitudes. The strong version of the Enlightenment insight into the attitude-dependence of normative statuses is the

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idea that normative statuses are *instituted by* normative attitudes. It is not just that there are no normative statuses of authority and responsibility except in a context where people *take* each other to have authority and *hold* each other responsible. The thought is that such attitudes of attributing and acknowledging responsibility and authority actually *produce* those statuses. Normative statuses are creatures of normative attitudes.

Kant implements an especially clear version of this thought. For Kant thinks that discursive subjects can *make* themselves responsible by *taking* themselves to be responsible. Indeed, on his understanding of normative bindingness, one is genuinely *normatively* bound only by commitments one has laid down for oneself, rules one has bound *oneself* by. (Some commitments turn out to be categorial—to explicate the structure of rational commitment as such—and so to be implicit in undertaking any determinate commitments.) For Kant, concepts are rules that determine what one makes oneself responsible for by applying them, whether doxastically in judgment or practically in acting intentionally. The content of the concept determines what commitment one has undertaken, what normative status one has acquired, by adopting the attitude of acknowledging it.

Hegel notices two potential problems with an account of this shape. First, though it is easy to think of autonomy as an *ability* possessed by rational knowers and agents—the ability to bind themselves by norms—it is a distinctively *normative* ability. In fact, it is a kind of *authority*. To treat someone as a rational being is to attribute to her the *authority* to bind herself by her attitudes, to become responsible or committed (subject to normative assessment) by acknowledging responsibilities or commitments. This authority is the *dignity* of rational subjects, and Kant takes it that other rational subjects have a duty or obligation to acknowledge and attribute that authority. That is the duty to *respect* their autonomy. But he does not take it that the authority that is autonomy is itself instituted by the attitudes of those who respect that normative status. The authority that is autonomy and the responsibility on the part of others to respect that authority are normative statuses that are not understood as instituted by normative attitudes. These normative metastatuses are brutally taken just to be part of what it is to be a rational normative subject, and not further accounted for. That the Kantian account has this structure might make it easier to retain a version of the status-dependence of normative attitudes, on which the premodern tradi-

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tion focused. But that advantage is bought at the cost of not fully respecting the strong version of the modern insight into the attitude-dependence of all normative statuses.

A more serious issue concerns the *contents* of the attitudes that institute commitments according to the autonomy model. Those commitments, in judgment and intention, have determinate contents only insofar as the subject has available concepts with such contents. The model says that it is up to me whether I am committed—for instance, to the coin’s being copper. But if the relations of material incompatibility and consequence that articulate the concept copper I have applied in undertaking the commitment are *also* up to me, then I have undertaken no determinate commitment at all. As Wittgenstein says: “If whatever is going to seem right to me is right, that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right.’” [*PI* §258] Concepts with determinate contents serve as normative standards for assessing whether the subject who applies them has fulfilled the rational responsibilities undertaken thereby—has acknowledged incompatibilities and drawn appropriate conclusions. Hegel wants to know how it is that the subject has access to such determinately contentful normative standards. If they cannot be the products of the attitudes of the one who applies them in judgment, where do they come from? He does not find an adequate answer in Kant.

One of the master ideas of the interpretation of Hegel developed in this work is that a principal task of the *Phenomenology* is to explain the advent of determinately contentful concepts: their nature and the process of experience that not only applies but institutes them. That is what makes this a “semantic” reading. The trouble with the Kantian story is that it in effect envisages two different processes, one that *produces* determinate conceptual contents and a different one that then *applies* them in experience. For Kant, all empirical activity, whether cognitive or practical, consists in applying concepts. That is really the only thing Kantian rational subjects can do. So empirical activity presupposes the availability of the determinately contentful concepts whose application it consists in. Determining the contents of those concepts happens somewhere else, offstage. Once the conceptual enterprise is up and running, making judgment possible in the first place, Kantian judgments of reflection can form new concepts from old ones. But the institution of determinately contentful concepts generally is a precondition of experience, not a product of it. Hegel, by contrast, offers an account

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of experience as at once instituting and applying determinately contentful concepts.

For these two reasons, both because it takes the crucial normative meta-statuses as not instituted by attitudes and because it unduly separates the institution of determinate conceptual contents from their empirical application, Hegel cannot just take over Kant's autonomy story about the institution of normative statuses by normative attitudes. But he does find in Kant's account all the raw materials he needs for his successor account. The leading idea of that account is that instituting normative statuses requires cognitive attitudes that are *symmetrical, reciprocal, or mutual*.

Each is for the other the middle term, through which each mediates itself with itself and unites with itself; and each is for itself, and for the other, an immediate being on its own account, which at the same time is such only through this mediation. They *recognize* themselves as *mutually recognizing* one another. [PG 184; emphasis added]

It is this symmetrical cognitive constellation of basic normative attitudes and statuses that he refers to in the very next sentence as "the pure Notion of recognition, of the duplicating of self-consciousness in its oneness." It is the basic structure of robust general recognition, in which suitably socially complemented cognitive attitudes institute statuses of cognitive authority, their normative subjects, and the dyadic community that consists of normative subjects who actually reciprocally recognize and are recognized by each other. "The elaboration of the concept of this spiritual unity within its doubling presents us with the movement of *recognition*." [PG 178]

Recognizing others is practically taking or treating them as the subjects of normative attitudes and statuses. More specifically, in the model, it is the attitude of attributing the status of authority to institute statuses by one's attitudes, when those attitudes are suitably complemented. This is a version of the sort of authority that is Kantian autonomy, differing in understanding the constellation of attitudes that can institute (actualize otherwise virtual) statuses as socially mediated rather than individually immediate. Adopting cognitive attitudes in this sense is applying to the one recognized an articulated normative concept of a self. It is consciousness of a self *as* a self. The recognizing consciousness also has that concept applied to it; it is a recog-

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nizing self *for* a recognizing self. But the self it is a self for, the one that is conscious of it as a self is not itself, but the recognized-recognizing other self. The self-consciousness that is instituted and actualized for the recognizing-and-recognized individuals making up the recognitive dyad is a property they have *as* a recognitive dyad. It is only secondarily and as a result that it is a property of each individual. Hegel refers to the recognitive community of recognizing-and-recognized individual normative subjects as “Spirit” [Geist].

“Independence” is in the model *authority*: the authority of the several recognitive subjects. It is not *immediate* authority (independence), but authority that is socially *mediated* by the attitudes of others, who attribute it in recognizing the independent normative subject *as* authoritative. “Freedom” is Hegel’s term for the symmetrical recognitive constellation that integrates immediacy as the actuality of attitudes with their social mediation (through the requirement of suitable complementation of attitudes for their institutional authority). Hegel’s idea is that when recognitive attitudes are symmetrical, when each party attributes to the other the authority to institute by their attitudes both responsibilities on their own part and authority on the other’s part, then genuine normative statuses are instituted.

In the mutual recognition model, authority and responsibility are coordinate and complementary. It is entirely up to me whom I recognize: to whom I attribute the authority to institute normative statuses by their attitudes, when those attitudes are suitably complemented by those to whom they attribute them. In doing so, though, I make myself responsible to those I do recognize. For while it is up to me in that same sense (I have the authority) to acknowledge commitments (responsibilities) on my own part, it is not in the same sense up to me whether I succeed in *making* myself responsible by *so taking* myself to be responsible. My acknowledgment of a commitment, my claim of authority, yield actual statuses of responsibility and authority only if those statuses are also attributed to me by those I have granted the authority to do so, by recognizing them. Nothing but attitudes are necessary (or sufficient) to institute genuine normative statuses. But on the Hegelian recognitive model such normative statuses are understood as essentially *social* statuses. It is *our* attitudes—my attitudes *and* the attitudes of those I recognize and who recognize me, a recognitive community—that institute normative statuses. My attitudes play an essential role in determining what

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authority and responsibility I have, but I cannot make myself authoritative or responsible all on my own.

It is this feature that makes intelligible how, by my attitudes of acknowledgment and recognition, I can bind myself by norms that are *not* simply a matter of my attitudes—so that it is *not* the case that “whatever seems right to me is right,” in which case any norm governing assessments of right or wrong would accordingly drop out of the picture. It is up to me whether I use the term “copper” to express my claim, and so claim that the coin is copper. But the boundaries of the commitment I have succeeded in undertaking thereby, what is incompatible with it and what its consequences are, is administered by those I have granted that authority by recognizing them as metallurgical experts. On Hegel’s account, the distinction between force and content, between the attitude I express and the determinately contentful norm I thereby bind myself by, is practically enforced by a *social* division of labor. It is administered by different bearers of authority and responsibility. My authority is balanced by that of the recognitive community instituted by our reciprocal recognitive attitudes. Each of us is responsible to all the others for the constitution of that community, and of the normative statuses (including normative selfhood) that are instituted by our reciprocal attitudes. That is how the attitude-dependence of normative statuses and the status-dependence of normative attitudes are reconciled.

At this point one might ask: But what of the process of experience, and the crucial role in it played by the retrospective-recollective institution of an expressively progressive tradition? The social division of labor in the story about the institution of normative statuses by reciprocal recognitive attitudes is from a temporal point of view horizontal, a matter of relations among contemporaries. The story about experience, in contrast, is essentially historical, temporally vertical, with the crucial relations holding between earlier and later episodes of experience. How do the social and the historical dimensions of Hegel’s story mesh?

The answer is that the social and historical dimensions are intimately related. Both are to be understood in normative terms of recognitive relations of authority and responsibility. So construed, the historical, temporally biperspectival account of how the process of experience institutes representational relations between phenomena and noumena, appearance and reality, senses and referents, and normative attitudes and normative statuses shows

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up as a crucial special case of the social reciprocal recognition model of the institution of normative statuses by normative attitudes. For the triphasic experiential process by which representational relations to determinate conceptual contents are both made and found (considered prospectively and retrospectively, respectively) exhibits the structure of coordinate, reciprocal authority and responsibility characteristic of the institution of normative statuses by mutual recognitive attitudes. The historical process of determining conceptual contents in the *Vernunft* sense is a social recognitive process.

This point emerges most clearly, perhaps, in the institutionalized case of the determination of the contents of legal concepts by the judges who both make and apply common and case law. The norms in that example are laws, which must be determinately contentful in that they must settle what conduct is forbidden and what conduct is required by them (what is incompatible with or necessitated by them). In that forum, there is nothing to institute those norms except the attitudes of the judges, practically expressed in the decisions they make in applying them. That is the sense in which these norms are properly thought of as “judge-made law.” Each judge exercises real authority in each case she is deciding—in applying the legal concepts in question to novel sets of facts, specified in terms of nonlegal concepts. But it is authority constrained by corresponding responsibilities. For the judge’s decision is authoritative only insofar as its authority is recognized by future judges. If they do not treat the case as correctly decided, given law the judge inherited, they will not treat it as having precedential authority for their own decisions. In deciding a case, in applying the legal concepts one way rather than another, the judge is in effect petitioning future judges for recognition, for the authority to determine the content of the normative status, the law, by the attitudes she manifests in applying it that way. Their decision about whether to grant that authority is a decision about the extent to which the judge has been responsible to the authority of prior judges’ decisions as to the proper boundaries of the legal concepts in play. The authority of the “law-making” judge is balanced by responsibility to the applications of prior judges, the content of the norm inherited from them. And the judge is responsible to future judges in that they *hold* that judge responsible *to* the authority of the tradition she inherits. They administer that authority. And of course, no future judge’s decision to treat the current judge’s decision as precedential or

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not is itself finally authoritative. It, too, is responsible to the (equally defeasible) authority of judges of the still further future.

The recollective process is how causes get shaped into reasons. Even if what the judge had for breakfast made her decide as she did—in that the genealogical subjunctive is true that if she had eaten something different, she would have decided differently—a suitable recollective narrative can exhibit the decision as nonetheless *correct*: as a making explicit of some aspects of the content of the law that the recollection exhibits as having been all along implicit. The attitude so caused is exhibited as expressive of a genuine norm, and hence as reason providing for future judges. Recollection is a kind of rationalization. But it is not unconstrained. The authority of a present judge's retrospective rationalization must be recognized by future judges to be more than just an attitude. Though he does not offer an alternative metaphysics of *Vernunft*, I take it that if he could be brought to use such language, Wittgenstein would agree with Hegel that one of the alienating culprits responsible for our inability to hold together the attitude-dependence of normative statuses and the status-dependence of normative attitudes is a deformed, dualism-inducing conception of the relations between reasons and causes.

What is enacted in determining the content of legal concepts this way is recognizably a version of the model of instituting normative statuses by reciprocal cognitive attitudes. At each stage in the determination of the content of legal concepts, the authority of each judge's attitudes over the developing content is balanced by a correlative responsibility to the norm being applied. The normative labor of instituting the norm by applying it is divided between different normative subjects. Authority is real (a normative status, not just an attitude of claiming authority) only insofar as it is recognized. And the authority of the recognizer suitably to complement the attitude of claiming or attributing authority must itself be recognized by others, on pain of demotion from actual to virtual: from status to mere attitude. Both the attitude-dependence of normative statuses and the status-dependence of normative attitudes are in play at every point. For the authority of actual applications over the developing conceptual contents (making law) and the responsibility of such applications to the inherited conceptual contents (finding law) are active throughout. In the process of determining content (in the *sui generis* making/finding sense of "determining"), each generation inherits binding norms. But (seen prospectively) each alters them

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by their attitudes. This is how *we* (in the temporally extended sense) can both be bound by the norms we inherit, looking back, and make the norms, going forward.

VIII. Dimensions of Holism: Identity through Difference

It is worth briefly rehearsing a different path that can be taken through the story told here, emphasizing a common structure that is cumulatively developed in it. One of the big ideas that distinguishes Hegel's thought from that of his predecessors is his commitment to what would come to be called "holism." He talks about it under the heading of a new "speculative" conception of identity. Understood speculatively, identity is not to be contrasted with difference, but is to be thought of as comprising and being articulated by difference. We are to think first of a whole that is what it is, whose identity consists in, its different parts standing in the relations to one another that they do. Then we are to think of the parts themselves as being identified and individuated functionally, by the roles they play in constituting the whole in question. They are not to be thought of as self-standing, in that they are the things they are antecedently to and independently of being related to each other in the way they are in the whole that comprises them. Rather, they are identified and individuated by the functional roles they play in the whole. The parts play different roles in constituting the whole. But we are to think both that those differences are essential to the identity of the whole and that standing in the relations to the other different parts that they do is essential to the identity of each part. For these reasons, Hegel will say that the parts, though different from one another, are identical to one another "in the speculative sense," which is compatible with and depends upon them also being different from one another.

Conceptual structures of this abstract shape—holistic conceptual structures—are ubiquitous in Hegel's thought. He was the first to try to think through, consecutively and rigorously, what is involved in such holistic structures. And there is room for skepticism about whether the general concept is so much as intelligible. How, exactly, is the individuating work done? The whole is identified and individuated by the relations among its parts, and the parts are identified and individuated by their relations to each other in

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forming the whole that they do. There is potentially a chicken-and-egg circularity problem with this specification. Hegel's characterization of such structures as "infinite" and his suggestion that they are to be understood by "traversing the moments" (at the end of *Force and Understanding*), might seem to acknowledge the difficulty without offering much concrete help in addressing it. The battle over Hegel's later reception in *fin de siècle* British Idealism was largely waged over this issue of the intelligibility and usefulness of the idea that "all relations are internal relations." The underlying distinction between internal and external relations was sometimes conveyed by the example of a ladder. The relations between its rails and its rungs are what make it a ladder. It is only by standing in those relations to each other that the bits of wood make up a ladder. By contrast, the relations between the ladder and wall it is leaning up against and the ground it is standing on are external to it. Move it, take it out of those relations, and it remains a ladder and the ladder that it is. Its internal relations are essential to (necessary for) its identity. Its external relations are accidental to (contingent with respect to) its identity. This is the model Quine had in mind when he said (in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism") that meaning is what essence becomes when it is detached from the thing and attached to the word. At the extremes, British Absolute Idealists thought of all relations as internal (Russell's "world as a bowl of jelly") and atomists thought of all relations as external (Russell's "world as a bucket of shot"). Whitehead cited both as united in committing the "fallacy of lost contrast."

But this is not the level of generality at which Hegel's holism should be considered. It is best approached in terms of the various detailed uses Hegel makes of holist structures in his pragmatics and semantics, and in the intricate relations among them. We can begin with his recognitive metaphysics of normativity. Particular biological organisms, individuated by their different desires, adopt recognitive attitudes toward one another. They thereby institute recognitive communities—a kind of whole or universal—of those who are recognized by those they recognize. As members of such communities, as particulars "falling under" such universals, they become more than just the particulars with which we began. They become self-conscious individual normative subjects of statuses of authority and responsibility. The identity of the community is constituted by the recognitive relations among its different members, and those members are the more-than-merely-particular individuals they are by standing in just the recognitive relations

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to others that they do. They are identified and individuated by their recognitive relations to those specifically different from them. Any worries about the circularity of holistically individuated individuals and the universals that characterize them are resolved by the role of the orrectically individuated particular organisms who recognitively bootstrap themselves from the realm of *Natur* to that of *Geist*. (I have argued elsewhere that a crucial role played by immediacy in mediated conceptual structures is precisely to provide antecedently individuated vehicles for holistically defined significances.¹³)

But we have seen that this simple story of the institution of norms by mutual recognition is just the beginning of Hegel's sophisticated metaphysics of normativity. The critique of the Master's practical conception of pure independence, authority without correlative responsibility, shows that these two fundamental normative statuses (aspects of what subjects are in themselves) are holistically related. Authority and responsibility are reciprocally sense-dependent and reference-dependent on one another. For one's commitment to be determinately contentful, the authority to undertake such commitments must be balanced by the authority of others to hold one responsible for them.

Unpacking the recognitive model a bit further has showed that the two fundamental normative attitudes of attributing and acknowledging responsibility and authority—which express the difference in social perspective between what subjects are for others and what they are for themselves—are also holistically related to one another. They, too, are reciprocally sense-dependent and globally reference-dependent on one another. One cannot understand one except as part of a whole that includes the relations of these different attitudes toward one another, and subjects cannot have the capacity to adopt one practical capacity unless they have the capacity to adopt the other. Further, when we look at the normative fine structure of the recognitive process by which normative statuses are instituted by normative attitudes—in particular, when we look at the way the recognitive model grows out of and builds on the basic Kantian normative status of having the authority to commit oneself (make oneself responsible by acknowledging a responsibility)—we see that the various normative attitudes and the various normative statuses are all holistically related to one another, too. Normative statuses are both reciprocally sense-dependent and reciprocally reference-dependent on normative attitudes.

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The recognitive model of the institution of normative statuses by normative attitudes shows very well the attitude-dependence of normative statuses. The converse status-dependence of normative attitudes shows up at several levels. One must have the recognitive authority to hold another responsible in order for one's recognitive attitudes to count as suitably complementary and so able to cooperate in instituting a determinately contentful status. More deeply, for one's acknowledgment or attribution of a responsibility to be determinately contentful, those attitudes must be acknowledgments or attributions of normative statuses with determinate contents. Explicating the status-dependence of normative attitudes in Hegel's metaphysics of normativity requires attention to the *contentfulness* attitudes inherit from the statuses they are attitudes toward.

The semantics implicit in Hegel's normative pragmatics begins with his nonpsychological conception of the conceptual. To be conceptually contentful is to stand in relations of determinate negation (and so of mediation) to other such contentful items. The identity of each conceptual content consists in its relations of exclusive difference (contrariety) to other such contents, and the identity of the Concept that comprises them all is articulated by those relations of exclusive difference between all its component determinate conceptual contents. Here, too, to avoid paradox or regress we should think of immediately distinguishable particulars as bearers or vehicles of these conceptual contents. Those contents can then be thought of as identified and individuated by the relations of material incompatibility and consequence they stand in to other such contents. In discussing the *Perception* chapter we saw how Hegel unpacks what is implicit in this picture of conceptual content to derive a complex, multilayered holistic structure of properties and objects. Already at this point there is a *lot* more metaphysical fine structure to the holistic systems Hegel is considering than are hinted at in the simple-minded summary in terms of identity through difference with which I began. And we saw that *Force and Understanding* both takes the unpacking of holistic structures still further and takes the nature of such structures as an explicit topic. It is here that we get such characteristic specifications as these:

These moments are not divided into two independent extremes offering each other only an opposite extreme: their essence rather consists

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simply and solely in this, that each *is* solely through the other, and what each thus is it immediately no longer is, since it *is* the other. They have thus, in fact, no substance of their own, which might support and maintain them. [PG 141]

[A] *difference* which is no *difference*, or only a difference of what is *self-same*, and its essence is unity. The two distinguished moments both subsist [bestehen]; they are *implicit* and are *opposites in themselves*, i.e. each is the opposite of itself; each has its “other” within it and they are only one unity. [PG 161]

That the simple character of law is infinity means, according to what we have found, a) that it is *self-identical*, but is also in itself *different*; or it is the selfsame which repels itself from itself or sunders itself into two. . . . b) What is thus dirempted [Entzweite], which constitutes the parts . . . exhibits itself as a stable existence . . . but c) through the Notion of inner difference, these unlike and indifferent moments . . . are a *difference* which is no *difference* or only a difference of what is *self-same*, and its essence is unity. . . . The two distinguished moments both subsist; they are *implicit* and are *opposites in themselves*, i.e. each is the opposite of itself; each has its “other” within it and they are only one unity. [PG 161]

At the high level of metaconceptual abstraction at which we can characterize a conceptual structure as “holistic,” then, we see generically the same kind of holism characterizing Hegel’s initial conception of conceptual content that we saw characterize his recognitive conception of relations among normative attitudes and normative statuses. But we also saw that that conception of conceptual content is hylomorphic. Conceptual contents in Hegel’s sense can take two forms, objective and subjective, depending on whether the relations of determinate negation (material incompatibility) that articulate them are construed in alethic modal terms or deontic normative ones—that is, whether their exclusive difference means that it is *impossible* for two properties to be coinstantiated, or two states of affairs both to obtain, or whether it is merely *impermissible* for one subject to acknowledge two corresponding commitments.

The intentional relations between conceptual contents of these two forms (the one articulating subjective thoughts and the other objective states of

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affairs) are the basis of the *representational* dimension of conceptual content: “of”-intentionality rather than the “that”-intentionality articulated by relations of determinate negation. We saw that these representational relations between the two equally holistic forms of conceptual content (representings and representeds, Hegelian senses and referents, phenomena and noumena) are to be understood in terms of the *recollective* phase of experience. The process and practice that is experience in Hegel’s sense has both cognitive and practical dimensions. It inevitably is the experience of error and failure, but it is also the process and the practice whereby conceptual contents are determined and truth discovered. The exercise of recollective rationality reveals determinate conceptual contents and norms with those contents as governing the process of discovering them through experience. It is the practice that articulates at once the status-dependence of normative attitudes crucial to Hegel’s normative pragmatics and the notion of determinate conceptual content central to his semantics, tying them together holistically in a pragmatist account. Recollection in one sense makes, and in another sense finds, holistic interdependences between not only the two forms of conceptual content on the semantic side and the attitudes and statuses on the side of normative pragmatics, but the semantic distinctions and the pragmatic ones. As the origin of the distinction between sense and referent, the holistic interdependences recollection makes visible are not assimilable either to sense-dependence or to reference-dependence. The result is a holistic pragmatist interdependence of pragmatics and semantics. Hegelian holism is a house with many mansions. Hegel is happy to talk about each of the interdependencies it comprises, and about the system of all of them together, as exhibiting the holistic structure of identity through difference he calls “infinity.”

IX. Truth as Subject, *Geist* as Self-Conscious

Like this Conclusion, Hegel’s *Preface* (written after the rest of the book) states some of the largest and most important claims he understands the whole book to entitle him to make. It is not a bit of philosophical argumentation that is supposed to do the entitling. Nor is it more than a minimal explanation of those claims. What we get in the *Preface* are only the minimal articu-

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lations necessary to locate, for one who has mastered the whole work, which features of it are being invoked and labeled. It is valuable for giving us in one place an overview of what Hegel takes himself to have established, a general picture of what he thinks he has accomplished.

The central slogan of the *Preface* is that

everything turns on grasping and expressing the True not only as Substance, but equally as Subject. [PG 17]

Grasping the true is implicitly comprehending it, while expressing it is explicitly comprehending it. The latter involves the use of specifically logical vocabulary, of the sort Hegel deploys in the *Phenomenology*. The centrality of the claim that the True is not only Substance but Subject is indicated by its repetition—it appears with only slight variations in [PG 18], [PG 25], [PG 32], [PG 37], [PG 39], [PG 54], and [PG 65]. Let us look first at “the True.” In [PG 20] we are told that the True is the whole. In this idiom we do not find the opposition between truth and certainty that is in play in the rest of the book. The truth of Spirit’s self-consciousness and its certainty coincide when it knows itself absolutely.

The True . . . is the process of its own becoming, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal, having its end also as its beginning; and only by being worked out to its end, is it actual. [PG 18]

Here Hegel is talking about the expository process he pursues in the *Phenomenology* of philosophically making explicit what is implicit in ordinary empirical and practical concept-use, by considering the various “shapes of [self-]consciousness” that express different structural categories in terms of which it can be rendered. But he is also talking about the process of experience by which the contents of those concepts are determined and show up as representing how things really are. The recollective phase of each episode of experience places the explicit result in which experience (so far) culminates back at the beginning of the process, as having always all along implicitly governed the development of a constellation of commitments, as the normative standard for assessments of the partial success and failure of each prior

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episode in the process—episodes now rationally reconstructed into an unbroken, cumulative expressive progression. The truth is

the process which begets and traverses its own moments, and this whole movement constitutes what is positive [in it] and its truth. This truth therefore includes the negative also, what would be called the false, if it could be regarded as something from which one might abstract. The evanescent itself must, on the contrary, be regarded as essential, not as something fixed, cut off from the True. [PG 47]

(This is the passage that continues with the metaphor of truth as a Bacchanalian revel with not a soul sober.) It is by comprehending this process as a whole that we are to understand the dual manifestations of the true as substance and as subject.

The role the logical or speculative concept of substance has played in the body of the work is that of what constrains cognition and action, that on which individuals depend or answer to in experience. We have heard about two basic sorts of substance: *natural* substance and *ethical* [sittlich] substance. The first comprises the inorganic and organic aspects of things, as they at once provide an arena within which we actualize and express ourselves, and set standards for successful cognition and action. The second is the norm-governed, norm-instituting recognitive community. The two correspond to what are called, in the terminology Hegel inherits from Kant, natural and practical necessity. (“Necessary” for Kant means “according to a rule.”) We have seen that the two kinds of rules articulating these two kinds of necessity are made explicit in alethic modal and deontic normative vocabulary, respectively.

Representational thinking, *vorstellen*, articulating the metaconceptual categories of *Verstand*, understands both kinds of substance, natural and *geistig*, in terms of “abstract immediacy (the immediacy which barely is).” [PG 32] This is the immediacy of being and the immediacy of thought. Natural substance is construed as confronting thinking substance as an independent constraint on cognition and action. The focus is on external, objective representational *relations* between substances construed as different kinds of immediacy. The first step in overcoming this abstract opposition,

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which threatens to make cognition and action unintelligible, is to see both sorts of substance as involving also a moment of mediation.

Thoughts become fluid when pure thinking, this inner immediacy, recognizes itself as a moment. [PG 33]

[T]he Subject . . . by giving determinateness an existence in its own element supersedes abstract immediacy, i.e. the immediacy which barely is, and thus is authentic substance: that being or immediacy whose mediation is not outside of it but which is this mediation itself. [PG 32]

Mediation is, broadly, inferential articulation. To understand both being and thought as “thoroughly mediated” is to understand them as articulated by relations of material incompatibility and consequence. Such a conception makes possible “understanding truth as substance,” which is understanding truth as a matter of one identical conceptual *content* taking two *forms*: as fact and as thought. This is *bimodal hylomorphic conceptual realism*.

But we have seen that “understanding truth as substance,” in the sense of bimodal hylomorphic conceptual realism, is an ultimately one-sided view. It looks at things and thoughts only from the point of view of their conceptual articulation—that is, as mediated. Their surplus nonconceptual immediacy, overflowing containment by any determinate conceptual structure of mediation, is what both alethically necessitates and normatively demands *change* of conception.

[E]*xperience* is the name we give to just this movement, in which the immediate, the unexperienced, i.e. the abstract, whether it be of sensuous being, or only thought of as simple, becomes alienated from itself and then returns to itself from this alienation, and is only then revealed for the first time in its actuality and truth, just as it then has become a property of consciousness also. [PG 36]

What alethic incompatibility (for instance, of properties) on the side of objects implicitly is becomes explicit in the normative demand that subjects resolve and repair incompatible commitments. This internal connection

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between determinate negation (material incompatibility) as an objective relation and practical normative obligations to *do* something, to *change* the contents they cognitively and practically endorse, shows mediation and immediacy to be two sides of one coin. Cashing that metaphor, mediation and immediacy must be understood as two aspects of the *process* of experience. Immediacy manifests itself in the *disparity* between the objective and subjective forms of conceptual content, which is the motor of the process of conceptual development constitutive of the subject.

This is the insight that Hegel invokes under the heading of “understanding the True as subject.”

For mediation is nothing beyond self-moving self-sameness, or is reflection into self, the moment of the “I” which is for itself pure negativity or, when reduced to its pure abstraction, simple becoming. The “I,” or becoming in general, this mediation, on account of its simple nature, is just immediacy in the process of becoming, and is the immediate itself.¹⁴ [PG 21]

The “I,” the self, the subject is identified with the movement, “becoming in general”—that is, experience. This is already Kant’s view, where the subject of experience, what is responsible for its commitments, is identified with the process of synthesizing a constellation of commitments that has the rational unity characteristic of apperception—by practically acknowledging the critical, justificatory, and ampliative rational task responsibilities constitutive of judgment. And it is this process of experience that determines (prospectively and retrospectively, making and finding) conceptual contents.

Determinate thoughts have the “I,” the power of the negative . . . for the substance and element of their existence. [PG 33]

The guiding slogan of the *Preface*,

everything turns on grasping and expressing the True not only as Substance, but equally as Subject, [PG 17]

can be understood in four stages.

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- First, truth is understood as substance. It is understood in terms of an identity relation between natural and normative substance. This is *hylomorphic conceptual realism*: the appearance of a single conceptual content in the two substantial forms of thought and fact.
- Second, truth is understood as subject. This is truth as a feature of the process of experience (The “I” as “becoming,” “the power of the negative”), which encompasses not only the symmetrical relations between substances of the first stage that consists of identity of mediated conceptual content, but also the disparity and disruption of immediacy manifested as error, driving (normatively demanding) the process of determining content.
- Third, a symmetrical relation is discerned between conceiving truth as substance, at the first stage, and conceiving truth as subject, at the second stage. We see that neither can be understood except by means of its relation to the other. The relational conception of truth as substance and the processual conception of truth as normative subject, corresponding to the two modal forms that conceptual content can take, alethic and deontic-normative, are reciprocally sense-dependent. This is *objective idealism*.
- The final stage is the discovery that “substance is in itself or implicitly Subject.” [PG 47]

At this point, it is not just that we must conceive the truth not only as substance but as subject, but must also construe substance as an aspect of subject: as being implicitly what subject is explicitly. We must appreciate an asymmetrical priority of the recollective recognitive process that both constitutes self or subject and determines conceptual contents, over the semantic (including representational) relations between normative and natural substance. For that process *institutes* those relations. This final stage is what I have called “*conceptual idealism*.”

Hegel presents this final, culminating stage in our phenomenological self-consciousness as an “overcoming of otherness” on the part of the knowing and acting subject. That its independence (authority) is constrained by a correlative dependence (responsibility), manifested in a representational (semantic, intentional) relation to an objective world now shows up as a metaphysically unavoidable aspect of the determinate contentfulness of its

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own thoughts. Objective being as substance is understood in terms of the role it plays in the development of the thinking subject, the self. He makes this final stage of self-understanding explicit in a long passage that summarizes the lessons he takes *Geist* to have learned about itself over the course of its development, and wants us, his readers, to learn from his recollective rehearsal of that process.

The disparity which exists in consciousness between the “I” and the substance which is its object is the distinction between them, the negative in general. . . . Now although this negative appears at first as a disparity between the “I” and its object, it is just as much the disparity of the substance with itself. Thus what seems to happen outside of it, to be an activity directed against it, is really its own doing, and Substance shows itself to be essentially Subject. [PG 37]

The disparity within natural substance itself is the way its immediacy overflows every constellation of commitments articulated by *Verstand*-determinate conceptual contents, leading to a further episode of the experience of error and normatively demanding of the subject the alteration of its commitments. Those commitments include commitments concerning what is incompatible with what and what is a consequence of what. Changing those is further determining the contents of the concepts in terms of which cognitive and practical commitments are couched. The immediacy of objective being and the instability of every constellation of determinate commitments are two aspects of the same metaphysical matter of fact.

The passage continues:

When it has shown this completely, Spirit [Geist] has made its existence identical with its essence; it has itself for its object just as it is, and the abstract element of immediacy, and the separation of knowing and truth, is overcome. Being is then absolutely mediated; it is a substantial content which is just as immediately the property of the “I,” it is self-like or the Concept [Begriff]. With this the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is concluded.

When, at this fourth stage, it conceives itself in these terms (that is, according to the categories of *Vernunft*), *Geist* becomes for the first time fully and ade-

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quately self-conscious. That is what Hegel means by saying that its existence is identical to its essence. Immediacy is now understood in terms of its role in the process of mediation—that is, the process of conceptualizing it, incorporating how things really are into how things are taken to be. Hegel talks about doing this as “mediating the immediate,” or “giving contingency the form of necessity.” The form of necessity is normative, conceptual form, the form in which it can be seen recollectively as exercising *authority* over the process of determining conceptual contents (the representings responsible to this represented). At this point, we (and *Geist* itself) can see how the determinateness of our very thoughts depends on incorporating natural, immediate contingency into our concepts as part of the process of determining their contents. This is self (truth as subject) overcoming the otherness of natural substance, by seeing the essential role it plays in the development of the self (as a truth process).

And at this point, the status-dependence of normative attitudes has been reinstated, and alienation overcome. Now the immediacy of being is understood in terms of the role it plays in the development of the self, which is the determining of conceptual content. The status-dependence of attitudes—the fact that the determinate content of attitudes depends on (is responsible to, is normatively governed by) how things really are—is seen as a necessary condition of the development of thinking subjects. We have seen that the status-dependence of attitudes—there being a fact of the matter about what a subject is really committed to that transcends what that subject or any other subject *takes* it to be committed to—is a matter of the *determinate contentfulness* of the attitudes. Their conceptual content—what one has committed oneself to by adopting the attitude—is what the attitudes remain responsible to, what exercises authority over them. And we have seen that that determinate contentfulness is intelligible in terms of the process of experience by which conceptual contents are determined. That process of determination shows up prospectively as a determining as *making* determinate (in the Kant-Frege *Verstand* sense) and retrospectively as a *finding out* of what is always already determinate (in the Kant-Frege *Verstand* sense). The first perspective articulates the attitude-dependence of normative statuses, and the second the status-dependence of normative attitudes. So the “overcoming of otherness” is a moving beyond alienation. The status-dependence of attitudes—the fact that the determinate content of attitudes depends on (is responsible to) how things really are—shows itself as a necessary condition of the development of thinking subjects.

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The unalienated, *sittlich*, postmodern age is to be ushered in by the achievement of this final stage of self-consciousness. At this point self-consciousness finally understands what it has been doing all along in mediating immediacy by incorporating it into the content of concepts, thereby giving objective contingency the normative form of necessity. It now comes to realize that the *Verstand-vorstellen* conception of itself as an antecedently determinate normative subject, thinking substance, confronting and only externally representationally related to an alien antecedently determinate objective natural substance, was itself an appearance of the relations between appearance and reality. What it was a one-sided appearance *of* is the process of experience that is the real self. The finally adequate form of self-consciousness understands that the authority (independence) it exercises in cognition and action depends for its determinate contentfulness on being balanced by a coordinate dimension of responsibility to (dependence on) immediate being that manifests itself as the motor of the determining of the conceptual contents that articulate its own thoughts. (Hegel calls this “pure self-identity in otherness.” [PG 54])

The determinateness seems at first to be due entirely to the fact that it is related to an other, and its movement seems imposed on it by an alien power; but having its otherness within itself, and being self-moving, is just what is involved in the simplicity of thinking itself; for this simple thinking is the self-moving and self-differentiating thought. [PG 55]

This realization is a form of self-consciousness, not just of individual self-conscious selves or subjects, but, Hegel says (for instance, in the passage quoted earlier from PG 37) of *Geist* itself. The phenomenology that Hegel recollectively reconstructs for us in his book is not the process of determining ground-level empirical and practical concepts, along with the constellation of commitments they articulate—what he sometimes calls “the Concept.” It is rather the philosophical process of development of the speculative metaconcepts in terms of which we are to understand the ground-level process of experience. The subject here is not an individual knower and agent, but the whole of *Geist*. What is recollected is the “shapes of (self-)consciousness,” in the sense of the categories articulating the constellation of metaconceptual commitments that constitute *Geist*’s understanding of itself.

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What it arrives at explicitly at the end of the process recounted in the *Phenomenology of Geist*, and so recollects as having been implicit all along (what he calls “Absolute Knowing”), is a set of “speculative,” in Hegel’s sense logical, metaconcepts adequate for expressing explicitly how experience, consciousness, self-consciousness, and rational agency—all the aspects of normative, *geistig*, activity—really work.

It is one of the guiding ideas of the present reading of the *Phenomenology* that the book should be read at these two levels. It is a phenomenological recollection (and so rational reconstruction as expressively progressive) of the stages in the development of the self-consciousness of *Geist*, and of the philosophical concepts (such as “determinate negation,” “immediacy”/“mediation,” “in-itself”/“for consciousness,” “independence”/“dependence”) that articulate that self-consciousness. According to this reading, these are *metaconcepts*, whose distinctive expressive role is to make explicit the use and content of the ordinary empirical and practical concepts (Hegel’s “determinate concepts” expressing “determinate thoughts”¹⁵) deployed in nonphilosophical cognition and practical agency. I take it that the *point* of developing the philosophical metaconcepts is just to explain how things work at the ground level. This is what I have called the strategy of “semantic descent.” Adopting this strategy, I see Hegel as further developing Kant’s insight that in addition to concepts deployed in describing and explaining empirical goings-on and deliberating about and assessing practical doings, there are concepts whose expressive role is, rather, to make explicit fundamental features of the framework that makes possible description and explanation, deliberation and assessment. We can understand why both figures expend most of their attention and effort on the categorial metaconcepts. Their discovery is one of the transformative ideas that usher in this period in philosophy. But their excited exploration of the possibilities opened up by considering this new sort of concept can obscure what is of at least equal importance: what Kant and Hegel use those newly discovered categorial metaconcepts to say about the use and content of ordinary ground-level concepts.

Confusion can arise, however, about which of the two levels Hegel is referring to when he makes certain claims. Does he mean, at a particular point, to be talking about the empirical and practical experience of individual self-conscious subjects and the concepts they deploy, or about the

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experience that shapes *Geist's* understanding of itself and the development of the metaconcepts used to make sense of ground-level experience? To what extent do the two stories run along in parallel, and to what extent do they diverge? Here I think two large-scale interpretive issues arise that Hegel does not explicitly address, and that his readers have by and large also not addressed. One concerns the relations between the sense in which ordinary knowers and agents are self-conscious and the sense in which *Geist* as a whole is self-conscious. The other concerns analogies and disanalogies between the process of development and what is required to understand ordinary ground-level empirical and practical concepts, on the one hand, and the process of development and what is required to understand categorial speculative or logical metaconcepts on the other.

As to the first of these issues, there is an obvious tension between Hegel's treating *Geist* as a whole as a self-conscious normative self or subject, and his social-recognitive theory of what self-consciousness and selfhood (being a normative subject) consists in. After all, one of his big ideas is that self-consciousness in the sense that matters for sapience is a normative, and hence a social phenomenon—not something that happens between the ears of an individual, but something that arises as the product of individuals' social-practical recognitive attitudes toward other members of the community and the social-practical recognitive attitudes adopted by those others in turn. Self-consciousness is the normative social status of someone who is *reciprocally* recognized: recognized by those she recognizes.

But how is *Geist* as a whole supposed to qualify as self-conscious in this essentially *social* sense? I rehearsed above a reading of Hegel's claim that when it achieves fully adequate self-consciousness, consciousness is no longer "burdened by relation to an other" in the form of a wholly independent objective natural world, with thought and being conceived as antecedently and independently determinate substances standing to one another in representational relations that are purely external to those substances. In this sense, no doubt, for Hegel *Geist* as a whole is correspondingly not "burdened by relation to an other" in the form of the objective world. But what matters here is not intentional relations between subjects and objects but social recognitive relations of subjects to other subjects. Surely in this social sense, *Geist* is not related to any other comparable subject. Are the other subjects to which it is recognitively related—in virtue of which relations it can qualify

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as self-conscious in Hegel's sense—then the individual normative subjects whose attitudes and practices *Geist* comprises? I suppose one might try out such a line, but it will be hard to tell a story according to which the recognitive relation *Geist* stands in to individual *geistig* normative subjects is the *same* as the recognitive relation they stand in to each other, or to it.

I take it that the right answer to this question is set out above. The structure of authority and responsibility exhibited by the *historical* development of *Geist*, shaped prospectively by the disruptive phases of the experience of error and practical failure and retrospectively by recollective rational reconstruction of an expressively progressive tradition is recognizably a structure of reciprocal recognition—albeit a distinctive one. At any point in its development, *Geist* as a whole stands in recognitive relations to its past and future time slices, just as judges at common law do to past and future judges. Each is recognized as having a certain sort of authority in instituting the status claimed by the current incarnation: the status of being responsible to the past and authoritative over the future. Those current attitudes institute actual statuses of responsibility and authority only insofar as they are suitably complemented by the attitudes of those recognized as having the authority to do so. Although the temporal ordering is asymmetrical and cumulative, the recognitive relations are reciprocal and symmetrical in that *every* stage stands in the *same* recognitive relations to *its* past and future, and *every* stage also eventually plays the role of past and future to *other* stages. Individual normative subjects stand both in horizontal social reciprocal-recognitive relations to their contemporaries and in vertical social reciprocal-recognitive relations of the distinctively historical species to their predecessors and successors in those recognitive communities. *Geist* as a whole stands *only* in social recognitive relations of the vertical historical species, for it has no contemporaries to which it could be related recognitively in the horizontal social sense. That is a specific difference between the sense in which *Geist* is a self-conscious subject of normative statuses and the sense in which individual knowers and agents are self-conscious subjects of normative statuses. But they share the generic sense of normative selfhood as instituted by relations of reciprocal recognition.

As to the second issue about the relations between ground-level “determinate” concepts and metalevel “speculative,” “logical,” or philosophical concepts, as I have told the story Hegel certainly does take them to be different

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kinds of concepts. I have interpreted that distinction in terms of an understanding of categorial concepts in Kant's framework-articulating sense as *metaconceptual* concepts: concepts concerning the use and content of ground-level concepts. It is part of that, potentially controversial, hermeneutic commitment that I see Hegel as assimilating determinate and speculative concepts in one crucial respect. The contents of both kinds of concepts develop by experiential processes of the same biperspectival sort, characterized prospectively by disruptive experiences of incompatible commitments and their repair, and retrospectively by healing recollective vindications of those repairs by rationally reconstructing them as the culmination of a process that takes the form of the step-by-step emergence into explicitness of what becomes visible as having been all along implicit in the partially mistaken, partially revelatory constellations of prior commitments.

So it is of the essence of this reading to agree with Hegel both that there is an important distinction between determinate and speculative concepts, and that they are alike in the structure of the process by which both concepts of those two kinds and the constellations of commitments expressed by means of them develop. But Hegel couples those insights with two further commitments concerning how the two sorts of concepts are alike and different of which it seems to me we should be more critical. First, he takes it that because they both develop their contents in generically the same way, by processes having the same general structure, it follows that for concepts of *both* kinds the *only* way to specify or convey their contents is by a retrospective rational reconstruction of a tradition of their uses. This is how he proceeds for philosophical terminology in the *Phenomenology*, with a tradition reconstructed from actual precedent philosophical commitments, and in the *Science of Logic*, with a tradition reconstructed from merely possible antecedents—a way the final concepts *could* have been developed. It is also how he proceeds to illuminate the somewhat lower-level metaconcepts addressed by his lectures on religion and on art.

He means to contrast that recollective way of proceeding with the idea of specifying or conveying those contents by *defining* them in terms of other concepts. This venerable idea is pathognomonic of *Verstand*. Like so much else of that categorial framework, it culminates in Kant, whose philosophical prose is algebraic, in the sense that almost all of his technical terms have definitions, and that those definitions can almost always be substituted for

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the defined terms in his subsequent claims to yield formulations of those claims to which he would assent. If *Verstand* definitions are the only alternative, then Hegel is just following his insight where it leads in insisting that recollective reconstructions are the only way to render intelligible the contents of speculative ideas. But if I am right about the distinctive metaconceptual, metatheoretical character of speculative and logical concepts, then the characteristic framework-explicating expressive role that they play, which sets them off from ground-level empirical and practical concepts, affords another route to their contents. For we can convey concepts of this metaconceptual sort by explicating what they make explicit: by saying what features of the use and content of ground-level concepts it is that they express. This is the route pursued in this work—and in this Conclusion. So I disagree with Hegel's assimilation of his philosophical concepts to ordinary "determinate" concepts in this respect.

There is a more substantive respect in which Hegel, as I read him, distinguishes "determinate" concepts from logical and philosophical ones. For he clearly and explicitly claims that it is possible to achieve a fully and completely expressively adequate set of philosophical and logical concepts. These are the concepts whose deployment at the end of the *Phenomenology* is announced as making possible "Absolute Knowing." They are the concepts expounded in the *Science of Logic*, which articulate *das System* (not *Hegel's* system, but *the System*). Thinking in these terms makes possible the final, fully transparent form of self-consciousness. On the metaconceptual reading, this means that these metaconcepts provide expressive tools sufficient to make explicit what we are doing when engaging in discursive practices—how constellations of commitments (including those regarding what is incompatible with what and what follows from what, which articulate conceptual contents) evolve experientially through the processes of empirical cognition and practical agency. Some of his readers have concluded, bizarrely, to my mind, that Hegel *also* thinks that there is or can be a final, fully adequate set of determinate ground-level empirical and practical concepts and commitments. There is no evidence he thought any such thing—if one is careful in keeping track of the distinction he clearly makes between philosophical-logical concepts and determinate empirical concepts. I take it he thought that the process of determining truth and conceptual content, the "vast Bacchanalian revel, with not a soul sober," is for empirical concepts an everlasting

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party, for reasons of deep principle. The truth-process at the ground level is one that *necessarily* always has the potential, and is subject to an inextinguishable normative *obligation*, to continue on through further stages.

Supposing that that is right, Hegel sharply distinguishes philosophical concepts in this respect. The metaconceptual reading of those concepts offers room for such a distinction from ground-level concepts. The sensuous immediacy that always confronts and must be absorbed and digested into conceptual form is an inexhaustible normative motive force for change. It does not follow that what is true of empirical theories must be true of metatheories of them. Perhaps here, full expressive adequacy can be achieved. Perhaps not. It is possible that expressive progress in our metaconcepts, driven by inevitable experiences of error, inadequacy, and failure, requiring repair and recollective vindication of those repairs, is also a never-ending process. On this question, I think we should be prepared to be critical.

X. The Age of Trust: Reachieving Heroic Agency

Already in his *Introduction* Hegel had pursued the Kantian thought that the most important epistemological issues should be addressed in terms of their implicit semantic presuppositions. Given his normative pragmatics, Hegel's pragmatist semantics dictates that cognition be discussed in the wider social context of the institution of norms by recognition. The edifying aim of Hegel's semantic theory is to rationalize and motivate us to adopt cognitive practices taking a distinctive new postmodern shape. Practical cognitive attitudes of confession and forgiveness institute a new kind of cognitive community. Exercises of practical agency within such a postmodern cognitive community exhibit a new, symmetrical normative structure of authority and responsibility: trust. It is an essentially *historical* social structure because of the role *recollection* plays in it.

Recollection and recollective rationality are the bridge between Hegel's semantics and its edifying effect on our cognitive practices. On the side of semantics, recollection establishes and gives practical significance to the representational dimension of conceptual content. That is the relation between the subjective form of conceptual content in representing thoughts, articulated by deontic normative relations of material incompatibility and

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consequence, on the one hand, and the objective form of conceptual content in represented facts, articulated by alethic modal relations of material incompatibility and consequence, on the other hand. On the side of pragmatics, when recollection becomes a form of recognition (as magnanimous forgiveness) it institutes unalienated, *sittlich* relations between normative statuses and normative attitudes. Both the status-dependence of normative attitudes and the attitude-dependence of normative statuses are given their due.

The story here accordingly concludes by looking more closely at the sort of recognitive community and the nature of the newly self-conscious sort of intentional agency it supports, which our hard-won semantic understanding motivates us to institute. At its core is forgiveness: recognition in the form of recollection.

Hegel calls the traditional *sittlich* practical understanding of intentional agency “heroic,” in the sense that agents take responsibility for their doings under all the descriptions true of those doings. No normative distinction is made between what was done intentionally, or what the agent knew he was doing, on the one hand, and what he did unintentionally and without realizing that that is what he was doing. Thus Oedipus is held responsible for killing his father and marrying his mother, even though he did not intend to do those things and was not aware that that is what he was doing. For those are still things he *did*, not just things that *happened*. Oedipus did intend to, and did, kill *that man* and marry *that woman*. On the traditional, heroic conception it is the normative statuses that matter, not the agent’s attitudes. Parricide and incest *ought not be*. One should not act so as to incur the normative status of father killer and mother fucker. The ought-to-*dos* governing attitudes are just to be read off of the ought-to-*bes* that articulate statuses. Attitudes of knowing and intending matter only in determining *that* one is responsible for a deed, not for determining *what* one thereby did and so is responsible for having done. The status one acquires by doing something is not itself construed as mitigated by or otherwise relativized in any way to the attitudes of intending and knowing in virtue of which it counts as one’s doing in the first place. That one did not mean to do what one did can engender sympathy, but it does not diminish responsibility.

It is for this reason, Hegel thinks, that the traditional *heroic* practical conception of agency is inevitably always also a *tragic* conception. The tragedy

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does not consist in the badness of the outcome. It consists in the fact that in acting at all one puts oneself at the mercy of forces outside of one's knowledge and control. Those alien forces determine the content of one's actual deed, what one turns out to have done and to be responsible for having done. (Hegel quotes in this connection the medieval European proverb: "When a flung stone leaves the hand, it belongs to the devil.") Tragedy is the unavoidable submission of the heroic agent to *fate*. The idea of *fate* invokes not some sort of determinism or antecedent necessitation of outcome but just those dark (because unknowable and uncontrollable) forces that engulf and overwhelm what is launched by one's limited knowledge and intention, transforming it into deeds that reach far beyond those attitudes into unforeseeable culpability. Shouldering the responsibility that fate in this sense brings down upon one who acts is tragic heroism. This is the intimate relation of mutual presupposition between *tragedy*, *fate*, and *heroism*.

By contrast to this tragic practical conception of agency in terms of heroic identification with and submission to one's fate, the modern conception of agency is distinguished precisely by the idea that agents are genuinely responsible for (status), and so should be held responsible for (attitude), only what they intended to do and knew they were doing. Davidson well articulates the distinction at the core of the modern conception when he distinguishes, among the specifications of things one has genuinely *done*, between descriptions under which what one did is *intentional* (turning on the light) and descriptions of what one did that are merely *consequential* (alerting the burglar, of whom one was unaware). What makes an event a doing at all, something that is imputable to an agent, is that it is intentional under *some* description. But that event then counts as a doing under *all* its specifications, including those that pick it out by consequences that were not intended or foreseen by the agent. It is of the essence of the modern idea of practical responsibility that acknowledgments and attributions of the normative *status* of responsibility are conditioned by and proportional to the agent's *attitudes* of intending and believing. It is now seen to be unjust to condemn or blame someone for what he did on the basis of consequential descriptions under which the agent did not intend it and could not foresee it. Those *attitudes* of agents, what they intend and believe, are taken to play constitutive roles in determining their normative *status* as culpable or admirable. This conception of responsibility as proportioned to intention and knowledge is the applica-

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tion to the practical understanding of intentional agency of the distinctively modern appreciation of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses.

The core of distinctively modern practical self-consciousness is for Hegel a special way of understanding the “distinction that action implies”: “that between what is purposed and what is accomplished in the realm of existence.” [PR §114Z] It is to distinguish two senses in which agents do things, a narrower and a wider one, and to restrict responsibility to what is done in the narrow sense.

It is the right of the of the will to recognize as its *action* [Handlung], and to accept *responsibility* for, only those aspects of its *deed* [Tat] which it knew to be presupposed within its end, and which were present in its *purpose* [Vorsatz]—I can be made *accountable* for a deed only if *my will was responsible* for it—the *right of knowledge*.¹⁶ [PR §117]

He explicitly appeals to this distinction as marking the decisive difference from traditional practical conceptions of agency:

The *heroic* self-consciousness (as in ancient tragedies like that of Oedipus) has not yet progressed from its unalloyed simplicity to reflect on the distinction between *deed* [Tat] and *action* [Handlung], between the external event and the purpose and knowledge of the circumstances, or to analyse the consequences minutely, but accepts responsibility for the deed in its entirety. [PR §118Z]

Hegel takes it that making this distinction between *Tat* and *Handlung* is a decisive advance in our understanding of ourselves as agents. But this new level of practical self-consciousness courts the danger of a distinctive kind of alienation from its deeds.

Consciousness, therefore, through its experience in which it should have found its truth, has really become a riddle to itself: the consequences of its deed are for it not the deeds themselves. What befalls it is, for it, not the experience of what it is in itself, the transition is not a mere alteration of the form of the same content and essence, presented now as the content and essence, and again as the object or [outwardly] beheld essence of itself. [PG 365]

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If we misunderstand the distinction that action essentially involves by rendering it according to the Masterly categories of pure independence [*Verstand*], where authority must be total to be real, then our deeds are split into a native normative region of responsibility for what we are authoritative about and an alien, merely causally related region, comprising the unintended, unforeseen consequences of what we are genuinely authoritative about and responsible for. What threatens to go missing is the complementary unity that action essentially involves, the sense in which

[a]ction simply translates an initially implicit being into a being that is made explicit. [PG 401]

Because we are not considered responsible for unintended, unforeseen consequences of what we do intentionally and knowingly, those aspects of our doings are not understood as really part of what we have done. For, as Kant saw, agency must be understood in terms of the authority to make ourselves responsible. And on the misunderstanding Hegel sees as part and parcel of the modern form of practical self-consciousness, *no one* is responsible for the part of the deed imputed to the agent that outruns what was authorized by her intentions, purposes, and reasons. Relative to the premodern, heroic conception, this notion of agency appears as severely cramped and contracted. In the purest, Kantian, form of this modern conception, what we genuinely do, in the sense of being responsible for, extends no farther than our intendings (willings, volitions) themselves.

The metaconceptual categories that articulate the self-consciousness characteristic of modernity—on display in Kant's purifying distillation of it, which brings it to fulfillment and completion—are those of *Verstand*. At their core is the idea of pure independence, which though showing up in specifically different guises, is the generic structure that informs and deforms both traditional and modern forms of *Geist*. Diagnosed in Hegel's allegory of Mastery and Servitude, it is the idea of authority without correlative responsibility to some countervailing authority. It is what deflects the progressive elements of Kant's conception of autonomy into the contraction of objectively efficacious agency to the subjective realm of will, shrinking agents' responsibilities from their doings to their mere tryings: that over which they can be misunderstood as having unlimited authority. The post-

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modern form of agency and its practical and theoretical self-understanding is to be structured instead by the metaconceptual categories of Hegelian *Vernunft*.

The conception of *Vernunft* is what explains the reciprocity of the normative statuses of authority and responsibility (the sense in which they are always two sides of one coin) and the reciprocity of normative recognitive attitudes of acknowledging and attributing authority and responsibility, and the relations between these. In doing so, it reconciles the distinctively modern insight into the attitude-dependence of normative statuses—the sense in which statuses of authority and responsibility are instituted by reciprocal recognitive attitudes—with the traditional appreciation of the status-dependence of normative attitudes. This is the dimension along which attributions and acknowledgments of commitments (responsibilities undertaken by exercising one's authority to do so) answer for their correctness to what agents are really committed to. The alienation that is the worm in the shining apple of modernity is the practical incapacity to see how normative statuses can *both* be instituted by normative attitudes *and* transcend those attitudes, so as genuinely to constrain them. His conception of *Vernunft*, and how it overcomes the commitment to Mastery as pure independence manifested in *Verstand*, is Hegel's response to this challenge. It is what animates the post-modern shape of self-conscious practical agency.

At the heart of *Vernunft*, we have seen, is the conception of *recollection*. For the key to understanding the way Hegel moves beyond the *basic* Hegelian normative statuses jointly socially instituted by *synchronic* reciprocal *relations* of recognitive attitudes consists in appreciating the orthogonal *diachronic* historical dimension of recognitive *processes*. As we saw, Hegel emphasizes the significance for his story of such temporally evolving processes already in his *Introduction*, where we are taught that in order to understand representational relations between what things are for consciousness and what they are in themselves, we must look to the process that is the experience of error. It is the recollective phase of diachronic recognitive processes that explains the attitude-transcendence of normative statuses. That includes the special cognitive representational norms according to which representing attitudes are responsible for their correctness to standards set by what counts as represented by those representings just in virtue of exercising that distinctive kind of authority over them. (It is this part of Hegel's story that has been

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misunderstood in terms of coherence or consensus—not because anything he says encourages this, but because readers who ignored the historical dimension could not see any alternative, given the evident social underpinnings of his account.) Discursive norms, both practical and cognitive, are understood according to the categories of *Vernunft* as features of essentially social and historical cognitive processes, developing in tandem with the attitudes that articulate them. Understanding operating according to the categories of *Verstand* is blind to both the social and the historical dimensions of conceptual norms.

So what does intentional agency look like when viewed from the standpoint of *Vernunft*? To begin with, on the horizontal level of contemporaneous cognitive attitudes, we have a social division of normative labor between the deliberating and acting agent and the assessing community. The practical attitudes of the agent have authority over her doing in the narrow sense it is of the essence of modernity to distinguish: what Hegel calls the action, *Handlung*. The practical attitudes of the community have authority over the doing in the wide sense acknowledged already by traditional conceptions: what Hegel calls the deed, *Tat*. The first corresponds to specifications under which what happens is intentional and foreseen. The second corresponds to specifications in terms of consequences that were not intended or foreseen, but which count as things done, rather than *just* things that happen, because that very same event is intentional and foreseen under *some* specifications. The agent herself has no distinctive authority regarding the attribution of the doing under these specifications. They are available to any interested party. Hegel says:

Actualization is . . . a display of what is one's own in the element of universality whereby it becomes, and should become, the affair of everyone. [PG 417]

The work is, i.e. it exists for other individualities. . . . The work produced is the reality which consciousness gives itself; it is that in which the individual is explicitly for himself what he is implicitly or in himself, and in such a manner that the consciousness for which the individual becomes explicit in the work is not the particular, but the universal, consciousness. [PG 405]

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The “universal consciousness” here invokes the attitudes of the recognitive community.

As construed according to the constellation of metaconcepts that is Hegelian *Vernunft*, both the authority of the individual agent and the authority of the community of those recognized by and recognizing the agent essentially involve correlative forms of responsibility. Adopting the attitude that is endorsing an end or purpose, practically committing oneself, intending, is undertaking a distinctive kind of responsibility. And imputing the deed to the agent in the wider sense of something done by the agent, but for which the agent is not responsible in the narrow sense in which she is responsible for what she does knowingly and intentionally, is also taking a certain kind of responsibility for it. To understand those responsibilities, one must consider the vertical historical dimension, and look to the way they structure temporally extended processes.

For the paradigmatic actions Hegel addresses are not the punctiform events on which recent Anglophone action-theory has focused: flipping a switch, signing a document, calling a taxi, hanging up one’s hat, and the like. The kinds of doings he is principally interested in are processes rather than events: writing a book, building a house, learning a trade, diagnosing or treating a disease. The two sorts of cases are alike in that the agent is responsible for both sorts of doing in the sense of being answerable as to her reasons for what she does. But they are unlike in that Hegel is concerned also with the agent’s responsibility to formulate and carry out a plan, endorsing instrumentally structured subgoals and subplans, and to adapt those plans to contingencies arising during their execution, and he is concerned with all the instrumentally subordinate reasons that show up and come to bear on the success or failure of that extended process.

There is, however, a more striking difference between the projected *Vernunft* conception of agency and more familiar modern *Verstand* conceptions (under which rubric Hegel would include contemporary ones such as those of Davidson and Anscombe). That difference lies in the understanding of the responsibilities the agent’s recognitive community undertakes for the deeds of the agent. These are the responsibilities that complement the partly constitutive recognitive authority that community exercises—the authority to acknowledge, by *holding* the agent responsible, the partly constitutive

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practical authority the agent has to *make* herself responsible, in the ways distinctive of intentional agency. These communal responsibilities have no analogue in the modern conception. For on the postmodern *Vernunft* conception, the recognitive community not only has the authority to attribute the deed under descriptions in terms of unforeseen, unintended consequences; it in a distinctive way *takes responsibility itself* for the deed under those consequential specifications.

Properly understood and instituted, agency involves a division of normative labor in which agent and recognitive community play complementary roles. The agent exercises a distinctive kind of authority and undertakes a distinctive kind of correlative responsibility insofar as her acknowledgment of practical commitments (the attitudes that are intentions, Hegel's *Vorsätze*) sets into motion the process that is the deed. But the deed is understood as not done by the agent alone, but as also done in a different, although equally constitutive sense by the agent's community. All are responsible for the doings of each, and each for the doings of all. Appreciating this is the fundamental practical, agentive aspect of the self-understanding of *Geist* that is fully self-conscious as

this absolute substance which is the unity of the different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: "I" that is "We" and "We" that is "I."
[PG 177]

I have been reading Hegel's "independence" here as invoking the reciprocal authority of the different parties to the action, and insisting with him that it necessarily involves also reciprocal responsibility—that is, "dependence."

The recognitive community's responsibilities for the deeds of its members are of two principal kinds: constructive ameliorative consequential responsibilities and reconstructive recollective hermeneutic responsibilities. The first are made possible because the deed an agent's intention sets in motion is a process that is never finished and done with. It has true specifications in terms of any and all of its consequences, however distant. (This is what Davidson refers to as the "accordion effect.") And those consequences roll on to infinity.

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Action has multiple *consequences* in so far as it is translated into external existence; for the latter, by virtue of its context in external necessity, develops in all directions. These consequences, as the *shape* whose *soul* is the *end* to which the action is directed, belong to the action as an integral part of it. But the action, as the end translated into the external world, is at the same time exposed to external forces which attach to it things quite different from what it is for itself, and impel it on into remote and alien consequences. [PR §118]

That those consequences are “remote and alien” to the motivating intention (what the action is *for* the agent) but also “an integral part of it,” its “shape and soul,” is what makes the agent’s doing on the modern, alienated conception, “a riddle to itself: the consequences of its deed are for it not the deed itself.” By contrast, for the recognitive community attributing the deed, the consequences that outrun the specifications under which the doing is intentional (exercises of the authority of the agent) are an essential element of the deed. And the first point is that the community can intervene to affect those consequences. Subsequent actions by those who recognize the original agent and attribute the action contribute to the content of the always-evolving deed. Part of what one must do in order to count thereby as recognizing the original agent as one of *us* (a member of *our* recognitive community) is acknowledging one’s own responsibility to shape the agent’s deed by affecting its consequences. (One application of this view is Hegel’s notorious claim that punishment is recognitively owed to the criminal by the community. His fellow community members recognize him by punishing him. It counted as a crime insofar as his doing had the expressive significance of a rejection of recognitive community. By punishing him his fellows practically and constitutively reject that rejection of recognitive community.)

Leibniz took it to be a fact that nothing is for nothing in this best of all possible worlds—that what initially looks to be defective, a failure, or evil will eventually be redeemed and be visible (at least to God) as making a positive contribution, indeed, as being just what is necessary for the outcome to be optimal, the whole to which it contributes ideal. Hegel radicalizes Kant’s notion of a regulative ideal to understand this Leibnizian perfectionist thought, as expressing not an objective fact, but the content of a

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commitment: as something subjects are responsible for *making* true. Recognizing an agent as one of us is practically treating what she did as part of what we all are doing. Adopting that attitude is acknowledging the responsibility to make what was already done come out right, as a constraint on what we have reason to do now. What we must have reasons for, what we must justify doing now, is a deed that includes everything already done by those we recognize as our fellows. It is part of our task to see to it that those earlier doings make positive contributions to the larger whole that subsumes it—a whole that includes and so is partly constituted by our own current and future doings. Those earlier deeds are ongoing processes that flow as if streams into the river that is *our* doing. When agency is understood and recognitively institutionalized according to the metaconception of *Vernunft*, the act of one is recognized as the act of all. This conception is epitomized by the Musketeers' slogan: "One for all and all for one."

To understand what guides and sets standard for practical constructive ameliorative consequential interventions in the evolving processes that are the deeds of the members of a *vernünftig* recognitive community, we must look to the companion recollective reconstructive hermeneutic responsibility. The recollective task is one of rationalization, vindication, justification—of finding reasons in and for what happened. The job of recollection is, in the Hegelian slogan, giving contingency the form of necessity—that is, retrospectively exhibiting that contingency as norm-governed after all. Doing that is turning a mere past into an intelligible history. (Our history is both what makes us what we are and something we make.) Recognitively recollecting intentional doings is imputing to each one, under all its disparate and contingent specifications and manifestations, a distinctive kind of unified content. That content, what Hegel calls an "Absicht," is a kind of rationalizing intention that stands to the deed in the wide, consequence-including sense, as the original, individually motivating practical commitment (Hegel's *Vorsatz*) stands to the action in the narrow sense in which it is intentional (Hegel's *Handlung*) and so rationalizable by the practical reasoning of the agent. The new consequential specifications of a doing that later community members are to contribute as part of their practical recognitive responsibility to those they hold responsible for intentional doings are supposed to be ones that make it easier to perform the recollective-reconstructive task on the emerging whole to which they contribute.

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The aim is to make the deed as rationally reconstructed one that those recollecting it can endorse now, on their own behalf. However unpromising it might have seemed at the outset, the process the agent initiated by acknowledging a practical commitment (*Vorsatz*) is to be seen as turning out to have been a good one, one there is reason to have promoted then and to endorse now. Some illumination can be gained by comparison and contrast with the paradigm of recollection with which I introduced the notion earlier, and to which I have returned repeatedly in this work. Judges at common law justify their current decision by exhibiting it as the culmination of process encompassing prior precedential decisions concerning the applicability of the same concepts. That process is rationally reconstructed, by careful selection and characterization of precedents, so as to take the form of the gradual emergence into explicitness of a norm that becomes visible as having been all along implicit in the deliberations of prior judges. In that case, what is recollectively vindicated, motivated, and justified is the current judge's practical attitude (applying or withholding the application of a legal concept), whereas in the case of agency what is recollectively vindicated, motivated, and justified is the original attitude of undertaking a practical commitment, which is now recollected as norm-governed (correct, precedential). The two sorts of case have, as it were, different directions of fit. But in rationalizing their own attitude, the recollecting judges also vindicate and endorse the prior decisions whose authority they acknowledge by treating them as precedential. The retrospective rational reconstruction of an expressively progressive tradition incorporating prior adoptions of attitudes displays a norm (emerging into greater explicitness) that at least partly validates all the attitudes it incorporates as having precedential authority. That is analogous to the way in which the retrospective rational reconstructions of other members of the recognitive community can recollectively vindicate the actions set in motion by their fellows. It is also true that the judge's own decision is responsible to the practical attitudes of earlier judges, manifested in their decisions, in that the authority of the current decision derives entirely from its fidelity to the norm it reconstructs as emerging from those earlier ones.

The final form of mutual recognition, discussed at the end of the long *Spirit* chapter of the *Phenomenology*, is that in which the reciprocal recognitive attitudes take the form Hegel denominates "*confession*" and "*forgiveness*." Hegel himself does not offer a name for this structure of recognition. Adopting

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and adapting a term he uses in a related context, I call this recognitive structure “trust” (his “Vertrauen”). This is recognition conceived and practiced according to the categories of *Vernunft*. Hegel presents it as developing out of the modern practical conception according to categories of *Verstand*, as distilled to its essence by Kant. In his allegorical presentation, the decisive move is the “breaking of the hard heart of the judge,” who, confronting the confession of the miscreant gives up the superior pose he has so far adopted, forgives, and himself confesses in turn: “I am as you are.” What is confessed and forgiven is the gap or disparity between normative attitudes and normative statuses. One confesses that what one has done is not *simply* to act according to a norm. One has always done both more and less than what one ought, what is appropriate or required. One’s attitude of acknowledging or attributing a commitment never does full justice to it, never gets its content quite right. One’s acknowledgment at once of the authority of a norm and of one’s responsibility to it is always impure, evincing an imperfect grasp of the content of the norm, admixed with other motives, and affected by the context of other collateral commitments.

Let us look more closely at how the transition to the third age of *Geist* is described and motivated. The *Spirit* chapter of the *Phenomenology* rehearses the progressive development from the traditional to the modern structure of *Geist*, so as to prepare us readers for the epiphany in which that development culminates: the envisaged transition to the third, postmodern stage, the age of trust. The capstone achievement of self-consciousness that brings about this transformation is making explicit what shows up retrospectively as having been all along the implicitly governing structural norm of recognition. As we saw, Hegel introduces this newly self-conscious form of normativity (and hence subjectivity) in the rhetorical form of a pair of allegories: the allegory of the hero and his valet, and the allegory of the penitent confessing his transgression to the hard-hearted, unforgiving judge.

Hegel introduces the first with a twist on a well-known slogan of his day:

No man is a hero to his valet; not, however, because the man is not a hero, but because the valet—is a valet. [PG 665]

The hero is allegorical for one who acts out of appreciation of his duty, one who fulfills his responsibilities, one who acts as he ought, as he is committed

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to act, one who in his practical attitudes and actions acknowledges the bindingness or authority of norms. “Valet” is the English translation of the German “Kammerdiener,” literally, room-servant. The valet in the allegory sees the attitudes of the hero not as governed by and expressive of the acknowledgment of norms, but as the product of immediate sensuous desires and contingent particular inclinations. The *Kammerdiener* stands for a view that explains all attitudes in terms of other attitudes, without needing to appeal to governing norms that they are attitudes toward and acknowledgments of. Hegel does not deny that this sort of explanation in terms of attitudes alone can be done. The norm-blind reductive naturalist perspective is an available perspective.

Hegel denominates the norm-blind reductive naturalism for which the *Kammerdiener* stands “niederträchtig.” The contrasting norm-sensitive hero-aware meta-attitude that takes some attitudes to be themselves genuinely norm-sensitive and norm-acknowledging he calls “edelmütig.” Hegel thinks that in being discursive beings at all, in believing and acting, we have already implicitly committed ourselves to an *edelmütig* meta-attitude. This is a possibility afforded by *Vernunft*, which, when it comes to explicit self-consciousness ushers in the postmodern structure of *Geist*.

The issue addressed by the allegory of the *Kammerdiener* concerns the intelligibility of the traditional idea of the status-dependence of normative attitudes in the face of the modern insight into the attitude-dependence of normative statuses. The *Kammerdiener* stands for the self-sufficiency, the explanatory sovereignty, of attitudes. But this meta-attitude does not leave room for the authority and efficacy of norms—for the idea that normative statuses of authority and responsibility, what one is really entitled or committed to, make a real difference to attitudes that accordingly deserve to be thought of as *acknowledgments* of those norms.

The normative governance of attitudes by norms has two dimensions, deontic and alethic. First, the norms (normative statuses) serve as *standards for assessment of the correctness of attitudes*. My attitudes of acknowledging a commitment myself, or attributing a commitment to others, are correct just in case we really are committed, in case those attitudes properly reflect the statuses they are attitudes toward. This is what it is for the attitudes in question to be *normative* attitudes: attitudes toward norms, attitudes of acknowledging or attributing normative statuses. Second, the norms they are attitudes toward

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should make a difference to the adoption of those attitudes. The attitudes should be *subjunctively sensitive* to the normative statuses they acknowledge and attribute. This is to say that the norms are efficacious, in that *if* the content of the norm being acknowledged or attributed *were* (or *had been*) different, the attitude *would be* (or *would have been*) different.

The heroism of the hero is allegorical for the norm-governedness of his attitudes in this dual sense. The correctness of his attitudes is to be assessed according to the standard provided by the norms he acknowledges, and his practical attitudes are understood as being sensitive to the contents of those norms, in that if the norms were different, the hero's attitudes would be different. The challenge allegorically represented by the *Kammerdiener* is to make the possibility of the status-dependence of normative attitudes intelligible in the face of the standing possibility (which Hegel admits) of purely naturalistic genealogical alternative accounts of the advent of normative attitudes that appeal only to other attitudes. If invocation of normative governance of attitudes by normative statuses is not *necessary* to account for the attitudes, it is not clear how it can be *legitimate*. Insofar as this reductive naturalist challenge to the normativity of agency cannot be convincingly met, the result is *alienation* from the norms, the loss of traditional *sittlich* practical appreciation of the status-dependence of normative attitudes, of the authority or bindingness of norms on attitudes.

The second allegory, of the confessing miscreant and the hard-hearted judge, presents a different sort of challenge to the intelligibility of the governance of practical attitudes by norms. It stems from Kantian rigorism about what is required for genuine responsiveness to norms, rather than from reductive naturalism. What the miscreant confesses is the admixture of non-normative attitudes in the causes of his action. He did not act just out of acknowledgment of "pure duty for duty's sake." Other attitudes also provided motives to which the action was subjunctively sensitive, in the sense that if they had been different (and the norm not), what was done would have been different. Subjunctive sensitivity was not limited to the content of the norm being acknowledged. The doing was in this regard both more than and less than a pure acknowledgment of the norm. Here the challenge is not that treating the performance as the acknowledgment of a norm is not *necessary* to explain the practical attitude, but rather that it is not *sufficient*. If invocation of normative governance is not by itself *sufficient* to account for attitudes

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(because an admixture of contingent, particular motives and circumstances—what the penitent confesses—is also always in play), then how can it be *legitimate*?

The challenge to the intelligibility of normative governance comes from the idea that the authority of norms over attitudes must be *total* in order to be *genuine*. It is a manifestation of the deformed conception of *pure independence*: the idea that authority (normative independence) is undercut by any sort of correlative responsibility to (dependence on) anything else. This is the practical normative conception Hegel criticizes allegorically under the rubric of “Mastery.” Hegel sees Kant as perfectly distilling the essence of the modern form of this conception, as part of his otherwise progressive understanding of normativity in terms of autonomy. As a result, Kant adopts a *contraction* strategy, in which genuine doings shrink down to mere willings, because every more robust sense of action involves responsibility to other factors, subjective and objective, that are not themselves in the same sense governed by the norm that rationalizes the willing. In the allegory, the hard-hearted judge is the Kantian rigorist, who takes it that the penitent’s confession of an admixture of nonnormative motives shows that the action does not (also) express the acknowledgment of a norm, and so must be judged lawless. The affinity to the reductive naturalism of the *Kammerdiener* should be clear. For there, too, the mere possibility of a nonnormative, reductive naturalistic explanation of attitudes is taken to preempt the normative governance explanation, and in that sense to deny the authority of the norm. If the normative governance account of an attitude has a rival, it is taken to have no authority at all. Independence is seen as incompatible with any sort of dependence. Any correlative responsibility undermines claims of authority.

Unlike the *Kammerdiener* allegory, the allegory of the hard-hearted judge is extended to provide a path forward to a proper understanding of the status-dependence of normative attitudes. The “breaking of the hard heart” occurs when the judge rejects his original *niederträchtig* response to the confession of the wrongdoer and replaces it with forgiveness and an *edelmütig* confession of his own. The result is the achievement of a new kind of community (“The reconciling Yea, in which the two ‘I’s let go their antithetical existence, is the existence of the ‘I’ which has expanded into a duality.” [PG 671]). This is the final, *vernünftig*, postmodern form of reciprocal recognition, and

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so, of normativity and of *Geist*, structured by the normativity instituted by that newly self-conscious form of recognition.

What the contrite agent confesses is everything in its deed that is not norm-governed—in Hegel’s idiom, every manifestation of particularity (the agent’s circumstances and collateral attitudes in the form of intentions or beliefs, and of contingent unintended consequences) rather than universality (norm, governing normative status). It confesses every failure of the status-dependence of the practical attitudes whose content is revealed in the deed as actually done. Confession [Geständnis] in this sense is at once a performance partly constitutive of a special form of self-consciousness and a petition for recognition. (The connection is forged by Hegel’s understanding of self-consciousness as a social status that is the social product of attitudes of mutual recognition.) In Hegel’s allegory, it is met not with an *edelmütig* reciprocating recognition, but with a *niederträchtig* merely critical assessment of failure to fulfill responsibilities (failure of attitudes to be normatively governed by statuses). The blaming, hard-hearted Kantian rigorist judge plays the “role of the moral valet” to the penitent agent.

The consciousness that judges in this way is itself base, because it divides up the action, producing and holding fast to the disparity of the action with itself. Further, it is hypocrisy, because it passes off such judging, not as another manner of being wicked, but as the correct consciousness of the action, setting itself up in this unreality and conceit of knowing well and better above the deeds it discredits, and wanting its words without deeds to be taken for a superior kind of reality. [PG 666]

The judge’s attitudes are exclusively adopted from the perspective of normative *assessment*. The judge as assessor does not identify with the perspective of the deliberating agent, or even acknowledge the essential complementary roles in constituting normative statuses played by attitudes of assessment and deliberation—that is, attribution to another and acknowledgment one-self of practical commitments.

The point of this episode in the allegory is to enforce the contrast with the next step. The “breaking of the hard heart” describes the adoption by the assessing consciousness of the appropriate *edelmütig* recognitive response to the petition for recognition that is the penitent’s confession. That response

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Hegel denominates “forgiveness” [Verzeihung]. To understand the structure of normativity that gives *Geist* its characteristic postmodern shape, we must understand the constellation of reciprocal recognitive attitudes that institutes that structure. This is recognition in the form of mutual confession and forgiveness: the structure of trust. The shift to forgiveness that is the breaking of the judge’s hard heart is a move from the judge merely *attributing* responsibility for the agent’s deed to the judge practically *acknowledging* his own responsibility for that deed. As such, it is an act of *identification with* the doer, by making oneself coresponsible for what was done. The appropriate response to confession of an incapacity to produce deeds that are simply and purely governed by norms is for the judge to make a corresponding confession, to acknowledge “I am as you are,” admitting that the judge, like the agent, is also doomed to act from a mixture of attitudes that are acknowledgments of governing norms and attitudes that are not such acknowledgments.

The responsibility the assessing consciousness undertakes for what is done is complementary to the responsibility the deliberating consciousness undertakes for its act, rather than identical with it. It has two dimensions: reparative and recollective. The reparative responsibility is practically to intervene in the still-unfolding consequences of the doing, which provide an ever-increasing stock of consequential specifications of it. The deed is never done, and part of the generous *edelmütig* way of holding someone responsible for what they do is to acknowledge responsibility for helping to make it turn out well. One can do that by practically contributing new consequences, thereby making-true new consequential specifications of the deed. When everyone does acknowledge a responsibility to do that, each doing by a member of a community whose constitutive recognitive attitudes to one another take the form of confession and forgiveness is a doing by all. The deed of each is the deed of all.

But what counts as “better” consequences? The standard for such normative assessments of consequences is set by the other, recollective dimension of forgiveness. The reparative responsibility to ameliorate the consequences of the doing being forgiven must be understood in terms of recollection. The aim is to make the whole that results from one’s current action, thought of as a contribution to a tradition, *more fully and successfully recollectable* than that tradition would otherwise be. So this constraint, too, is defined in

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terms of recollection. It is the norms of recollection that determine what count as “better” consequences, and to which contributing to such consequences must be subjunctively sensitive.

XI. Forgiveness: Recognition as Recollection

Recognition in the form of recollective forgiveness is the key to understanding norm-governedness in general. Taking recollective responsibility for another’s doing is practically acknowledging the obligation to tell a certain kind of retrospective story about that doing. That is the responsibility to rationally reconstruct it *as* norm-governed. The magnanimous forgiving recollector must discern an implicit norm that governs the development of the deed. This is the intention [Absicht], which stands to the consequentially extended *Tat* as the agent’s initial *Vorsatz* stands to the *Handlung*, which is the narrower action specified only under the descriptions explicitly licensed by the purpose for which it was performed. The *Absicht* must be exhibited as normatively governing the doing in the dual sense both of serving as a normative standard for assessment of the practical attitudes it governs (each specification of the doing being thought of as an acknowledgment of that norm) and as being the norm that those attitudes can be seen to have been subjunctively sensitive to, in the sense that had the norm been different, so would the attitudes.

One recollectively discerns / imputes a norm that is in the form of an *Absicht*: something that governs the practical process as what is being *striven* for or *aimed* at. Saying that goes beyond just saying that it serves as a normative standard for assessments of the success of practical attitudes. For that could be true without entailing that anyone cares about the standard and is making decisions in the light of what the norm enjoins (is being heroic, in the sense the *Kammerdiener* denies). The additional element involves thinking of each component of the subsequent retrospectively constructed / discovered tradition as surrounded by a cloud of incompatible alternatives. The recollective forgiver then practically takes or treats the subject of the attitude in question as *choosing* the alternative taken (the one incorporated in the recollective-recognitive forgiveness-narrative), as having *selected* it out of the cloud of relevant alternatives, identifying with it by rejecting them. That

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is what it is to treat the governing norm as not just a norm of assessment, but as an *Absicht*. This is rationally reconstructing a tradition of attitudes that are status-dependent, in the sense of being governed, in the dual sense, by an implicit norm that becomes gradually more explicit as it is acknowledged by the attitudes incorporated in the recollected tradition.

The metanorm that governs recollective performances (and the practical attitudes they express) is that the norm one reconstructively discerns and imputes ought to normatively govern *all* the consequential specifications of attitudes in and downstream of the *Handlung*. That includes the practical-reparative and hermeneutic-recollective attitudes the assessing judge adopts. So the forgiving agent must endorse the norm being attributed as governing the deed—must acknowledge its authority. That is part of taking coresponsibility for it. In forgiving, one makes oneself responsible for the emerging norm one attributes as the implicit *Absicht* of the deed. This is *identifying with* the agent, in the sense of risking and if need be sacrificing one's own attitudes, by subjecting them to normative assessment according to the norm one both attributes and acknowledges, and being subjunctively sensitive to that norm in one's own attitudes. In this specific sense, the forgiving agent acknowledges the doing as its own, as the doing not *only* of the agent who initiated it, but *also* of the forgiving recollector.

Forgiving recollection can be understood on the model of the institutional common- or case-law jurisprudential practices mentioned earlier. There, the current judge rationally reconstructs the tradition by selecting a trajectory of prior precedential decisions that are expressively progressive, in that they reveal the gradual emergence into explicitness of a norm (the content of a law) that can be seen to have implicitly governed all the decisions (attitudes) in the reconstructed tradition. It is that norm that then justifies the current judge's decision. The norm that is seen as emerging from the rationally reconstructed tradition of decisions sets the standard for normative assessment by future judges of the current decision, which claims to be subjunctively sensitive to that very norm. So the recollecting judge subjects herself to (acknowledges the authority of) the norm she retrospectively discerns. The more of the prior decisions the recollection rationalizes and exhibits as expressive of the norm, the better the recollective warrant that norm provides for the current decision. The larger the residue of decisions that cannot be fit into the retrospectively rationally reconstructed tradition as precedentially

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rationalizing and expressive of the norm, the greater the scope for criticism of the current decision by future judges, who may or may not acknowledge it as correct and so precedentially authoritative. For the only authority the decision has derives from its being a suitable acknowledgment of responsibility to the tradition of prior decisions.

Forgiving (recollectively recognizing), on this account, is hard work. It cannot be brought off with a single, sweeping, abstractly general gesture: “I forgive you for what you did.” One could always *say* that—but saying it would not make it so. In addition to fulfilling one’s commitment to practically affect the consequences of the doing one is forgiving, one must produce a concrete recollective reconstruction of the deed, under all of its intentional and consequential specifications. Recollection is a *making*—the crafting of a distinctive kind of narrative—that is successful only insofar as it ends up being recognizable as having the form of a *finding*. What is found is found as having been all along implicit. What is implicit is for Hegel always to be understood in terms of the process of expressing it: making it explicit. Explaining what one must do in order thereby to count as recollecting is filling in the notion of expression. The implicit norm it imputes as governing a doing is in one sense made by the recollection, and in another found by it. The idea of a doing of this kind only seems paradoxical—like the idea of giving contingency the form of necessity. Recollection is the narrative genre to which the rationalization of decisions appealing to common or case law also belongs. One must recruit and assemble the raw materials one inherits so as to exhibit a norm one can oneself endorse as always having governed the tradition to which one oneself belongs, with which one oneself identifies—a tradition that shows up as progressively revealing a governing norm, making ever more explicit what was all along implicit. The expressively progressive tradition discerned culminates (for now) in the consequential specification of the doing that is that very recollection of it.

What if what one is given to work with (the sum of all the purposive and consequential specifications of the doing one inherits) is *too* hard to forgive? What if the subject of the attitude that is being forgiven as part of the larger enterprise of forgiving something upstream of it is in fact dispositionally unresponsive to the verdict of the norm? What if (as the *Kammerdiener* alleges) the doing in fact is sensitive only to other concerns (attitudes) particular to its subject? What if the consequences are just too dire? It seems that the

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metanormative criteria of adequacy for *successful* forgiveness, both reparative and recollective, are in many cases *impossible* to satisfy. Some things people have done strike us, even upon due reflection, as simply *unforgivable*. In these cases, though we might try to mitigate the consequences of evil doings, we have no idea at all how to go about discerning the emergence of a governing norm we could ourselves endorse. This is just the limiting case of a ubiquitous phenomenon. Any actual recollective undertaking will involve strains: elements of what is actually done, at *every* stage in the developing process, that *cannot* be smoothly, successfully, or convincingly given a satisfactory norm-responsive explanation.

Indeed. But now we must ask: Whose fault is it that the doing, or some aspect of it, is unforgivable—the doer or the forgiver? Is the failure that of the bad agent or of the bad recollector? Is whose fault it is a matter of how things anyway just are? Or is it at least partly reflective of the recollector's failure to come up with a more norm-responsive narrative? The first is the attitude of the *unsittlich* valet, for whom no one is a practically norm-acknowledging hero, in the sense of being genuinely responsive (subjunctively sensitive) to norms. To treat the recollective failure as wholly the fault of the doer, to take it as simply an objective fact that there is no norm we could endorse that governs the deed as the assessor inherits it, is to adopt exactly the blaming practical attitude of the hard-hearted judge—an attitude Hegel criticizes as *niederträchtig*. The contrasting *edelmütig* attitude he recollectively recommends as implicit in the idea of norm-governedness as such is rather recognition as recollective forgiveness, in the specific sense of identifying with the doer, taking coresponsibility for the doing. That is to acknowledge at least equal responsibility on the part of the unsuccessful forgiver. For the issue is not properly posed in alethic modal terms of the *possibility* or *impossibility* of forgiving what was done. It is a deontic normative matter. One is *committed* to forgiving, *responsible for* forgiving. This is the Hegelian version of a Kantian regulative ideal—one whose content is “Tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner.” One can be committed to that recognitive ideal (normatively governed by it in the dual sense) even if one must in many cases confess that one *cannot* understand—and so forgive—all.

It might well be that one is in fact incapable of fulfilling that magnanimous commitment, of carrying out that responsibility to forgive in concrete detail. If and insofar as that is so, it is a normative failure that the unsuccessful

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would-be forgiver should *confess*. To take proper recognitive recollective responsibility requires the forgiving agent to confess his own inadequacy to the recollective task. (Compare: The judge at common law fails, in her recollective vindication of her own decision, to treat *all* previously decided cases as precedential. That fact makes her own authority vulnerable. She must trust future judges to find a way to forgive the incompleteness of her recollective reconstruction of a tradition, and treat her decision as nonetheless authoritative in the sense of precedential, because adequately acknowledging its responsibility to, the authority of, the tradition being retrospectively rationally reconstructed.) Your confession of a failure of your practical attitudes appropriately to acknowledge a norm is a petition for my recognition in the form of my forgiving recollective taking of (co)responsibility for your doing. My subsequent failure to adopt adequately forgiving recollective recognitive attitudes is something I, too, am responsible for confessing. That confession is itself an act of identification with you: “I am as you are.” My attitudes, like yours, fail adequately to satisfy the norms that they nonetheless acknowledge *as binding, as governing* those attitudes. For one acknowledges an obligation (the bindingness of a governing norm) insofar as one *confesses* the extent to which one has been unresponsive to the demands of the recollective norm, unable properly to fulfill a recognitive responsibility. And one is genuinely sensitive to that normative demand in making such a confession. Confessing is a kind of doing that *makes* it the case that one both acknowledges the authority of and is in fact sensitive to the norm recollected as governing the attitudes that make up the tradition one has discerned (including one’s own attitudes), even though one admits one’s incapacity to fulfill the responsibility one thereby acknowledges.

As a magnanimous, *edelmütig*, forgiving assessor of another’s doing, one *confesses* that it is (also) one’s *own* fault, that one is not good enough at forgiving. And one must *trust* that this recollective-recognitive failure, too—like the failure of the original, inadequately forgiven doer—will be more successfully forgiven by future assessors (who know more and are better at it). That one *cannot* successfully tell a recollective story is not what matters. That is a deontic failure, relative to one’s commitments. It is something to be *confessed*, in *trust* that that failure, too, can be *forgiven*. The well-meaning but incompetent forgiving recollector’s confession, like that of the contrite agent, is a petition for recognition in the form of forgiveness. The trusting confession

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of recollective failure completes the identification of the one playing the role of assessor with the one playing the role of agent. The recognitive attitudes of forgiveness and confession emerge as two sides of one coin, two aspects of the symmetrical, norm-instituting, recognitive structure of *trust*. Its slogan is “Attribute responsibility forgivingly, acknowledge responsibility contritely.” In a normative community with this recognitive structure, everyone forgives to the limits of each one’s ability, everyone confesses those limits, and everyone trusts that each, too, will eventually be forgiven. The content of the shared recognitive attitudes with which all parties identify is “Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive those who trespass before us.”

It is of the essence of both the reparative ameliorating dimension and the recollective hermeneutic dimension of the forgiving recognitive attitude that they address a performance that expresses a *prior* practical attitude. The doing being forgiven must already be under way. For this reason, the final, *vernünftig* form of reciprocal recognition as confession and forgiveness is essentially *historical*. The attitude-governing norms it institutes and acknowledges have the rich diachronic recognitive form of *traditions*. Hegel himself practices forgiving recollection, retrospectively rationally reconstructing expressively progressive traditions, in his own accounts of intellectual and cultural history, in the way he reads the history of art, religion, and especially philosophy. It is what I mean to be practicing in the stories I tell here.

The claim that is crucial for understanding the third age of *Geist* as retaining the progress made by modernity while overcoming its structural alienation is that recognition understood as including the recollective institution of traditions acknowledges both the attitude-dependence of normative statuses and the status-dependence of normative attitudes. On the one hand, it incorporates the insight that norms (normative statuses) are instituted by reciprocal recognition—that is, by recognitive attitudes that are symmetrical in the sense of being suitably socially complemented. On the other hand, each recollective rational reconstruction is obliged to display the normative attitudes it addresses as governed by norms (normative statuses) in the dual sense of being subject to assessment according to those norms and of being subjunctively sensitive to them. In this way, the postmodern recollective recognitive practices reachieve a *sittlich* appreciation of the authority of norms over attitudes, the sense in which attitudes are responsible to

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(governed by) norms they acknowledge and attribute. It is true that acknowledgment of the authority of governing norms is always within the scope of a recollective rational reconstructive *story* about what is going on. The normative status on which attitudes are understood as dependent (to which they are responsible) is itself always the object of a recollective attitude. In this sense, the overall account invokes nothing but attitudes. But *that* attitudes are status-dependent (norm-governed) is an essential, necessary, and characteristic structural feature of *every* recollective recognitive attitude as such. In that sense, the status-dependence of normative attitudes is not merely a contingent product of some attitudes people happen to adopt. It is in the end what makes normative attitudes *normative* attitudes—acknowledgments and attributions of normative *statuses* of responsibility and authority.

That the historical recognitive structure of trust (reciprocal recollective forgiveness and confession) balances and does equal justice to the attitude-dependence of normative statuses and to the status-dependence of normative attitudes is ultimately the justification for understanding forgiveness as the appropriate recognitive response to the petition for recognition that is confession. That recognitive structure provides the context in which it emerges that *attributing* responsibility (holding someone else responsible) and *acknowledging* responsibility (taking responsibility oneself) are not just different normative attitudes, and not just socially complementary normative attitudes that *globally* presuppose one another in the sense that they are each intelligible in principle only in a context that includes the other. They also presuppose one another *locally*, in a way that expresses an identity underlying their difference of social perspective. Confession makes the one who holds the penitent responsible for something, herself responsible for forgiving it. That is, confession normatively obliges the one who attributes a responsibility also to acknowledge a coresponsibility (both reparative and recollective) for that very same doing. That the attitudes of holding another responsible and oneself taking responsibility are in this very strong sense two sides of one coin (different only as aspects of a unity intelligible only as having both) turns out to have been implicit in the relations between normative statuses and normative attitudes all along. This is parallel to the metaphysically ironic lesson taught by the allegory of Mastery: authority and responsibility are not just coordinate normative statuses in that if X has

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authority over Y, then Y is responsible to X. For it to be determinately contentful, X's authority must also always involve X having a correlative responsibility and must acknowledge the authority of some others to *hold X* responsible. Pure normative independence, without any corresponding dependence, is a fantasy. When acted on practically, that fantasy of authority without responsibility (*pure* independence, the ideology of Mastery) metaphysically deforms both the normative statuses it institutes and the self-conscious individuals whose statuses they are.

We have seen that one special case where it is particularly important to be able to make sense of the status-dependence of attitudes (the normative governance of attitudes by statuses) is *cognition*: the case we began by considering. Kant taught us to think about representation in normative terms. A representing is a representing insofar as it is *responsible* for its correctness to how things are with what counts as represented by it just in virtue of its having that sort of *authority* over it. For Kant, the principal challenge in making sense of the *objectivity*—in the sense of their objective purport—of our cognitive representations is understanding how they are normatively governed by what they thereby count as representing. In the terms Hegel puts in play already in his *Introduction*, this is understanding the normative character of the relation between what things are *in themselves* and what they are *for consciousness*. That is the authority that how things implicitly are in themselves exercises over how they explicitly are for consciousness. What knowing and acting subjects are *in themselves* is their normative statuses, while what they are *for consciousness* (for themselves or for others) is a matter of normative attitudes (acknowledged or attributed, respectively). In the special case of cognition, what things are for consciousness also consists of attitudes, which are now to be understood as responsible to, normatively governed by, how objective things are in themselves. Hegel offers an expressive account of this semantic relation, which is in turn cashed out in terms of the process of recollection.

For this sort of normative governance of attitudes, too, is to be understood ultimately in terms of traditions consisting of recollectively rationally reconstructed attitudes. Any way things could be in themselves is already conceptually articulated by relations of material incompatibility and consequence to other possible states of affairs. Thus it is in shape to be the content of an attitude, to be grasped as how things are for consciousness. (The same

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contents can show up both in objective-alethic and subjective-deontic forms.) What for each recollection plays the role of noumenon, the referent represented with varying degrees of fidelity by the senses of all the recollected cognitive attitudes (phenomenal appearances of that noumenal reality) in the rationally reconstructed tradition of error and discovery, is itself something things can be for consciousness, a phenomenon, the content of a possible attitude. Rehearsing an expressively progressive trajectory whereby the sequence of appearances is seen to be normatively governed by the reality that emerges into explicitness through that rationally reconstructed experience of error is providing a phenomenology that in a distinctive way warrants the resulting cognitive commitments of the recollector.

In the cognitive case, what is confessed and forgiven is *error*—the deontic incompatibility of commitments that precludes proper entitlement to them. This is the part of the content of attitudes that—according to a particular only partially successful recollection of the tradition to which it belongs—is *not* norm-governed, is *incorrect* according to the governing norm, does *not* exhibit subjunctive sensitivity to the content of that norm. It is the residue of contingency that the recollection has not given the form of necessity, has not shown to be as it ought to be according to the governing norm. That there is always such a surplus, such a residue, is what the recollector must confess. What the contrite recollector trusts is that this failure, too, will successfully be forgiven by *edelmütig* recollectors yet to come—that this contingency, too, will eventually be given the normative form of necessity by being incorporated in the conceptual contentful norm that will then be seen as having governed the whole process, including the current, inadequate recollective rational reconstruction of it. That every recollection must leave some residue, some aspect of the attitudes it reconstructs as remnants of contingency (and so must confess its own need for recollective forgiveness) is the way sensuous immediacy overflows conceptual mediation. That is the source of the experience of error and failure that provides the normative demand that is the motor for change of commitment. But that each successive recollection that is itself retrospectively forgiven as expressively progressive gives the form of necessity to more of what had previously been visible only as contingent makes this same process the road of truth. That incorporation of immediate contingent particularity into mediated normative universal conceptual form is the source of the *determinateness* of the conceptual contents of doxastic

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attitudes. For it is an essential requirement of the norm that governs the process of determining those conceptual contents.

It is characteristic of self-consciousness operating according to the metaconceptual structure of *Verstand* (whose modern apex is expressed by Kant) to take determinately contentful conceptual contents for granted. Those contents are thought of as always already being *fully* determinate in the sense of having sharp boundaries, determining norms for correct application in all possible cases (“rails laid out to infinity”). It is characteristic of self-consciousness operating according to the metaconceptual structure of *Vernunft* (characteristic of the third, postmodern phase of *Geist*) to understand determinateness differently, in terms of the on-going, never-ending expressive process of further determining conceptual contents by recollectively incorporating previously recalcitrant concrete aspects of how things are (what really follows from what, what is really incompatible with what) into conceptual form: giving nonnormative contingency the normative form of necessity. The determinateness of objective reality manifests itself in the active restlessness of the conceptual norms that structure the attitudes of knowing and acting subjects. It is because the process in terms of which the determinate contentfulness of conceptual norms is ultimately intelligible (the process of determining them) has the magnanimous (*edelmütig*) recognitive form of *trust*—of an endless progressive spiral of confession of partial normative failure, recollective forgiveness of that failure, and confession of the partial failure of that forgiveness while trusting in future forgiveness—that Hegel’s account is properly describable as presenting a “semantics with an edifying intent.”

That the normative relations of authority and responsibility between representeds and representings (the relations between how things objectively are, in themselves, and how they subjectively are, for consciousness) are to be understood as a special case of the authority of normative statuses over attitudes is an explanatory prioritizing of the practical over the cognitive and of normative pragmatics over representational semantics. It is accordingly a kind of *pragmatism* about semantics. The norm governing cognitive doings is recollected as implicit in the experience of error—which, as the process by which conceptual content is progressively determined, is also the experience of knowing. It is something like the intention (in the technical sense of *Absicht*) to represent (refer to, know) how things are in themselves. According

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to Hegel's normative understanding of representational relations, the objective realm of conceptual contents articulated by alethic modal relations of incompatibility and consequence normatively governs the subjective realm of conceptual contents articulated by deontic normative relations of incompatibility and consequence. Cognitive attitudes are responsible to the facts they represent in the sense that those facts set the standard for recollective normative assessment of the correctness of the attitudes, and the attitudes must be recollected as subjunctively sensitive to those facts. The fact that these normative *representational relations* are to be understood ultimately in terms of the *recognitive process* and essentially *historical social practice* of magnanimous recollective forgiveness is *conceptual idealism*.

Agency in the age of trust reaches the heroic character—so striking in the original ancient form of agency—that was pushed out by the ironic distancing and alienation from norms essential to the achievement of individual self-consciousness that is the triumph of modern over traditional forms of normative life. Central to heroism was what Hegel calls “character”: the decisive *sittlich* identification of an individual agent with the norms, practically treating them as authoritative over and binding on one's attitudes. This is an acknowledgment of the status-dependence of normative attitudes, of one's attitudes as norm-governed. The ought-to-*dos* governing normative attitudes (acknowledged or attributed responsibilities) are understood as wholly determined by the ought-to-*bes* that articulate normative statuses (what someone is really responsible for or committed to: their duty). As a result, the heroic agent takes responsibility for every aspect of his act. If some feature of it is not as it ought to be, that is confessed to be the agent's responsibility, whether or not it was intended or foreseen. Compared to the contracted modern conception, the heroic conception makes the agent primarily responsible for a much-expanded deed, stretching out to include distant, unanticipated consequences. For this reason, traditional heroism is essentially tragic: it requires subjecting oneself to the dark, unknowable power of fate, identifying with what one is made by forces beyond one's knowledge and control. Shouldering the responsibility that fate in this sense brings down upon one who acts is tragic heroism.

Heroism in the age of trust is like heroism in the age of tragedy in its *sittlich* acknowledgment of the bindingness of norms, in the sense of their governing authority over normative attitudes, the status-dependence of those

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attitudes. There are norms that set standards for assessment of the correctness of our attitudes of acknowledging and attributing responsibility and authority, and it is the responsibility of each agent to be sensitive to those norms, shaping her attitudes accordingly. Each forgiving retrospective recollective rational reconstruction of an expressively progressive tradition of attitudes is responsible for discerning just such governing norms. And where the cramped and contracted modern practical conception of agency drew a bright line between normatively attributable and assessable aspects of each doing, and nonnormative ones—between what the agent can properly be held responsible for, because done knowingly or intentionally, and what is done only in the sense of happening because of such doings in the narrow sense—the trusting conception is heroic, like the tragic conception, in that responsibility is total. Responsibility is taken for the whole deed. There is no aspect of intentional doings that overflows and falls outside the normative realm of responsibility—no specification of the deed for which no one takes responsibility. The difference between the two forms of normative heroism is that in *Geist* with the recognitive structure of trust, responsibility for the deed is shared between the agent whose practical attitudes initiated the doing and the members of her recognitive community, who take it as their own by committing themselves to recollectively forgiving it.

Agency as understood and practiced within the magnanimous recognitive structure of confession and recollective forgiveness combines these two heroic aspects of the premodern conception: *sittlich* appreciation of the status-dependence of normative attitudes and acknowledging total responsibility for the deed as consequentially extended beyond the knowledge and control of the agent. It can maintain a heroic expanded conception of the deed for which responsibility is taken because it has an expanded conception of who is responsible for each doing. Complementary recognitive attitudes both institute the governing norms and acknowledge the authority of the norms so instituted. The essentially historical fine structure of those reciprocally related recognitive attitudes and normative statuses articulates a division of normative labor between the individual agent whose practical attitudes initiate a self-conscious intentional doing, who takes responsibility for it in one sense, and members of the agent's recognitive community, who take responsibility for it in another sense. In this way the two essentially modern insights into the attitude-dependence of normative statuses and the

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distinction of responsibility marked by the individual agent's "rights of intention and knowledge" (the distinction between *Handlung* and *Tat*) are respected, and synthesized with the two principal features of premodern heroic agency.

But the *vernünftig*, trusting conception of agency as heroic does away with the element of tragic subjection to fate. Fate showed up as an alien, inhuman force in the tragic form of agency because it was a *nonnormative* force, one that though not itself governed by norms, nonetheless substantially shapes our normative responsibilities. What was left to us was bearing up and carrying on in the face of the incursions by alien fate into the properly normative realm in which we dwell. The postmodern neoheroic form of practical normativity replaces (normatively) blind fate with something we do for reasons. What *happens* is given the form of something *done*. Immediacy, contingency, particularity, and their recalcitrance to conceptualization are not done away with. But they now take their proper place. For we appreciate the necessary role they play in the process of determining the contents of the norms we both institute by our recognitive attitudes and acknowledge as governing that experiential process. The individual burdens of tragic subjection to fate are replaced by the communal recollective tasks of concrete magnanimous forgiveness. Where our normative digestion and domestication of immediacy, contingency, and particularity shows its limitations, when (as in each case at some point they must) they outrun our recollective capacity to incorporate them into the mediated, normative conceptual form of governing universals, that failure of ours is properly acknowledged by confession and trust in the forgiveness of that failure to fulfill our responsibilities, by more capable future recollectors.

The wounds of the Spirit heal, and leave no scars behind. The deed is not imperishable; it is taken back by Spirit into itself, and the aspect of individuality present in it, whether as intention or as an existent negativity and limitation, straightway vanishes. The self that carries out the action, the form of its act, is only a moment of the whole, and so likewise is the knowledge, that by its judgement determines and establishes the distinction between the individual and universal aspects of the action. [PG 669]

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The responsibility the individual tragic heroic agent takes on himself is accordingly spread out and shared. The doing of each (in one sense) is now the doing of all (in another, recognitively complementary sense). For all share responsibility for each action. The distinctive role played by individual agents is not obliterated. For the responsibility acknowledged by and attributed to the initiating agent is different from the reparative and recollective recognitive responsibility undertaken by those who shoulder the burden of forgiving the agent. Every deed now shows up both as a practical contribution to the content of all that came before it, and as acknowledging a recollective responsibility with respect to all those deeds. The temporally extended, historically structured recognitive community of those who are alike in all acknowledging the authority of norms, confessing the extent of their failure to be norm-governed, acknowledging their responsibility recollectively to forgive those failures in others, confessing the extent of the failure of their efforts at recollective and reparative forgiveness, and trusting that a way will be found to forgive those failures, is one in which each member identifies with all the others, at once expressing and sacrificing their own particular attitudes by taking coresponsibility for the practical attitudes of everyone. It is the “‘I that is ‘We,’ the ‘We’ that is ‘I.’”

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Afterword

To the Best of My Recollection

Hegel was a major figure in the philosophy department at Yale during my undergraduate years. But I was occupied with other things (so much being, so little time!) and never attended any of the many classes offered on his works during my time there. When I was in graduate school at Princeton, my Doktorvater Richard Rorty was officially a great admirer of the Hegel of the *Phenomenology*, but actually much preferred and practiced reading Kant. He esteemed the Hegelian historicizing and naturalizing of Kant that he saw as accelerating through much of the rest of the nineteenth century, only to be dashed when Russell and Husserl, each in his own ingenious way, found things for philosophy once again to be apodictic about. But Hegel's logic and metaphysics left Rorty predictably cold. He seemed to think that everything he really needed from Hegel he could get from the much more congenial John Dewey. When I left Princeton to take up my first (and, as it turns out, only) academic job, in Pittsburgh, I still had never read the *Phenomenology*.

I had come to Pitt because of Wilfrid Sellars. He thought of himself first and foremost as a Kantian. He once said that he hoped the effect of his work would be to move analytic philosophy from its Humean to its Kantian phase. But the parts of his work I most admired at the time were what he described as his “incipient *Meditations Hegeliennes*.” In the opening paragraph of his masterwork *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* he had explicitly aligned his arguments against the Myth of the Given with those of “Hegel, that great foe of immediacy.” I resolved to look at the original.

I found the *Consciousness* chapters of the *Phenomenology* fascinating. As William James described Peirce's Lowell lectures, they offered “flashes of brilliant light, relieved against Cimmerian darkness.” In *Sense Certainty* Hegel indeed convincingly made the main point of Sellars's critique of “the whole framework of givenness”: that to provide reasons capably of justifying beliefs, the senses must deliver conceptually articulated, judgeable contents, and that the capacity to grasp such contents presupposes a whole battery of conceptual abilities. But that line of

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thought was entangled with another one, which I found obscure but promising. It explored the practical and conceptual stage setting required to support the normative structure of authority that Sellars called “token credibility,” characteristic of the use of demonstratives and indexicals. Sellars had raised this topic in *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, but not pursued it. I came to see that Hegel understood the intimate connection between deixis and anaphora, and had thought deeply about its significance. This was not a topic anyone else had put themselves in a position to think about in the intervening 150 years. The *Perception* chapter gave me tantalizing glimpses of how a metaphysics based on the notion of determinate negation might work, and how it might be connected to a broadly inferentialist picture of conceptual content.

On my first reading of *Force and Understanding*, I realized that Hegel had also anticipated another important lesson Sellars had taught me. This is to think of the distinction between observable and theoretical entities not as ontological, but as methodological or epistemological: not as a difference of kinds of object, but only of our mode of access to them. Theoretical entities are those we can know about (come to be entitled to claims about) only inferentially. And that is a status that can change—for instance, as new instruments make new kinds of observation possible. Apart from that insight, though, I could make nothing at all of this long, complex, and evidently pivotal chapter of the book. It was enough to prompt a further engagement with the work, however. In 1980 I accordingly offered my first graduate seminar on the *Phenomenology*. I figured I had enough to say about the epistemological parts of the book to support a term spent reading the book with whatever graduate students were willing to accompany me on the adventure.

As it happened, at this time I was for independent reasons thinking about the normativity of concept-use. It had come to seem to me that the essence of Rorty’s pragmatism was the idea that all norms—including those that govern the justification of knowledge claims—are matters of social practice, and are accordingly plastic and subject to historical variation. I understood this as a line of thought tying together a series of his earlier papers. As I reconstructed it, it begins by thinking of “incorrigibility as the mark of the mental.” What is distinctive about Cartesian minds—and the reason the mind/body problem isn’t ancient—is that *pensées* are things we can’t be wrong about or ignorant of. This epistemic incorrigibility and transparency is what ties together for Descartes such otherwise disparate items as pains and fleeting thoughts. Rorty understood this as a special structure of authority: sincere first-person avowals of experiencings were not overrideable by other claims. And that structure of authority he understood as a matter of social practice, which need not have always had this structure (it didn’t for Aristotle), and need not continue to have it. “Eliminative materialism” envisaged the possible alteration of our practices after a materialist turn, so as to accord overriding authority instead to cerebroscopic measurements of brain states.

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We do now, he thought, actually have minds in the Cartesian sense. But we didn't always, and we might not do so in the future. (This wholly new take on the mind/body problem seemed nonaccidentally analogous to Nietzsche's new form of atheism: not that the idea of God is absurd and corresponds to nothing in the world, but that when we lived and moved and had our being within traditional practices there was a God, and that when we changed to the practices constitutive of modernity we killed Him.)

In addition to getting from Sellars the inferentialist semantic idea that to be conceptually contentful required being "located in a space of implications" (what, according to him, distinguished descriptions from mere labels), I had taken to heart his lesson that

in characterizing an episode or a state as that of *knowing*, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says. [EPM §36]

(Rorty takes focus on this passage to be characteristic of those of us—himself prime among them—whom he calls "*left-wing* Sellarsians.") In fact, Sellars didn't mean this claim to be restricted to episodes of knowing, but to characterize believables generally. The space of reasons is above all a *normative* space. Sellars here was gesturing at a normative theory of concept-use generally: a normative pragmatics in which an inferentialist semantics is embedded. This context of Sellarsian ideas suggested a broader range of application for Rorty's pragmatist, social-practice approach to normativity.

I was also coming to think about the normativity of discursiveness more generally. Normativity showed up first as a distinctive Kantian theme. My 1980 essay "Freedom and Constraint by Norms" focused on his apparently paradoxical view of freedom as a special kind of constraint: constraint by norms rather than by causes. Judging and acting intentionally showed up as binding ourselves by rules in the form of the concepts being applied. And what I was thinking of as Rorty's social pragmatism about norms seemed to be inspired by the later Wittgenstein's view of discursive norms as implicit in social practices. So when, in connection with that inaugural Hegel seminar, I read the *Self-Consciousness* chapters for the first time, I was ripe and ready to see there the general outlines of a full-blown theory of norms as socially instituted by reciprocal recognition. Such a theory seemed to promise what I had missed in Wittgenstein: an account of what it *means* for norms to be implicit in social practices.

Further, it occurred to me that the idea that norms were socially synthesized by reciprocal recognition could provide a model for the use of the logical vocabulary of particularity, individuality, and universality that I had seen Hegel deploy in the *Perception* chapter, and that I knew vaguely he developed at length in the *Science of Logic*. For particular living creatures could, by adopting to each other

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practical attitudes of mutual recognition, simultaneously synthesize universals, in the form of the resulting recognitive communities, and themselves as self-conscious individual selves—that is, particulars as characterized by universals, selves as members of communities. Hegel’s account of self-consciousness as an essentially social achievement seemed to provide a model in terms of which to understand his characteristic use of logical vocabulary. I didn’t understand how all of that might work, but I was hooked.

I adopted the practice (which continues to the present) of offering a seminar on the *Phenomenology* every third year, as part of a regular rota. This gave me the opportunity (and imposed the obligation) to reread and rethink the book carefully on a regular basis. My partners in this enterprise were the generations of graduate students at Pitt (and later in Leipzig) who participated in these seminars. A gratifyingly high percentage of those who passed through our department during these decades attended them, as a sort of ritual of passage. More than anything else, it was these conversations that shaped the story I tell here. It is impossible for me to disentangle my progress from their suggestions and objections.

Although the main focus of my attention lay elsewhere (1980 is also when the plan for my 1994 book *Making It Explicit* took definite shape), I made regular progress through this decade on the elaboration of what amounted to a translation manual from Hegel’s ferocious vocabulary into terms that brought his ideas into close, exploitable contact with the issues I found most significant and puzzling in contemporary philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and epistemology.

A key development for me was the realization, in the late 1980s, that not only did the *Reason* chapter offer a sophisticated theory of action in the sense in which Anscombe and Davidson had given shape to that distinctive subfield of analytic philosophy, but that it made some of the same fundamental moves that distinguished Davidson’s transformative account. Hegel, too, thought of actions as having many descriptions, as being actions because some of those are descriptions under which they are intentional, and yet as counting thereby as things genuinely done under all their descriptions, even those under which they are not intentional. He explicitly embraced what Davidson called the “accordion effect,” whereby effects unrolling into the indefinite future permit ever-new descriptions in terms of their consequences of what is still the very same doing. But Hegel went well beyond Davidson in understanding the distinction between intentional and consequential descriptions of doings in terms of normatively significant differences in social perspective. This is the difference between the context of deliberation, in which the agent is authoritative and for which she is responsible, and the context of assessment, in which the recognitive community is authoritative and holds the agent responsible.

In 1990 Bert Dreyfus and David Hoy invited me to be one of the speakers at a six-week National Endowment for the Humanities summer seminar in Santa Cruz, California, devoted to Heidegger and Davidson. I dutifully wrote a Hei-

degger piece—as I had a few years earlier for another NEH summer seminar they had put on in Berkeley. (Egged on by my friend and colleague John Haugeland, they thought I should be thinking more about Heidegger, and seized on these occasions to entice/compel me to do so. The results are reprinted as the Heidegger chapters of *Tales of the Mighty Dead*.) Though I did present that Heidegger material, because Davidson himself was attending, I spent most of my week’s seminar talking about Hegel on agency. Bert’s and David’s best efforts were unable to arouse in Davidson any interest at all in Heidegger, but he was intrigued by the story I was telling about what Hegel had to add to his own theory of action. While he was not moved to take on reading Hegel himself, he remained actively interested in what I had to say on the topic, and we continued to engage fruitfully on the topic (and after *Making It Explicit* came out, on a host of others) for many years.

At this point it seemed to me that what I had learned from Hegel about a variety of issues of great contemporary interest (at least to me) formed a critical mass. Abstract objects depend for us for their actualization. So when we get within telling distance of a story of sufficient potential interest, there is a palpable obligation for us to do right by it. I resolved to write a book-length report of what I thought I understood about the *Phenomenology*. The initial result, in 1992, was the first draft of this book, then titled “Action, Recognition, and Trust.” It took the form of fourteen lecture-length chapters, following the order of Hegel’s chapters, addressing the parts of the book from which I thought we had the most to learn philosophically on the topics I cared most about. Lindsay Waters had recently moved to Harvard University Press and he and I were deep in the final preparations for the publication of *Making It Explicit*. As a young editor, he had stuck his neck way out in championing that massive, technically demanding tome. And of course we didn’t have any idea at that point how that project would be received. But he nonetheless enthusiastically also adopted the nascent Hegel book project, filing away that first draft and claiming for HUP the right to publish its eventual successor. He knew how long it had taken me to get *MIE* into final form, and was not only unfailingly supportive of the new endeavor, but prepared to be endlessly patient. Neither of us knew how long it would end up taking. I am glad that I could deliver this manuscript to him before he retired (though only *just* before). Thanks, Lindsay.

John McDowell joined us at Pitt from Oxford in 1985—attracted in part by Sellars’s presence. (He had attended the first of Sellars’s disastrous Locke lectures at Oxford in 1965, finding the material fascinating but incomprehensible. He would later devote his Woodbridge lectures at Columbia to deciphering that lecture on Kant’s *Transcendental Aesthetic*, which had been published as the first chapter of *Science and Metaphysics*.) He participated in my Hegel seminar in the late 1980s and found my mapping of Hegel’s vocabulary onto more contemporary ones helpful for and encouraging to his own burgeoning interest in German Idealism

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(as he generously recollects in the preface to *Mind and World*). This was the beginning of a fruitful, ongoing conversation on these topics that has now lasted thirty years. John sometimes professes disbelief that I have actually heard anything he has said over that time, because as far as he can see, I never took to heart any of his patient explanations of how I was getting things radically wrong. That view is far from the truth. There are lots of things I see differently because of his criticisms—though I almost never end up seeing things as he thinks they are. In particular, his pointing out the *Einseitigkeit* of my early rendering of Hegel's view of intentional agency was the catalyst for my eventual realization (as I would like to think of it) of the essential temporally biperspectival character of conceptual content modeled on the relations between prospective and retrospective characterizations of intentions—which is one of the core structural features of the reading of Hegel I recount in this book. I think John tends to underestimate the extent to which I am helpless in the face of an emerging narrative.

In spite of the hint about the possibility of understanding the relations between particularity, universality, and individuality in terms of the simultaneous synthesis of recognitive communities and individual normative subjects by reciprocal recognitive relations among particular desiring organisms, I found myself unable to see any substantial connection between what Hegel was doing in the *Phenomenology* and what he did six to ten years later in the *Science of Logic*. I simply couldn't make anything of that work. In particular, I couldn't see how someone who understood everything I took Hegel to have understood in the *Phenomenology* about the nature of conceptual content and concept-use could be moved to go on to write that later work about whatever it was about. My jocular take at the time was that as far as I could see, the enforced boredom of years spent presiding over recitations as an instructor in the Nuremberg *Gymnasium* had basically driven him crazy. Of course this was not a sustainable position, but I didn't see how to do better.

Then, in the early 1990s, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, founding professor of the post-DDR philosophy department at the University of Leipzig, came to Pitt as a fellow at the Center for Philosophy of Science. He had just finished his massive 1992 book *Hegels Analytische Philosophie: Die Wissenschaft der Logik als kritische Theorie der Bedeutung*. He read the *Science of Logic* as presenting a theory of meaning, an account of both conceptual content and concept-use. And he could not understand how someone who had such sophisticated things to say on that topic already in 1812 could have gotten there from the literary and anthropological stylings of the neo-Romantic coming-of-age novel that was the 1807 *Phenomenology*. During our increasingly intense conversations during his year in Pittsburgh (conversations that continue to this day), we came to realize that we each had hold of a different part of what was the same elephant. Further, we were both outliers within the interpretive community in understanding Hegel's overall topic in broadly semantic terms, and in seeing him as addressing in a metaconceptually

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sophisticated way deep issues that contemporary philosophy of language had by no means yet seen its way to the bottom of. If we were right, the vast majority of Hegel's readers were overlooking the elephant in the room. They weren't seeing anything of the largest philosophical issues he was addressing, the sophisticated criteria of adequacy for responses to them that he acknowledged, and the big, bold moves he was making in his semantic theories.

For what it's worth, I take it that the tradition's losing sight of Hegel's principal motivating concerns was the result of the confluence of a number of historical accidents. Hegel left no first-rate students who focused on his logic and metaphysics. It was a tumultuous time, and it was his social and political theories that aroused the most interest. Then the eclipse of Hegelian thought in Germany in the middle years of the nineteenth century cut off the stream of continuous transmission of his ideas, obliging later generations to read the works basically *de novo*. One result is that the neo-Kantians who revived philosophical interest in discursive normativity and in particular its historicity (I'm thinking of the earlier works of Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp) saw their work as a continuation of Kant's (as Hegel himself had regarded his own) and did not recognize their concerns as having much in common with what they understood of Hegel's. Instead, Hegel's talk of *Geist* as self-conscious and reflective was interpreted in neo-Cartesian terms, to yield a bizarre picture of a supersubject whose consciousness is to be understood on the model of Descartes's understanding of ours. Appreciation of and concern for the normative dimension of intentionality waned in the first half of the twentieth century (despite echoes of his neo-Kantian teachers in Division One of Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit*). That topic was brought back to center stage philosophically only by the later Wittgenstein. And even there, understanding of this as one of his principal topics was slow to dawn on his readers. By the time the topic I take to be Hegel's principal concern became visible once again to philosophers, it was in terms far removed from anything anyone could recognize in his texts. It is fascinating to wonder what nineteenth-century philosophy (and indeed American pragmatism, and subsequent analytic philosophy—if there would have been such movements at all) would have looked like if Hegel's readers then had understood both his theories and their explanatory targets, in anything like the terms in which they are presented here.

The broader perspective on Hegel's project that resulted from ongoing conversations with Pirmin yielded new ways of thinking about both his social account of the norms governing discursive practice and his account of conceptual content in terms of material incompatibility and consequence (Hegel's "determinate negation" and "mediation"). By 1999 I had rewritten the manuscript from the ground up, under the new title "A Spirit of Trust."

Wrestling with what came to be called the "rule-following considerations" in the wake of Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein led me to see Hegel as directly addressing what is perhaps the central question that Wittgenstein raised in the

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vicinity. If all there is to confer meaning on linguistic expressions and content on intentional states is the use that we make of them, the functional role they play in our practices, how is it that such use can institute norms that are determinately contentful, in the sense of providing definite standard for assessments of the correctness of further uses in a whole range of possible novel situations? In *Making It Explicit* I had taken for granted the availability to scorekeeping linguistic practitioners of conceptual contents that were determinate in this sense. They were understood as settling what else those who applied concepts with those contents in assertion had committed themselves to thereby, what would entitle them to do so, and what was incompatible with such applications. I had self-consciously not addressed the question of where such determinate contents and their associated norms came from, and how they could be understood to be available to practitioners. Taking that to be a topic for another day was a divide-and-conquer strategy necessary to focus on a manageable topic in that book, to make the normative pragmatic story about the use of expressions and the inferentialist semantic story about their conceptual contents jointly tellable.

I had long thought that Hegel was the one to look to for wisdom about the relations between the historical development of conceptual contents and their determinateness. But I hadn't been able to assemble the various things I took him to be saying into a detailed account. In 2002–2003 I was fortunate to have the opportunity for undisturbed reflection afforded by a fellowship at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford. While my main efforts during this halcyon period were directed at preparing my upcoming John Locke lectures at Oxford (published as *Between Saying and Doing* in 2008), I resolved to use this opportunity also to try to figure out what Hegel had to say about the nature and structure of the historical processes by which conceptual contents are determined. I was convinced that Hegel had in 1806 asked himself the Wittgensteinian question about how to understand the use of expressions as at once the *application* of concepts subject to assessment according to norms and the *institution* of the norms that serve as standards for assessing such applications. In what I experienced as a breakthrough, I came to discern a detailed answer to this question in Hegel's account of *recollective rationality*, whose paradigm is the retrospective rational reconstruction of an intention (*Absicht*) normatively governing and unifying an extended exercise of agency (such as building a house or writing a book). I would like to think that he invented this concept, and I then discovered it. But it is probably best just to understand us both as having forgivingly recollectively rationally reconstructed it. Developing this interpretive idea led to completely new treatments of the *Reason* and *Spirit* chapters of the *Phenomenology*, and so to a new draft of the whole book in 2004.

In the 2004 draft, all that remained substantially the same from the 1999 draft was the treatment of *Consciousness*. In 2008 Stekeler invited me to Leipzig for a term as Leibniz Professor. I offered a graduate seminar on the *Phenomenology* and

for the first time made the then-current version of my manuscript available to people other than the graduate students and others who attended my seminars at Pitt. This working through made Hegel's *Introduction* look quite different to me than it had before. It now seemed to be taking place at two levels, offering an account of the development of determinate conceptual contents through the experience of empirical error as well as the development of forms of consciousness to ever-greater self-consciousness. I wrote up a detailed reading of Hegel's telling sixteen paragraphs (the topic of a seminar by Heidegger, later published in English with a superb translation by Kenley Dove—whose Hegel courses I had missed out on at Yale), and presented it in the form of three lectures at the Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich in 2011.

In *Between Saying and Doing* I had followed out some hints from Sellars about the deep relations between what is expressed by deontic normative vocabulary and what is expressed by alethic modal vocabulary. In crudest terms, the idea was that the former lets one *say* what one must *do* to be using expressions so as to say what the latter lets one *say*. Having had this thought myself, I came to see a version of it as animating Hegel's understanding of the relations between determinate negation as it applies in the objective sphere of things (where it is impossible for one object to combine the properties of being copper and being an electrical insulator) and in the subjective sphere of commitments (where it is not impossible, but merely impermissible to combine in one subject commitment to an object's being both copper and an electrical insulator). When faced with such incompatible commitments, the subject is normatively obliged to *do* something, to *change* those commitments. Here, I thought, was the key to the hitherto mysterious (to me) connection between determinate negation and a principle of *movement* that lies at the center of Hegel's metaphysics. It seemed to me that I now had the tools to understand Hegel's accounts of knowledge and intentional agency in terms of his conceptual realism: the idea that one and the same conceptual content can take the form of an objective fact, conceptually articulated by counterfactually robust relations of incompatibility and consequence expressible in alethic modal terms and also the form of a subjective commitment, conceptually articulated by relations of incompatibility and consequence expressible in deontic normative terms. This thought, I came to think, lay at the core of Hegel's idealism.

Too much had changed in my overall take on Hegel's project for me to be satisfied with the 1999 treatment of the *Consciousness* chapters—now the oldest part of the manuscript. I started over with this material, helped along by the 2013 iteration of my Pitt Hegel seminar. I had written new treatments of *Sense Certainty* and *Perception* in time to include them in the draft that was circulated to the eminent interlocutors Gilles Bouche brought together for a workshop on the then-current draft of *A Spirit of Trust* at the Free University in Berlin in the summer of 2014. Soon after I felt that I had finally understood the most mysterious bits of

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Force and Understanding, including a new way of thinking about the transition it effects from *Consciousness* to *Self-Consciousness*.

It remained only to redo my discussion of *Self-Consciousness*. I had produced a new reading of the transition from desire to recognition, which I first presented at a meeting of the Hegel *Verein* in Münster in 2003. But I needed to start over with the crucial treatment of the social achievement of self-consciousness by reciprocal recognition, and the pathologies of it that Hegel diagnoses in his allegory of Mastery and Servitude. I had been thinking hard about the relations between Kant's and Hegel's views on normativity and concept-use, and reported some of the results in my three Woodbridge lectures at Columbia (reprinted in my 2009 book, *Reason in Philosophy*). Trying to get clearer about how Hegel's understanding of normativity in terms of recognition develops out of Kant's understanding of normativity in terms of autonomy, it came to seem to me (perhaps not surprisingly) that Hegel himself provided exactly the metaconceptual expressive resources required. As applied to subjects rather than objects, his distinction between what a self-consciousness is in itself and what it is for consciousness is the distinction between normative statuses and normative attitudes. Prime among the terms Hegel uses for what consciousness can be in itself are "independence" and "dependence," by which I understand the normative statuses of authority and responsibility. And consciousness can be something for itself or for others, which I read as normative attitudes distinguished by their social perspective: attitudes of acknowledging (oneself) and attributing (to others) statuses such as responsibility. Translating both Kant's and Hegel's models of normativity into this regimented idiom of normative states and attitudes, it seemed to me, made it possible to be much clearer and more precise about both, and about the relations between them. In particular, this idiom made it possible to analyze complex normative statuses such as autonomy as constellations of simpler statuses and attitudes. The way in which recognitive attitudes institute normative statuses when they exhibit the proper structure also emerges clearly and naturally. (As part of this project, I wrote a long projected chapter recollecting the Early Modern developmental history of the metaphysics of normativity in this regimented idiom, emphasizing the strands that Hegel picks up and weaves together in his account. Useful as it was to me to work this story out in detail, in the end I decided it didn't pull its weight on the overall story and regretfully excised it from the book.)

Seen through the clarifying lens of this normative metavocabulary, the subject of the *Spirit* chapters—the great practical and conceptual sea change from traditional to modern normative, and so conceptual structures—shows up as the transition from forms of life expressing practical appreciation of the status-dependence of normative attitudes to forms of life expressing practical appreciation of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses. The challenge of envisaging a third great age of *Geist* succeeding the first two becomes that of reconciling these two

insights. What is needed to resolve the Wittgensteinian puzzle about how discursive practices can be understood as both *applying* already determinately contentful conceptual norms and *instituting* those norms shows up as a special case of such reconciliation. And the concept of recollective rationality Hegel introduces as his solution to this problem, too, can be much more clearly articulated in the regimented normative metavocabulary into which I was translating Hegel's terminology. At this point it finally seemed to me that all the expressive resources needed for a unified, illuminating telling of Hegel's story were ready for use.

Throughout the time I was wrestling with Hegel's ideas, I was illuminated and informed in ways too various to mention by the works of, and by conversations with, Robert Pippin and Terry Pinkard. It always seemed to me that we were moving in generally the same direction, thinking in concordant ways. More recently, I also learned a great deal from Paul Redding and Robert Stern. But I found that I could not do justice to working out the story that was taking shape for me in Hegel's text and at the same time triangulate that story with what these other insightful and sympathetic readers were making of it. This was my fault, and my loss. May others do better.

In the last years of work on this manuscript, I have been aided immensely by the opportunity to present all the material sequentially in an extended lecture series in Leipzig. In all, I have given eighteen lectures in that series, at the rate of three or four a year over the last five years. They have been sponsored by the Forschungskolleg for Analytic German Idealism (FAGI), in Leipzig. My German-language original book *Wiedererinnertes Idealismus*, collecting some of my Hegel essays, was published as the first volume in a series Suhrkamp Verlag collaborated on with FAGI. (John McDowell's *Die Welt im Blick* was the second entry in this series.) Financial support also was provided by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, in connection with their Anneliese Maier Forschungspreis.

Going through the extended process recounted here was for me an altogether exhilarating experience (in the sense Hegel gives to "Erfahrung"). For it took the expressively progressive shape of a voyage of discovery—the gradual emergence into the fully explicit light of day of themes and stories that then showed up as having been there all along, implicit, having hitherto revealed themselves only by the tantalizing glimpses occasionally afforded by dark but suggestive passages. It is, of course, an experience of this kind that Hegel prepared for us in the *Phenomenology*, presented as a reading of the development of human self-understanding. And it is such an experience that the body of this work aims at. Like the *Phenomenology* itself, *A Spirit of Trust* exemplifies the process of recollective rationality whose structure it is its business to articulate.

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Notes

Introduction

1. *PI* §258.

2. Hegel most explicitly makes this point in his allegorical treatment of “consciousness understanding itself as conscientious,” discussed at the end of Chapter 14 in this volume.

3. The original German for this important passage is “Schon ein Gedachtes, ist der Inhalt Eigentum der Substanz; es ist nicht mehr das Dasein in die Form des Ansichseins, sondern nur das—weder mehr bloß ursprüngliche noch in das Dasein versenkte, vielmehr bereits erinnerte—Ansich in die Form des Fürsichseins umzukehren. Die Art dieses Tuns ist näher anzugeben.” This is from Georg Lasson’s 1907 anniversary edition (Leipzig: Verlag der Dürr’schen Buchhandlung). Later editions and (so) translators often omit the text between the dashes.

4. *EPM* §1.

1. Conceptual Realism and the Semantic Possibility of Knowledge

All quotations from Hegel’s *Introduction* are in the Kenley Royce Dove translation, from Martin Heidegger, *Hegel’s Concept of Experience* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1970).

1. The idea of couching this story as the transition from a model of *resemblance* to one of *representation* is from the first chapter of my longtime colleague John Haugeland’s *Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press [a Bradford Book], 1989).

2. Descartes’s commitment to the mind’s awareness of its own representings being immediate in the sense of nonrepresentational (justified by the regress of representation argument) did not preclude his treating the contents of those rep-

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resentings as essentially involving their relations to other such contents. Indeed, his view of representation as a matter of isomorphism between the whole system of representings and the whole system of representeds entails just such a semantic holism. He never, I think, resolves the residual tension between the immediacy of his pragmatics (his account of what one is doing in thinking) and the holism of his semantics. Kant's pragmatics of judging as integration into a whole exhibiting the synthetic unity of apperception is not similarly in tension with his version of the holistic semantic thought.

3. It is by no means clear that Kant does hold this. A more plausible reading restricts the representation relation to what holds between the empirical, representing self and nature. It is the essence of transcendental idealism to understand both of these in conceptual, hence intrinsically intelligible, shape. Kant's side remarks about "things-in-themselves" are better understood as making purely negative points. On such a reading, Hegel is siding with Kant in endorsing the conceptual articulation of both sides of the representation relation, but does not want to endorse the transcendental idealist way of entitling himself to this claim.

4. Gottlob Frege, "The Thought: A Logical Inquiry," *Mind*, n.s., 65, no. 259 (July 1956): 289–311.

5. *PI* §95.

6. For instance, by Jennifer Hornsby, "Truth: The Identity Theory," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 47 (1997): 1–24, reprinted in *The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives*, ed. Michael P. Lynch (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 663–681. Also J. Dodd, *An Identity Theory of Truth* (London: Macmillan, 2000).

7. For instance, by J. Dodd, "McDowell and Identity Theories of Truth," *Analysis* 55, no. 3 (1995): 160–165. I doubt McDowell would be happy with this characterization of his views in *Mind and World* about the necessity of understanding ourselves as conceptually open to the layout of reality.

8. One of the grounds on which McDowell has, with some justice, been criticized, is his unwillingness to supply such details for the conception of the conceptual in play in *Mind and World*.

9. Here one can and should, however, invoke the distinction between reference-dependence (objectionable) and sense-dependence (not objectionable)—about which more later.

10. I discuss Kant's normative, pragmatic theory of judging, the way it leads to a notion of conceptual content, and what Hegel made of all of this in the first three chapters of *Reason in Philosophy*.

11. There is a route to a similar conclusion via the Rational Constraint Condition. Conjoined with a psychological construal of the conceptual, it supports the Davidsonian view that "only a belief can justify another belief." Then it seems one must reject the RCC—which results, McDowell claims in *Mind and World*, in a picture of beliefs (representations, now not really intelligible as *appearances* at all)

as “spinning frictionlessly in the void.” For the only alternative appears to be envisaging the world as somehow consisting of intentional states: the thinkings of a Berkeleyan God or a Bradleyan or Roycean Absolute.

12. Claude E. Shannon and Warren Weaver, *The Mathematical Theory of Communication* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1949).

13. Already something thought, the *content* is the property of substance; existence [Dasein] has no more to be changed into the form of what is in-itself and implicit [Ansichseins], but only the *implicit*—no longer merely something primitive, or lying hidden within existence, but already present as a *recollection* [erinnerte]—into the form of what is *explicit*, of what is objective to self [Fursichseins]. [PG 29]

14. For instance, in PG 79 in the *Introduction*.

15. For instance, in PG 91.

16. Really, “homomorphic,” because in general subjects need not be aware of (apperceive, conceptually represent) all the alethic modal relations of incompatibility and consequence that objectively obtain. But I mean “homomorphic” in the technical mathematical sense of a structure-preserving mapping from one relational structure (whose elements are subjective commitments labeled by declarative sentences, and whose relations are deontic normative relations of incompatibility and consequence) to another (whose elements are objective states of affairs—in virtue of the homomorphism, labelable by the *same* declarative sentences, and whose relations are alethic modal relations of incompatibility and consequence). The structure preserved is those relations. To say that the homomorphism h is “structure-preserving” in this sense means that if aRb in the commitment-structure, where R is normative incompatibility (or consequence) in that structure, then $h(a)R'h(b)$, where R' is alethic incompatibility (or consequence) in the objective conceptual structure.

17. I suppress temporal references here. Note that “simultaneously” is not a sufficient qualification. Rather, the predicates-properties themselves should be thought of as including temporal specifications. For having property P at time t can be incompatible with having property Q at time t' : it’s raining now is incompatible with the streets being dry in two minutes.

18. That it *cannot* in principle hold globally and permanently is a deep feature of Hegel’s understanding of sensuous and matter-of-factual *immediacy*.

2. Representation and the Experience of Error

1. I use “commitment” for how things are for consciousness. Hegel sometimes uses the term “setzen”: positing.

2. Hegel’s undifferentiated talk of “consciousness” in the *Introduction* carefully does not distinguish between *a* consciousness and consciousness in general.

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Later on, in the *Self-Consciousness* chapter, we see that the *social* articulation of consciousness in general into mutually recognizing individual *self*-consciousnesses is essential to understanding either one.

3. Saying much more than this immediately raises more systematic and theoretical questions. Can this distinction be paraphrased as that between what we represent and how we represent it? Does the rough-and-ready distinction of ordinary language involve running together two distinctions that ought to be kept apart: that between *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*, and that between the content expressed by declarative sentences and that possessed by singular terms? What further commitments are involved in taking it that in thinking or saying that things are thus and so I am representing a state of affairs? My principal purpose here—rationally reconstructing the fundamental considerations, commitments, and ideas that shape the views Hegel expounds in his *Introduction*—is best served by not rushing to engage such theoretically sophisticated semantic issues.

4. Of course, these complementary reductive approaches are not the only strategic possibilities. One might offer independent accounts of conceptual and representational intentionality, and then explain how they relate to one another. Or one might, perhaps most plausibly, insist that the two can only be explained together and in relation to one another.

5. “The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of representations in an intuition.” [A79, B104]

6. For instance, “daß ihm etwas das *An-sich* . . . ist,” in *PG* 85.

7. The assessment in question is Hegel’s “Prüfung,” in *PG* 85.

8. The point generalizes to constellations of more than two jointly incompatible commitments (so long as all the members of the set are essential to their collective incompatibility, in the sense that dropping them would leave a mutually compatible remainder). For simplicity, I will stick to the two-commitment case.

9. As Hegel puts it in *PG* 84 and *PG* 85, quoted earlier.

10. In the *Phenomenology*, this is a theme emphasized in the *Preface*, in partial explanation of why “everything hangs on apprehending and expressing the truth not merely as *substance* but also equally as *subject*.” [*PG* 17] Subjects are the ones who must respond to the normative demands implicit in applying a concept whose content is articulated by the relations of determinate negation (material incompatibility) and mediation (inferential consequence) it stands in to other such contents. That they must respond by *doing* something, *changing* their further commitments (rejecting some and accepting others) is the context in which we must understand his talk of the “movement of the *Begriff*.” [*PG* 34] This is what he is talking about when he refers to “the self-moving concept which takes its determinations back into itself. Within this movement, the motionless subject itself breaks down; it enters into the distinctions and the content and constitutes the determinateness,

which is to say, the distinguished content as well as the content's movement, instead of continuing simply to confront that movement. [PG 60] It is why "[d]eterminate thoughts have the 'I,' the power of the negative, or pure actuality, for the substance and element of their existence." [PG 33]

11. I offer some background, clarification, and examples of the concept of pragmatic metavocabulary in chapter 1 of *Between Saying and Doing*.

3. Following the Path of Despair to a Bacchanalian Revel

1. I take one of the positive points of Hegel's *Introduction* to the *Phenomenology* to be a suggestion as to what it is to treat such conceptual contents as appearances of a reality, to take such *Sinne* to be modes of presentation of *Bedeutungen*, to understand thinkables that can be expressed *de dicto* (e.g., as the thought *that* the object in the corner is round) as always also in principle expressible *de re* (e.g., as the thought *of* the ball that *it* is round). To do that one must acknowledge them as subject to a certain kind of normative assessment: answerability for their correctness *to* the facts, objects, and properties that they thereby count as *about*.

2. This is how "the form of the Notion [Begriff] . . . unites the objective form of Truth and of the knowing Self in an immediate unity." [PG 805]

3. "Das Wahre ist so der bacchantische Taumel, an dem kein Glied nicht trunken ist."

4. Spirit is this movement of the Self which empties itself of itself and sinks itself into its substance, and also, as Subject, has gone out of that substance into itself, making the substance into an object and a content at the same time as it cancels this difference between objectivity and content. [PG 804]

4. Immediacy, Generality, and Recollection

1. Besides these three options—nonconceptual objective world and conceptual subjective grasp of it, conceptually articulated world and conceptual grasp of it, and nonconceptual world taken in nonconceptually—there would seem to be the abstract possibility of a conceptually articulated world taken in nonconceptually. I do not know of any actual view of this shape, though there are analogues if the conceptual / nonconceptual distinction is replaced by such others as the infinite / finite or divine / human distinctions.

2. On the general issue, see the articles by Sosa and Burge that McDowell talks about in "De Re Senses," *Philosophical Quarterly* 34, no. 136 (July 1984): 283–294. That essay usefully sets out the issues, in a way that is congenial to the approach taken and attributed to Hegel here. The view that there is a distinctive role for

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demonstrative, object-involving thoughts (“strong *de re* commitments” in the idiom of chapter 8 of *Making It Explicit*), but that they are through and through conceptual is introduced by Evans, endorsed by McDowell (for instance, in the essay referred to here), and developed in a somewhat different direction in *Making It Explicit*.

3. Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, trans. and ed. J. Michael Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 79. This sort of use of “certainty” [Gewissheit] is also important for Hegel’s use of another important dyad, “certainty”/“truth,” which he uses to try terminologically to loosen the grip of the picture of subjects and objects as independent things, in favor of one in which we can appreciate thoughts and facts as having in favored cases the very same conceptually articulated contents.

4. Cf. Kant: “It is therefore correct to say that the senses do not err—not because they always judge rightly, but because they do not judge at all.” [A293/B350]

5. CDCM §108.

6. “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” was delivered as lectures in London in 1956, and Hegel wrote all of the *Phenomenology*, apart from the *Preface*, in 1806.

7. The first is introduced in PG 94 and its consequences extracted in PG 95 and PG 96, the second is introduced in PG 100 and unpacked in PG 101 and PG 102, and third is introduced in PG 103 and what is implicit in it elaborated in PG 104–107.

8. Hegel follows up on his introduction of the distinction between immediate knowledge and knowledge of the immediate in the opening sentence of *Sense Certainty* with this passage in PG 92, setting up the way he will exploit the distinction in the three movements of thought: “Among the countless differences cropping up here we find in every case that the crucial one is that, in sense-certainty, pure being at once splits up into what we have called the two ‘Thises,’ one ‘This’ as ‘I,’ and the other ‘This’ as object. When we reflect on this difference, we find that neither one nor the other is only immediately present in sense-certainty, but each is at the same time mediated: I have this certainty through something else, viz. the thing; and it, similarly, is in sense-certainty through something else, viz. through the ‘I.’”

9. Fussy terminological note:

1. It is tokenings (acts or episodes of tokening), not tokens, that are unrepeatable in the relevant sense. A religious enthusiast who makes a sign inscribed with an arrow and the legend “You are a sinner!” and goes around pointing at various passersby utilizes a single token (the sign), but performs many unrepeatable speech acts (tokenings), whose semantics varies from tokening to tokening.
2. Demonstratives and indexicals are different species of token(ing)-reflexive expression types. It is wrong to think of demonstratives as a

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kind of indexical: expressions relative to an index that consists not of a time, place, speaker, or world, but of a demonstration. That is wrong because in the case of genuine indexicals, the index in question can be specified independently of features of the particular speech act whose semantics depends on that index. But what is being demonstrated is highly context dependent along a further dimension. In David Lewis's example, what makes something "the most salient pig" can be *any* feature of the situation at all. Which one matters is not settled in advance, as it is for proper indexicals.

10. One might be tempted to argue that the two distinctions do not really generate three senses of "intuition," since uses of demonstratives are always exercises of receptivity in the sense that they are noninferentially elicited. This would not be at all plausible for indexicals, which include not only "here," but "there," not only "now," but "then." But they also include "a week from last Tuesday," which can surely be used as the conclusion of an inference—as indeed, it then becomes clear on reflection, can even the simplest here-now-me indexicals. "If she left an hour ago, she should be here by now," surely reports the product of an inferential process. The same considerations show that even demonstratives, whose most basic use *is* in making noninferential reports and perceptual judgments, also always have inferential uses.

11. Other examples include

So it is in fact the universal that is the true [content] of sense-certainty. [PG 96]
What consciousness will learn from experience in all sense-certainty is, in truth, only what we have seen, viz. the This as a *universal*. [PG 109]

12. Hegel splits up the pure indication that would be made explicit by a tokening of "this" into temporal and spatial dimensions, which would be made explicit by tokenings of "now" and "here," and makes the point indicated in terms of a "now that is night" and a "now that is day," on the one hand (in PG 96), and a "here that is a house" and a "here that is a tree," on the other (in PG 101). But the importation of this distinction is irrelevant to the point I am discussing.

13. For instance, in PG 98.

14. Thus, for instance, "festhalte," "Bleibende," "aufgezeigte" in PG 108.

15. For future reference, it should be registered that this structure could be invoked by talk of the future, viewing the present as past, and thereby making the present into something. We see further along, in the discussion of *Reason*, that for Hegel future interpretations quite generally determine what our acts are in themselves. It is this open-ended potential for interpretation they show to be something *for* future consciousness that is what we mean by the in-itself. This is just the doctrine of the historical significance of the distinction between noumena, reality, or what is in itself, on the one hand, and its phenomenal appearance, what it is for consciousness on the other, that was announced in the *Introduction*.

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16. I elaborate this point (without reference to Hegel) in chapter 7 of *Making It Explicit*.

17. A98–106.

5. Understanding the Object / Property Structure in Terms of Negation

1. “It is merely the character of positive universality which is at first observed and developed.” [PG 114]

2. Hegel says also: “I now further perceive the property as determinate, as contrasted with an other, and as excluding it . . . I must in fact break up the continuity into pieces and posit the objective essence as an excluding ‘one.’ In the broken-up ‘one,’ I find many such properties, which do not affect each other but which are instead indifferent to each other.” [PG 117]

3. Book V of the *Categories*.

4. I discuss this issue further in the second half of chapter 1 and in chapter 6 of *From Empiricism to Expressivism*.

5. Hegel invokes this issue explicitly by using the phrase “nimmt (sie) auf sich” (takes it upon itself, takes it up), in PG 118, PG 120, PG 122, and again in summary in PG 131.

6. In PG 123 and PG 124.

6. “Force” and Understanding—From Object to Concept

1. “In the dialectic of sense certainty, hearing and seeing have become things of the past for consciousness, and as perceiving, it has arrived at thoughts, which it brings together for the first time in the unconditioned universal [unbedingt Allgemeinen].” [PG 132]

2. In the introductory paragraph of *Force and Understanding* Hegel refers to “this unconditioned universal, which from now on is the true object of consciousness.” [PG 132]

3. Roger Boscovitch, in his 1758 *Theoria philosophiae naturalis redacta ad unicam legem virium in natura existentium* (Theory of natural philosophy reduced to the single law of forces which exist in nature), and Kant in his 1786 *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. Hegel echoes Boscovitch’s title within his allegory, in his discussion of the relation of the “single law” to disparate determinate laws.

4. Because forces are, in fact, theoretical entities—though not the only ones—this allegory is also synecdoche: letting a part stand in for the whole (a cattle herd of fifty head). That is not true of all the rest of the semantic allegories of the *Phenomenology*, however.

5. I take this to be the point of what would otherwise be the somewhat suspect move of assimilating particulars to universals as themselves being higher-order universals comprising the first-order universals that characterize them: using “universal” as a genus that has as species both properties that unify the disparate objects they characterize and objects as unifying the disparate properties that characterize them. This latter is conceiving particularity as a “universal medium.”

6. From Arthur Eddington’s 1927 Gifford Lectures, published as *The Nature of the Physical World* (New York: Macmillan, 1928), ix–x.

7. This is the view where, because no content can be acknowledged for the inner world of things as they are in themselves, “nothing would be left but to stop at the world of appearance, i.e. to perceive something as true that we [now] know is not true.” [PG 146]

8. In his Locke lectures, published as *Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968; repr., Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing, 1992). Hegel remarks on this reading of Kant in PG 146, pointing out that it would be a ridiculous overreaction to think of things in themselves as an *unknowable* beyond on this conception of them. Sellars agrees and takes this fact to be a prime advantage of his critical rendering of the Kantian idea. I criticize this view of Sellars in *From Empiricism to Expressivism*, beginning in chapter 1.

9. I discuss in more detail this issue of the intelligibility of holism, and what I take to be Hegel’s response to it, in “Holism and Idealism in Hegel’s *Phenomenology*,” which is chapter 6 in *Tales of the Mighty Dead*.

10. I have substituted Baillie’s “calm” for Miller’s “inert” in translating “ruhiges.”

11. PG 157. In this bit of the text, Hegel refers to the calm realm of laws as the “first supersensible world.” I count it as actually the second, after reality construed as the purely theoretical entities that give rise to observable manifestations (mere appearance) according to invidious Eddingtonian theoretical realism.

12. Tastes probably don’t actually work like this, so the example is not the best Hegel could have chosen. The colors work better.

7. Objective Idealism and Modal Expressivism

1. I discuss some more contemporary ways of working out this idea in chapters 1, 4, and 5 of *From Empiricism to Expressivism*.

2. *Word and Object* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960), 96.

3. This is the sort of error that is invoked in PG 131.

4. I take it that the lesson I am claiming is taught in the *Perception* chapter of the *Phenomenology* is also in play in the *Sein und Schein* section of the *Science of Logic*.

5. I discuss this point further in chapter 6 of *Tales of the Mighty Dead*: “Holism and Idealism in Hegel’s *Phenomenology*.”

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6. Recall from the discussion of the *Introduction* the crucial distinction between what things are *to* consciousness and what they are *for* consciousness—unmarked in extant translations, save for Kenley Dove’s. Martin Heidegger, *Hegel’s Concept of Experience* (with a section from Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit* in the Kenley Royce Dove translation) (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1989).

7. I have tweaked Miller’s translation. It is important that Hegel uses “Vorstellung,” representation, just where he does, and that makes it misleading to translate “darstellen” as “represent” here.

8. G. Leibniz, *Les nouveaux essais sur l’entendement humain, Préface*.

9. I discuss Sellars’s critique of descriptivism in the introduction and chapter 1 of *From Empiricism to Expressivism*.

10. I discuss this Kantian categorial idea and what subsequent philosophers such as Carnap and (especially) Sellars make of it in the first half of chapter 1 of *From Empiricism to Expressivism*, and the alethic modal case specifically in chapters 4 and 5.

11. “Conclusions are drawn from premises in accordance with principles, not from premises that embody those principles,” as Gilbert Ryle puts the point. “‘If,’ ‘So,’ and ‘Because,’” in *Philosophical Analysis: A Collection of Essays*, ed. Max Black (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1950), 328.

8. The Structure of Desire and Recognition

1. This way of putting things, in terms of commitments rather than desires, is discussed and justified later.

2. This comparison is developed further in “Holism and Idealism in Hegel’s *Phenomenology*,” chapter 6 of *Tales of the Mighty Dead*.

3. Daniel C. Dennett, “Intentional Systems,” reprinted in *Mind Design*, ed. John Haugeland (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981).

4. Hegel makes claims along these lines in his telegraphic discussion of the relation between self-consciousness and desire. One example is the summary claim that “the unity of self-consciousness with itself must become essential to self-consciousness, i.e. self-consciousness is *Desire* in general.” [PG 167] He stresses that “Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness” [PG 175]—that is, in another recognized recognizer. “The satisfaction of Desire is . . . the reflection of self-consciousness into itself, or the certainty that has become truth [that is, what things are *for* it and what things are *in* themselves coincide]. But the truth of this certainty is really a double reflection, the duplication of self-consciousness. Consciousness has for its object one which, of its own self posits its otherness or difference as a nothingness.” [PG 176] The object is the other one recognizes, who cancels the difference between it and the index consciousness in the sense that it, too, recognizes the other, thereby applying to both

the other and itself one universal expressing a respect of similarity or identity: being something things can be something for. “A self-consciousness exists only *for a self-consciousness*. Only so is it in fact a self-consciousness; for only in this way does the unity of itself in its otherness become explicit for it.” [PG 177] “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged [nur als ein Anerkanntes]. . . . The detailed exposition of the Notion of this spiritual unity in its duplication will present us with the process of Recognition [Anerkennen].” [PG 178]

5. Reflexivity is not redundant in the mathematical definition of equivalence relation because the argument depends on the relation being everywhere defined, in the sense that for every x there is *some* y such that xRy , i.e., that everyone recognizes *someone*. Given the philosophical surround, this condition can, I think, be suppressed.

6. We will see in Chapter 10 that in Hegel’s allegory, the Servant achieves a kind of awareness that is higher and more developed than that of the Master precisely by being both forced and obliged to act on desires he does not himself feel: the desires of the Master.

7. The modal logic defined by its recognitive accessibility relation is accordingly S5.

9. The Fine Structure of Autonomy and Recognition

1. “Naturalism without Representationalism,” in *Naturalism in Question*, ed. David Macarthur and Mario de Caro (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 71–88, and (with David Macarthur) “Pragmatism, Quasi-realism and the Global Challenge,” in *The New Pragmatists*, ed. Cheryl Misak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 91–120.

2. “[L]’obéissance à la loi qu’on s’est prescrite est liberté.” *Social Contract* Book I, section 8.

3. Compare “the distinction that action essentially involves” at PG 400, discussed in Chapter 11.

4. Confession: In what follows I often talk about “norms” interchangeably with “normative statuses.” Corresponding to this usage, I sometimes line up the Sellarsian distinction between ought-to-bes and ought-to-dos with that between normative statuses and normative attitudes. These usages ignore distinctions that in other contexts are of the first importance. (The normative statuses taken as paradigmatic for the regimentation here, authority and responsibility, are normative, but not norms, and differ from ought-to-bes such as that there should be no poverty.) My claim is that important structures show up if we keep to a level of generality that ignores these specific differences. The claim and commitment is that once those structures do become visible in all of their complexity, it will be

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possible to move beyond the crude assimilations that made that possible, and reintroduce more fine structure. But I do not attempt to do that in this work.

5. More on this in Chapters 11 and 12.

6. Hector-Neri Castañeda, “Indicators and Quasi-indicators,” in *The Phenomenology of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness*, ed. James G. Hart and Tomis Kapitan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), chapter 2. I discuss his *-regimentation in chapter 8 of *Making It Explicit*.

7. This is the pure social-status Queen’s shilling sense of “responsible”: doing something that (whether one knows it or not) has the social significance of entitling others to attribute a responsibility. In *Making It Explicit* I try to make it go as far as it can all on its own. Such an enterprise can seem perverse, but it is adopted with Popperian methodological malice aforethought. The idea is to explore the strongest, most easily falsifiable hypothesis, to see what explanatory work it can do, how far it will take one, before its explanatory resources are exhausted.

8. One can use modal-logical operators semantically defined on accessibility relations codifying recognitive attitudes to express how recognitive communities look from the point of view of one participant.

9. Chapter 3 of *Tales of the Mighty Dead*. An abbreviated version of this material appeared as “Hermeneutic Practice and Theories of Meaning,” *SATS—Nordic Journal of Philosophy* 5, no. 1 (2004): 5–26.

10. To keep things simpler and to make contact with some other recognizable philosophical programs, I have here used the language of theoretical postulates as hidden beneath an observable surface they are intended to explain. The discussion in Chapter 6 of the ways in which Hegel wants us to move beyond this way of thinking about theoretical entities should not be forgotten in this connection, though.

10. Allegories of Mastery

1. The discussion of *Reason* in Chapter 11 articulates the nature of intentional doings as practical acknowledgments of commitments in terms of the distinction between “Vorsatz” and “Absicht” that Hegel lays out in more detail in the *Philosophy of Right*. Understanding the *relation* between them requires attention to the *process* of determination by which the latter emerges from the former. That process is what showed up as “experience” in the *Introduction*, and as “work” in *Self-Consciousness*.

2. It is because the result of the processes considered must be specified in a normative vocabulary of authority, and responsibility, and attitudes that have those normative statuses as their objects that the reciprocal recognition model should not be thought of as a form of *sociologism* analogous to the *psychologism* that Frege criticized and Kant rejected.

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3. “The lord is the consciousness that exists for itself, but no longer merely the Notion of such a consciousness. Rather, it is a consciousness existing for itself which is mediated with itself through another consciousness, i.e. through a consciousness whose nature it is to be bound up with an existence that is independent, or thinghood in general. The lord puts himself into relation with both of these moments, to a thing as such, the object of desire, and to the consciousness for which thinghood is the essential characteristic.” [PG 190]

4. “The Spirit of Christianity,” in *Friedrich Hegel on Christianity: Early Theological Writings*, trans. T. M. Knox (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), 224–252.

11. Hegel’s Expressive Metaphysics of Agency

1. See also *PR* §109: “[T]he will is the struggle to transcend this barrier [Schranke], i.e. it is the activity of *translating* this content in some way or other from subjectivity into objectivity. The simple identity of the will with itself in this opposition is the content which remains self-identical in both these opposites and indifferent to this formal distinction of opposition.”

2. Such a line of thought depends on systematically failing to distinguish between the contentfulness of a thought and its being about something or representing a state of affairs.

3. For the moment I speak indifferently of “purpose” and “intention.” When we later look at the details of Hegel’s approach, these will need to be distinguished, corresponding to his uses of “Vorsatz” and “Absicht” in the *Philosophy of Right* (beginning at §114).

4. The word “Erfolg” (success) occurs only three times in the *Phenomenology*, never in connection with the theory of action, and of its six occurrences in *PR*, only one is an action-theoretic use (in a comment on a comment on the crucial §118), appearing under the heading “Dramatic Interest.”

5. Robert Pippin offers a nice discussion of this perspective in *Hegel’s Practical Realism: Rational Agency as Ethical Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

6. *PM* §505. See also *PR* §120. For my purposes here the difference between the right of knowledge and the right of intention does not matter.

7. *PR* §118Z. I later claim that this “contraction strategy” is something that is to be overcome eventually, and replaced by an “expansion strategy,” which reinstates the heroic (now *edelmütig*) sense of responsibility, but with an expanded subject of responsibility. That is why the discussion in the *Philosophy of Right* is explicitly flagged in §117 (and especially its *Zusatz*) as pertaining to *finite* action. The final story, retailed at the end of the Conclusion of this book, is about action conceived under the speculative category of *infinity*.

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8. The passage from *Philosophy of Right* just quoted continues, laying out the general outlines of the claims that must be interpreted to make sense of the *Vorsatz/Absicht* distinction, connecting it with the further notions of welfare (*das Wohl*) and the good (*das Gute*):

(b) The particular aspect of the action is its inner content (α) as I am aware of it in its general character; my awareness of this general character constitutes the worth of the action and the reason I think good to do it—in short my Intention.

(β) Its content is my special aim, the aim of my particular, merely individual, existence, i.e. Welfare.

(c) This content (as something which is inward and which yet at the same time is raised to its universality as to absolute objectivity) is the absolute end of the will, the Good—with the opposition in the sphere of reflection, of subjective universality, which is now wickedness and now conscience. [PR §114]

9. “Actions, Reasons, and Causes,” reprinted in *Essays on Actions and Events* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001). Michael Quante offers an extended comparison between Davidson and Hegel on this point in *Hegel’s Concept of Action* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

10. “[W]e ought to will something great. But we must also be able to achieve it, otherwise the willing is nugatory. The laurels of mere willing are dry leaves that never were green.” [PR 124Z]

11. Very much the same language is used at PG 642:

Action, in virtue of the antithesis it essentially contains, is related to a negative of consciousness, to a reality possessing intrinsic being. Contrasted with the simplicity of pure consciousness, with the absolute other or implicit manifoldness, this reality is a plurality of circumstances which breaks up and spreads out endlessly in all directions, backwards into their conditions, sideways into their connections, forwards in their consequences.

12. For instance:

This unity is the true work; it is the *Sache selbst* which completely holds its own and is experienced as that which endures, independently of what is merely the contingent result of an individual action, the result of contingent circumstances, means, and reality. [PG 409]

13. See for instance PG 409: “This unity is the true work; it is the *Sache selbst*” and PG 410:

The *Sache selbst* is only opposed to these moments in so far as they are supposed to be isolated, but as an interfusion of the reality and the individuality it is essentially their unity. It is equally an action and, qua action, pure action in general, hence just as much an action of this particular individual; and this action as still his in antithesis to reality, is a purpose. Equally, it is the transition from this determinateness into the opposite, and, lastly, it is a reality which is explicitly

present for consciousness. The *Sache selbst* thus expresses the spiritual essentiality in which all these moments have lost all validity of their own, and are valid therefore only as universal, and in which the certainty consciousness has of itself is an objective entity, an objective fact for it, an object born of self-consciousness as its own, without ceasing to be a free object in the proper sense.

14. Though I have thus far used the terms ‘specification’ and ‘description’ loosely, I mean ‘specification’ to be the broader category, including both descriptions and demonstrative and indexical expressions.

15. For one example put forward in the context of elaborating his theory of action, see *PR* §115Z.

16. Hegel says of the hylomorphic identity of content through changing forms in different phases of action:

Action is present at first . . . as End, and hence opposed to a reality already given. The second moment is the movement of the End . . . hence the idea of the transition itself, or means. The third moment is . . . the object, which is no longer in the form of an End directly known by the agent to be his own, but as brought out into the light of day and having for him the form of an “other.” The Notion of this sphere requires that these various aspects be grasped in such a way that the content in them remains the same without any distinction, whether between individuality and being in general, or between End as against individuality as an original nature, or between End and the given reality; or between the means and that reality as an absolute End, or between the reality brought about by the agent as against the End, or the original nature, or the means. [*PG* 400]

17. Forster, *Hegel’s Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). See especially chapter 14.

18. See also *PG* 419, which talks about the “positive meaning” of “the originally determinate nature of the individual” as “being in itself the element and purpose of its activity.”

12. Recollection, Representation, and Agency

1. John Searle, *Intentionality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 2.

2. Only “largely” because on his account the customary senses of expressions become their referents, when the expressions occur in the context of indirect discourse.

3. Gottlob Frege, “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry,” *Mind*, n.s., 65, no. 259 (July 1956): 289–311.

4. T. S. Eliot, *The Sacred Wood and Major Early Essays* (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1997), 28.

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5. T. S. Eliot, *The Complete Poems and Plays 1909–1950* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950).

6. There are subtleties arising from the extension of this account of looks-talk from first-person uses to third-person attributions, and the subsequent possibility of first-person uses of third-person forms in self-attributions, but they can safely be ignored here. See the discussion in my Study Guide to Sellars's *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*.

7. By way of analogy, one might think of the Dummettian claim that semantic theories must take account both of the *circumstances* of appropriate application of concepts and of their appropriate *consequences* of application, modeled on introduction and elimination rules for logical connectives. Semantic theories that look only upstream, to the circumstances of application—such as assertibilist, reliabilist, or informationalist ones—cannot be right because concepts can have the *same* circumstances of application and *different* consequences of application. Semantic theories that look only downstream, to the consequences of application—such as classical pragmatist ones—cannot be right because concepts can have the same consequences of application and different circumstances of application. Theories that collapse the two elements, representing content by truth conditions, which are required to be both individually necessary and jointly sufficient, miss the substantive and potentially controversial material inferential commitment implicit in the use of any concept: the commitment, namely, to the propriety of the material inference from the circumstances of appropriate application to the appropriate consequences of such application. (Dummett introduces this thought in *Frege's Philosophy of Language* [New York: Harper & Row, 1973], 453–455. I elaborate the argument in chapter 2 of *Making It Explicit* and chapter 1 of *Articulating Reasons*). The dynamic structure relating the prospective and retrospective perspectives (and so the two semantic dimensions of sense and reference) in the Hegelian theory rehearsed in this chapter is *much* more intricate and articulated than that relating circumstances and consequences of application.

13. The History of Normative Structures

1. Robert Pippin has argued this at length in *Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian Variations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

2. This is an oversimplification. In many places Hegel attributes more gross structure to history. For instance, in *PR* §§353–360 he identifies *four* stages in world history, putting the Oriental before the Greek, and interposing the Roman between the Greek and the modern (Nordic or German). I think there is a point to his practice in the *Phenomenology* of ignoring the first and treating the Roman as part of the extended transition to modernity.

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3. As Hegel says of the alienated, modern stage: “Destiny is alien to this Spirit.” [PG 492]

4. The Antigone passage is from lines 454–457 of *The Complete Greek Tragedies: Sophocles I*, vol. 8, trans. David Grene and Robert Fitzgerald, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), which Elizabeth Wycoff renders as

the gods’ unwritten and unfailing laws.
Not now, nor yesterday’s, they always live,
and no one knows their origin in time.

Hegel mentions this passage again in *PR* §144H in the third paragraph of his introduction to *Sittlichkeit*: “Antigone proclaims that no-one knows where the laws come from: they are eternal. That is, their determination has being in and for itself and issues from the nature of the thing [Sache].”

5. Does Hegel think that all premodern societies are characterized by reciprocal recognition? Not at all—as his remarks elsewhere about traditional Indian and Chinese societies show. Thus at the end of the *Philosophy of Right* he puts “Oriental world-historical realm,” which “originates in the natural whole of patriarchal society,” as a stage more primitive than the epoch epitomized by the Greeks. But he *does* seem to think that the sort of incompatible norms whose practical obtrusiveness triggers the transition to modernity arise only in this sort of recognitive context.

6. “A *natural* ethical community—this is the Family.” [PG 450]

7. “[C]haracter . . . that ethical consciousness . . . which, on account of its immediacy, is a specifically determined Spirit, belongs only to one of the ethical essentialities.” [PG 597]

8. F. H. Bradley summed up this view in the title of his essay “My Station and Its Duties,” in his book *Ethical Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1876).

9. “Der sich entfremdete Geist,” from the title of chapter 6B. Alienation, like *Sittlichkeit*, is not a psychological attitude of individuals (though it can be reflected there), but a structure the whole of Spirit exhibits.

14. Alienation and Language

1. Thus, “by means of the self as soul of the process, substance is so moulded and developed in its moments that one opposite stirs the other into life, each by its alienation from the other gives it an existence and equally receives from it an existence of its own.” [PG 491]

2. Leibniz talks about us as creatures who can say *moi*, but he doesn’t worry about the contribution that the *indexicality* of those sayings is making to the constitution of selves.

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3. Hegel has surely correctly diagnosed here a perennial strategy on the part of the representatives of Wealth: to accuse the agents exercising State Power of doing so not on behalf of the public welfare, but of their private bureaucratic interests.

4. The terminology is due to Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in *Four Essays on Liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 168–216.

5. Hegel introduces Enlightenment utilitarianism in this passage:

Enlightenment completes the alienation of Spirit in this realm, too, in which that Spirit takes refuge and where it is conscious of an unruffled peace. It upsets the housekeeping of Spirit in the household of Faith by bringing into that household the tools and utensils of this world, a world which that Spirit cannot deny is its own, because its consciousness likewise belongs to it. In this negative activity pure insight at the same time realizes itself, and produces its own object, the unknowable absolute Being and the principle of utility. [PG 486]

15. *Edelmütigkeit* and *Niederträchtigkeit*

1. The corresponding discussion in the *Philosophy of Right* is the following:

Since the subjective satisfaction of the individual himself (including the recognition which he receives by way of honour and fame) is also part and parcel of the achievement of ends of absolute worth, it follows that the demand that such an end alone shall appear as willed and attained, like the view that, in willing, objective and subjective ends are mutually exclusive, is an empty dogmatism of the abstract Understanding. And this dogmatism is more than empty, it is pernicious if it passes into the assertion that because subjective satisfaction is present, as it always is when any task is brought to completion, it is what the agent intended in essence to secure and that the objective end was in his eyes only a means to that. What the subject is, is the *series* of his actions. If these are a series of worthless productions, then the subjectivity of his willing is just as worthless.

But if the series of his deeds is of a substantive nature, then the same is true also of the individual’s inner will. . . .

Z: . . . Now this principle of particularity is, to be sure, one moment of the antithesis, and in the first place at least it is just as much identical with the universal as distinct from it. Abstract reflection, however, fixes this moment in its distinction from and opposition to the universal and so produces a view of morality as nothing but a bitter, unending, struggle against self-satisfaction, as the command: “Do with abhorrence what duty enjoins.” It is just this type of ratiocination which adduces that familiar psychological view of history which understands how to belittle and disparage all great deeds and great men by transforming into the main intention and operative motive of actions the inclinations and passions which likewise found their satisfaction from the achievement of something substantive, the fame and honour, &c., consequen-

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tial on such actions, in a word their particular aspect, the aspect which it has decreed in advance to be something in itself pernicious. Such ratiocination assures us that, while great actions and the efficiency which has subsisted through a series of them have produced greatness in the world and have had as their consequences for the individual agent power, honour, and fame, still what belongs to the individual is not the greatness itself but what has accrued to him from it, this purely particular and external result; because this result is a consequence, it is therefore supposed to have been the agent's end and even his sole end. Reflection of this sort stops short at the subjective side of great men, since it itself stands on purely subjective ground, and consequently it overlooks what is substantive in this emptiness of its own making. This is the view of those valet psychologists "for whom there are no heroes, not because there are no heroes, but because these psychologists are only valets." [PR §124]

2. Gilbert Harman, *The Nature of Morality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).

3. Saul Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).

4. Volume 3, p. 545, in the Haldane and Simpson translation of 1896 (repr., Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983).

5. *Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, published in English as *Reason in History*, trans. Robert S. Hartmann (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953), 13.

16. Confession and Forgiveness, Recollection and Trust

1. New specifications of the doing in terms of its consequences continue to unroll as time goes on:

Action, in virtue of the antithesis it essentially contains, is related to a negative of consciousness, to a reality possessing intrinsic being. Contrasted with the simplicity of pure consciousness, with the absolute other or implicit manifoldness, this reality is a plurality of circumstances which breaks up and spreads out endlessly in all directions, backwards into their conditions, sideways into their connections, forwards in their consequences. [PG 642]

2. I have altered the translation here. Miller has this as "over its specific Notion of itself" (emphasis added), reading "its concept" (or "his concept"), "seinem (bestimmten) Begriff," as a concept of the forgiving judge in the sense of having him as its object, rather than its subject—that is, as an objective, rather than a subjective genitive.

3. Matthew 6:9–13. A variant is at Luke 11:2–4.

4. *Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, published in English as *Reason in History*, trans. Robert S. Hartmann (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953), 13.

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5. Introduction to *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, 23.
6. *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, vol. 3, trans. E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1983), 552–553.

Conclusion

1. Saul Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).
2. Here is how Wittgenstein introduces the analogy:

[A]sk yourself whether our language is complete;—whether it was so before the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus were incorporated in it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs of our language. (And how many houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be a town?) Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses. [PI §18]

3. *PI* II XI, p. 225.
4. Granted, “rational normative bindingness” and “conceptual content” are not Wittgensteinian phrases: not ones he uses, or even would approve the use of. In particular, he might well object to the adjective “rational” in this context. Nonetheless, the principal points he is making can be put in these terms, and doing so helps to bring them into conversation with Hegel’s treatment of cognate issues.
5. “A Semantical Solution to the Mind-Body Problem,” in *Pure Pragmatics and Possible Worlds*, ed. Jeffrey Sicha (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing, 1980), 152.
6. As an actual example, consider *Smith v. United States*:

Federal law in the United States requires that a person who “during and in relation to . . . [a] drug trafficking crime uses . . . a firearm” be punished more severely than a person who traffics drugs without using a firearm. *Smith* questioned the application of this law to cases in which firearms are traded for drugs, and are not used for protection or aggression. The question here arises because of the indeterminacy of the phrase “uses . . . a firearm” in the context of the law: does the phrase apply to any possible use, including barter, or does it only apply to standard uses such as protecting and threatening?

“A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination: The Normative Fine Structure of the Judge’s Chain Novel,” in *Pragmatism, Law, and Language*, ed. Graham Hubbs and Douglas Lind (New York: Routledge, 2014), 7.

7. I discuss this particular case at greater length in “A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination,” in Hubbs and Lind, *Pragmatism, Law, and Language*, 19–39.

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8. “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry,” *Mind*, n.s., 65, no. 259 (July 1956): 289–311.

9. In a sense Hegel develops from J. G. Herder’s: “The mere narrator is an analyst, a writer of memoirs, of newspapers; the reasoner about the individual narration is a historical rationalizer; but the man who orders many occurrences into a plan, into a vision—he is . . . the true historical artist . . . he is the creator of a *history*.” “Older Critical Forestlets,” in *Herder: Philosophical Writings*, ed. Michael N. Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 260.

10. T. S. Eliot, “Little Gidding,” V.

11. The first paragraph of Henry James’s “The Beast in the Jungle” offers a paradigm of such backward anaphora.

12. Introduction to *Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, published in English as *Reason in History*, trans. Robert S. Hartmann (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953), 13; Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Werke in 20 Bänden mit Registerband*, vol. 12, 14th ed. (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986), 23.

13. “Holism and Idealism in Hegel’s *Phenomenology*,” in *Tales of the Mighty Dead*, 178–209.

14. The passage continues: “Reason is, therefore, misunderstood when reflection is excluded from the True, and is not grasped as a positive moment of the Absolute. It is reflection that makes the True a result, but it is equally reflection that overcomes the antithesis between the process of its becoming and the result, for this becoming is also simple, and therefore not different from the form of the True which shows itself as simple in its result; the process of becoming is rather just this return into simplicity.” [PG 21]

15. For instance, in the passage from PG 33 quoted earlier, and in PG 47, where the two levels of concepts and commitments are explicitly cited as parallel: “[T]he single shapes of Spirit do not persist any more than determinate thoughts do.”

16. Two further representative passages are these:

There are two aspects possessed by the practical consciousness, intention and deed (what is “meant” or intended by the deed and the deed itself). [PG 319]

[T]hough any alteration as such, which is set on foot by the subjects’ action, is its deed [Tat], still the subject does not for that reason recognize it as its action [Handlung], but only admits as its own that existence in the deed which lay in its knowledge and will, which was its purpose. Only for that does it hold itself responsible. [PM 272]

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